











Remote Controlled Restraint 
 






















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 























































Remote Controlled Restraint: 




How do technologies that remove warfighters from the front lines affect the frequency and 
intensity of military confrontations between states? Many scholars and policymakers fear that 
weapons that reduce the risks and costs of war – in blood and treasure – will lead states to resort 
to force more frequently during crises, destabilizing the international security environment. These 
concerns have featured prominently in debates surrounding the proliferation and use of remote 
warfighting technologies, such as drones. This project sets out to evaluate whether and how drones 
affect crisis escalation. Specifically, do drones allow decisionmakers to deploy military forces 
more frequently during interstate crises? Once deployed, how do these systems affect escalation 
dynamics? I argue that drones can help control escalation, raising questions about scholarly 
theories that suggest the world is more dangerous and less stable when technology makes conflict 
cheaper and less risky.  
At the core of this project is a theory of technology-enabled escalation control. The central 
argument is that technologies like drones that remove friendly forces from the battlefield may lead 
states to use force more frequently, but decrease the likelihood of escalation when used in lieu of 
inhabited platforms. More specifically, these technologies lower the political barriers to initiating 
military operations during crises, primarily by eliminating the risk of friendly force casualties and 
the associated domestic political consequences for launching military operations. At the same time, 
removing personnel from harm’s way may reduce demand for escalatory reprisals after remotely 
operated systems are lost to hostile action. Drones can also help to mitigate escalatory spirals by 
collecting intelligence that overcomes information asymmetries that often contribute to armed 
conflict, helping facilitate more measured decision-making and tailored targeting of enemy forces. 
By more fully considering how technology affects escalatory dynamics after the initial use of force, 
technology-enabled escalation control theory advances our understanding of the link between 
technology and conflict. 
I test the theory using a multi-method approach that combines case studies with original 
experiments embedded in surveys fielded on public and military samples. The dissertation also 
introduces a new research method for international relations research: experimental manipulations 
embedded in wargames with military participants. 
In Chapter 1 and 2, I define the concept of crisis escalation and review the literature that 
examines the effect of technology on escalation and conflict dynamics. I then introduce the theory 
of technology-enabled escalation control and outline four mechanisms that undergird the theory – 
increased initiation, tempered/tailored targeting, restrained retaliation, and amplified aggression. 
Each of these hypothesized mechanisms describes ways in which emerging technologies can 
prevent crises from escalating into broader or more intense conflicts. 
Chapter 3 describes each component of the multi-method research design that I use to test 
the theory in Chapters 4 through 7. Chapter 4 uses experiments embedded in surveys and wargames 
to assess whether and how drones allow states to more frequently initiate military operations. 
Chapter 5 tests whether drones enable decisionmakers to control escalation by restraining 
retaliation after attacks on a state’s drones. Chapter 6 and 7 test the theory in the context of U.S 
drone use during the Cold War and Israeli drone use from the 1960s through late-2010s. The 
findings of these empirical tests provide strong support for technology-enabled escalation control. 
In Chapter 8, I conclude with a summary of the analysis and test the generalizability of the 
theory beyond the state use of drones. I find that tenets of technology-enabled escalation control 
explain escalation dynamics associated with U.S. cyber operations against North Korea and 
Hezbollah’s use of drones against Israel and during the Syrian Civil War. The chapter also maps 
out pathways for future research and identifies policy implications. My findings suggest the 
growing proliferation of drones will increase the frequency of military confrontations during 
crises, yet these confrontations are unlikely to escalate. Even though drones may help control 
escalation, clearer doctrine, rules of engagement, and international agreements to govern their use 
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At the same time man found airplanes could be a military weapon he discovered that pilots were the costliest 
ingredient of the weapon. In our way of life, aircraft are expendable; human life is not. So man dreamed of 
removing the pilot from the weapon. 
 




In October 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian drone that had strayed into Turkish airspace. 
Russia virtually ignored the loss of the drone – Moscow publicly denied losing any aircraft and 
took no observable retaliatory measures.2 In stark contrast, Russia escalated significantly after 
Turkey downed a manned attack jet just one month later, leading to the death of a Russian pilot. 
In response, Russian forces bombarded Turkish-backed rebels in Syria, launched airstrikes on a 
Turkish supply convoy, and deployed warships armed with long-range air defense systems to the 
Mediterranean.3 On the diplomatic front, President Putin took steps to halt Russian tourism to 
                                                        
1 3205th Drone Group History, 31 March 1954 (Secret); Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, 
Alabama, 1. 
2 Orhan Coskun, “Turkey Shoots down Drone near Syria, U.S. Suspects Russian Origin,” Reuters, October 16, 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-warplane/turkey-says-its-warplanes-shot-down-
unidentified-aircraft-near-syria-idUSKCN0SA15K20151016. This dissertation uses the more widely used term 
“drone” to refer to remotely piloted aircraft.  
3 Victoria Richards, “Russia Deploys Warship to Mediterranean to Destroy ‘any Target’ after Plane Shot down by 
Turkey,” The Independent, November 25, 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russia-
deploys-missile-cruiser-in-mediterranean-to-destroy-any-target-after-plane-shot-down-by-a6747721.html; “Russia 
Bombards Syrian Rebels near Site of Downed Russian Jet,” Reuters, November 25, 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-latakia/russia-bombards-syrian-rebels-near-site-of-downed-
russian-jet-idUSKBN0TE1FN20151125; Natasha Bertrand, “Russia Is Already Exacting Its Revenge on Turkey for 
Downing a Russian Warplane,” Business Insider, November 26, 2015, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-
turkey-downed-jet-2015-11. 
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Turkey, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov cancelled a planned trip to Ankara, and the Russian 
government announced sanctions and ratcheted up anti-Turkish rhetoric.4  
Russia was not the first state to demonstrate starkly divergent responses to attacks on 
manned and unmanned assets. Over the course of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and China 
downed dozens of U.S. military aircraft – both manned and unmanned – outside of combat zones.5 
Some were attacked in international airspace, while others had deliberately or unintentionally 
strayed into the airspace of Communist states. When drones were involved, the United States 
generally refused to acknowledge their loss, even after rivals paraded the wreckage through 
national capitals.6 However, when manned assets were lost, Washington frequently took escalatory 
measures. In most instances, “escalation” was limited to strongly worded diplomatic 
communiqués.  In more drastic cases, like the large-scale U.S. mobilization that followed North 
Korea’s 1969 downing of a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane, the threat of military action was real. 
More recently, China and Iran have intercepted and seized U.S.-operated drones, and Pakistan has 
shot down Iranian drones that penetrated into its airspace — incidents that did not result in any 
significant escalation.7 Confrontations like these have the potential to become increasingly 
                                                        
4 “Russia Plans Sanctions against Turkey,” BBC News, November 26, 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-34933608; “Russia Places Sanctions on Turkey,” The New York Times, November 28, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/world/europe/russia-places-sanctions-on-turkey.html; “Missing Russian Pilot 
‘Alive and Well,’” BBC News, November 25, 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34917485. 
5 Larry Tart and Robert Keefe, The Price of Vigilance (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001); William E. Burrows, By 
Any Means Necessary: America’s Secret Air War in the Cold War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). 
6 William Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones (Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1982), 78. 
7 Scott Shane and David E. Sanger, “Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Bid,” The New York Times, 
December 7, 2011, sec. Middle East, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/drone-crash-in-iran-
reveals-secret-us-surveillance-bid.html; Jane Perlez and Matthew Rosenberg, “China Agrees to Return Seized Drone, 
Ending Standoff, Pentagon Says,” The New York Times, December 17, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/17/world/asia/china-us-drone.html; Naveed Siddiqui, “Iranian Drone Shot down by 
PAF, Confirms FO,” The Dawn, June 21, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1340897. 
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common as drones proliferate to military arsenals around the world, but there is little consensus in 
existing scholarly and policy work on whether and how drones shape escalatory dynamics in 
confrontations where they are used. Indeed, much of our current understanding of escalation 
focuses on the risk of conventional conflicts escalating across the nuclear threshold, sidelining 
important questions about the effect of other technologies on escalation.8 
This project sets out to explain how drones affect crisis escalation. What explains the 
radically different responses to the loss of drones and manned military platforms? To this end, I 
engage several questions. Do drones increase or decrease the likelihood and intensity of military 
confrontations? What underlying mechanisms drive these effects? More broadly, do new 
technological innovations in warfighting affect decision-making on escalation among civilian 
elites, military leaders, and the general public? How might these effects factor into broader military 
and political strategies? What implications can be drawn, and what kinds of new questions 
generated for scholarly debates on military innovation, crisis bargaining, and the initiation and 
escalation of the use of force? Last but not least, how can a better understanding of these dynamics 
help to inform policy on remote warfighting, drone proliferation, and modern warfare.  
This chapter proceeds in six parts. First, it draws from scholarly and policy literatures to 
define the project’s dependent variable, crisis escalation. Second, I define drones, describe their 
characteristics that make them unique from inhabited – traditionally manned – platforms, and 
explain how they can enable states to carry out military operations with less risk to friendly 
personnel and lower costs than manned assets. Third, I introduce the dissertation’s central theory: 
technology-enabled escalation control. I describe how when used as a substitute for manned assets 
                                                        
8 For example, see Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1965); 
Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Barry Posen, 
Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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during crises, drones increase the frequency with which states launch military operations during 
crises, but can prevent these operations from spiraling into broader conflicts. I also outline the 
theory’s scope conditions. Fourth, I describe the project’s multi-method research design, which 
combines case studies with experiments embedded in surveys and in military wargames. Fifth, I 
briefly summarize the empirical findings. I then provide an overview of the project’s scholarly and 
policy contributions.  
CONCEPTUALIZING CRISIS ESCALATION AND ESCALATION CONTROL 
Before proceeding, I define project’s dependent variable: crisis escalation. At its most 
fundamental level, escalation is an increase in the intensity or scope of a conflict between two 
actors.9 Herman Kahn, one of the first scholars to contemplate the nature of escalation, 
characterized it as a hypothetical 44-rung ladder.10 An actor can climb this ladder – from “political 
gestures” to interstate war and beyond – in several ways: by increasing the intensity of actions vis-
à-vis a rival (vertical escalation), by broadening the affected geographic area (horizontal 
escalation), or by simultaneously intensifying and broadening a crisis. According to Thomas 
Schelling, each of these actions represents a crossing of a threshold, “dividing lines” that 
“distinguish new activity from more of the same activity.”11 The crossing of multiple thresholds 
can lead a localized crisis to escalate into a broader, more intense, and potentially more 
destabilizing general conflict.   
                                                        
9 Forrest E. Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2008), 8. Escalation often includes more than two actors, but I treat it here as a dyadic process to 
more clearly identify the effects of technology on escalatory dynamics. 
10 Kahn, On Escalation, 3–5. 
11 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 135. 
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Escalation is therefore a context dependent, action-reaction process. One actor’s escalation 
triggers potential counter-reaction by a rival.12 Whether and how the rival responds dictates 
whether the crisis subsequently escalates, remains at its current intensity, or deescalates. An actor’s 
decision on the appropriate counter-reaction depends largely on its interpretation of what 
thresholds were crossed by the other actor’s escalation.13 For instance, an intentional action may 
be seen as a more significant affront than an accidental one and elicit a more escalatory response.14 
The use of some weapons may be seen as crossing a higher escalatory threshold – even if they 
generate equivalent battlefield effects – and trigger a more significant response.15 Attacks on some 
targets may be interpreted as crossing more thresholds than others, generating more intense 
retaliation. 
Because decisions on escalation are shaped by an actor’s interpretation of a rival’s actions, 
escalation inherently involves a psychological dimension. An individual’s perceptions about a 
rival’s motives or intent, for instance, can be colored by a variety of factors such as the individual’s 
background, emotional response, or institutional position. Since individual perceptions vary, so 
will decisions on escalation. Some individuals, for instance, might be more prone to support 
escalatory moves than others.  This subjectivity of perceptions also makes room for misperceptions 
that can lead to inadvertent or unintended escalation.16 For instance, a decisionmaker might 
                                                        
12 Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, 36; Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds, 11. 
13 Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, chap. 2. The timing of events also matters. The same type of event at different 
times may be perceived differently. For instance a fighter jet’s penetration into a rival’s airspace may be considered 
more escalatory during a crisis than during periods of peace. 
14 Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation. 
15 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” 
International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 433–68. 
16 On misperception see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press, 1976) and Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and 
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misinterpret a rival’s accidental action as deliberate and launch a significant escalatory response. 
In turn, decisionmakers in the rival state then need to decide if and how to respond. What military 
or political objective will a reaction achieve? And, how might the other actor respond?17 Predicting 
the other actor’s reaction is difficult, and even tactical moves can have far-reaching strategic 
consequences during crises. 
This dissertation examines escalation during crises – situations where a change in the type 
and intensity of interaction between two or more states heightens the probability of military 
hostilities and destabilizes interstate relations.18 By the time a crisis has erupted actors have already 
ascended rungs on the escalation ladder. Indeed, Herman Kahn describes “ostensible crisis” as the 
first rung, “political, economic, and diplomatic gestures” as his second rung, and “solemn and 
formal declarations” as the third rung.19 I focus on crises for several reasons. First, given the 
heightened tension during crises, decisionmakers may find themselves in a position to deploy 
military forces against a rival. Leaders may launch missions to collect intelligence on a rival or 
consider launching armed strikes. At the same time, their rivals may also be more prone to use 
force, potentially triggering confrontations between forces and further escalation. Second, acts of 
escalation are often more directly observable than those that occur once large-scale armed 
hostilities have erupted. This can make it easier to map the cause and effects of escalation. 
I consider escalation to be controlled when crisis behavior remains at low-rungs on the 
hypothetical ladder. To be clear, escalation control does not require a complete absence of armed 
                                                        
Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014). On 
inadvertent escalation see Posen, Inadvertent Escalation. 
17 Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, 3–5. 
18 Michael Brecher, Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality (Oxford: Pergamon, 1993), 3. 
19 Kahn, On Escalation, 39. 
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conflict. Indeed, two actors might frequently engage in low-scale skirmishes, but these types of 
interactions generally involve far lower costs in blood and treasure than a more escalatory large-
scale war. In general, escalation control during crises means actions fall below the threshold of 
sustained armed conflict and are geographically localized. For instance, I consider escalation to be 
controlled when an isolated armed clash between two actors ends (or perhaps continues) without 
triggering broader military action. In most cases, this is a deliberate decision of decisionmakers 
who chose not to escalate, because the risks of escalating are too great or not worth the issues at 
stake. Past studies have defined escalation control similarly.20 Herman Kahn viewed escalation 
control as keeping activity at lower rungs on the ladder.21 More recently, Austin Carson has argued 
that states can maintain relatively peaceful relations and avoid direct confrontations, even while 
engaging in limited, covert military activity against each other.22 This notion of escalation control 
is not just theoretical – similar conceptions appear in the defense policies of states around the 
world. United States military doctrine, for instance, describes steady state operations as, “a stable 
condition…characterized by shaping operations and activities at a relatively low level of intensity, 
urgency, and commitment of military forces.”23 Similarly, Israel’s current defense strategy focuses 
on controlling escalation and extending the duration of “campaigns between wars” – the low 
intensity conflicts that take place between major combat operations.24 
                                                        
20 Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, chap. 3. 
21 Kahn, On Escalation, 3–9. 
22 Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2018). 
23 U.S. Air Force, “Steady-State Operations,” in Air Force Basic Doctrine, vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis 
E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 2015). 
24 Deterring Terror: English Translation of the Official Strategy of the Israel Defense Forces (Cambridge, MA: Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, 2016), https://www.belfercenter.org/israel-defense-forces-strategy-
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 To be sure, controlling escalation can be challenging, in part because of the subjective 
nature of escalation thresholds defined above.25 Decisionmakers may misinterpret their rival’s 
actions or launch actions that their rival’s view as more escalatory than intended, triggering spirals 
of inadvertent escalation.26 Decisionmakers may also face pressure from domestic actors including 
nationalistic domestic constituents or bureaucratic interest groups to take aggressive and escalatory 
actions, potentially pushing them or providing the political support to escalate crises into broader 
conflicts.27   New technologies may create new thresholds and allow actors to carry out actions 
that may be perceived as falling at lower thresholds because they involve less risk to friendly 
personnel and less costly systems. In the subsequent chapters, I explore whether and how drones 
provide policymakers and military commanders with a tool to control escalation during crises. I 
also highlight cases in which crises might escalate – due to misperceptions or accidents – even 
when drones are involved. 
I treat escalation and escalation control as a dyadic phenomenon. This is a simplification 
of actual escalation dynamics as decisions on the use of force routinely occur in a far more 
complicated context. Crises often include more than two actors; states can constrain the crisis 
behavior of their allies; and patron states can deter escalation by third parties against their clients. 
While additional state and non-state actors can play a major role in shaping whether and how 
                                                        
document; Interview with Brigadier General, Former Director of IDF Strategic Planning Division, Tel Aviv, Israel. 
31 August 2016. 
25 Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds, 12. 
26 Morgan et al., 23–26. 
27 John E. Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” The American Political Science Review 64, no. 
1 (March 1970): 18–34; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 
1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); Lars-Erik Cederman, T. Camber Warren, and Didier Sornette, 
“Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War,” International Organization 65, no. 
4 (October 2011): 605–38. 
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escalation dynamics unfold, focusing on dyadic relationships allows me to concentrate my analysis 
on the effect of specific warfighting technologies on escalation dynamics, rather than other 
political or geographic factors.  
Although escalation thresholds are context dependent, scholars have developed a set of 
measures that categorize actions along ordinal scales of intensity that range from non-militarized 
actions like diplomatic demarches to high-intensity combat during interstate war.28 I draw from 
these ordinal scales to assess when and how much escalation occurs in the empirical chapters. 
While these measures do not capture case-specific nuances, they allow for standardized 
comparison across multiple cases and allow me to align my findings with existing research on 
crisis and conflict escalation. 
DRONES: EXPANDING THE MENU OF MILITARY OPTIONS 
 Understanding the effects of drones on crisis escalation dynamics is increasingly important 
as remotely operated weapons proliferate to militaries around the world. The United States uses 
armed drones to target suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen.29 China flies drones over 
contested islands in the East China Sea.30 Nigeria deploys drones against Boko Haram.31 And, 
                                                        
28 Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, 
Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2 (September 1, 1996): 163–
213. 
29 Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
30 “Japan Scrambles Jets over China Drone Flight near Disputed Islets,” Reuters, May 19, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-drone/japan-protests-to-china-over-drone-flight-near-disputed-islets-
idUSKCN18E1Q9. 
31 Jeremy Page and Paul Sonne, “Unable to Buy U.S. Military Drones, Allies Place Orders With China,” Wall Street 
Journal, July 17, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/unable-to-buy-u-s-military-drones-allies-place-orders-with-
china-1500301716. 
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Pakistan has shot down an Indian reconnaissance drone in Kashmir.32 Despite their proliferation, 
the effect of drones on escalation dynamics has yet to be fully theorized or empirically explored.33 
Existing studies tend to focus on either the moral implications of using “unmanned” weapons or 
the role drones play in overcoming political barriers to initiating military operations, without 
focusing on subsequent uses of force.34 This focus on conflict onset sidelines important questions 
about how drones shape broader escalation dynamics.  
This project focuses specifically on military drones, a technology that allows actors to 
generate battlefield effects, but without requiring friendly personnel on the physical battlefield.35 
Modern drones like the MQ-9 Reaper can both collect intelligence and launch airstrikes against 
rival leaders and infrastructure in distant combat zones, all while being piloted by operators located 
thousands of miles from the front lines and out of harm’s way.36 To be sure, militaries and 
engineers throughout history have worked to reduce the risk to military personnel associated with 
combat by increasing the distance between friendly troops and their adversaries. Arrows and 
swords supplanted clubs. These gave way to artillery, muskets, and rifles, which were eventually 
                                                        
32 “India Denies Losing a Surveillance Device on the LoC,” Daily Mail (India), July 15, 2015, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3162926/India-shoots-Pakistan-s-spy-drone-claim-
Military-deny-losing-surveillance-device-LoC-say-object-small-drone.html. 
33 For one recent exception see, Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from 
Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation,” International Security 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 7–42. 
34 John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, Drone Warfare (Cambridge: Polity, 2014); Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone 
(New York: The New Press, 2015). 
35 I use the term friendly personnel to describe military personnel associated with the side conducting drone operations. 
Some scholars believe that drones redefine battlefields and expand them well beyond areas where active hostilities 
are occurring. Unlike these studies that insightfully ask whether facilities such as drone bases in the United States are 
extensions of the battlefield, I use the term “battlefield” in the more traditional sense. See Chamayou, A Theory of the 
Drone; Hugh Gusterson, Drone: Remote Control Warfare (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2016). 
36 “MQ-9 Reaper Fact Sheet” (U.S. Air Force, September 23, 2015), 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx. 
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supplemented and replaced by aircraft and missiles. Drones represent a further step in this 
evolution, but are unique in several ways. First, drones can generally be launched without the 
presence of any friendly forces in a conflict zone. This significantly reduces the potential human 
cost to a state carrying out military operations.37 Second, many modern drones are capable of 
carrying out multiple phases of military operations. For instance, a single armed drone can locate 
a target, track it, and then attack it, reducing the number of assets needed to carry out an operation. 
Despite their burgeoning use in the current era, most theories that link military technology to 
conflict onset and escalation fail to factor in the characteristics of remotely operated systems. This 
limitation is understandable, as many theories on conflict dynamics were developed during the 
Cold War, when drones and other remote warfighting technology had less prominent roles in 
military operations.  
This project focuses on situations where drones are, or may be, used in lieu of traditionally 
manned systems or troops in a substitutive manner. According to theories of policy substitution, 
decisionmakers choose from a range of interchangeable foreign policy approaches after assessing 
the costs and benefits of each option.38 In response to a rival’s hostile actions, for instance, a state 
might launch retaliatory military strikes, issue a diplomatic demarche, enact economic sanctions, 
or employ some combination of these measures. While theories of policy substitution have 
                                                        
37 A targeted state could still hold at risk a rival’s drone operators outside the conflict zone – for instance by launching 
attacks on a drone’s ground control station located in the Continental United States. Such a move, however, would 
likely be considered to be highly escalatory.  
38 Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, “International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and ‘Nice’ 
Laws,” World Politics 36, no. 3 (April 1984): 383–406; Harvey Starr, “Substitutability in Foreign Policy: 
Theoretically Central, Empirically Elusive,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (February 2000): 128–38; 
David H. Clark and William Reed, “The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution,” American Journal of 
Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 609–24. 
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traditionally been applied to explaining broader foreign policy decisions of national leaders, the 
logic applies equally well to decisions on the conduct of military operations. 
National security decisionmakers must pick the military tools that can best achieve a 
desired objective while minimizing political and operational risks, factoring in what is known 
about the operational environment where a mission will occur and levels of domestic and 
international political support. For example, after intelligence officials had located Osama bin 
Laden, President Obama and his national security team considered several options for targeting 
the Al Qaeda leader. They reportedly considered using B-2 bombers to launch airstrikes, a ground 
operation in conjunction with Pakistani forces, and a U.S. special operations forces raid. 
Ultimately, the administration settled on the special operations raid on ground that it offered a high 
likelihood of successfully eliminating bin Laden and allowing the intelligence community to 
confirm his death, with less risk of leaks and mission complications than a joint operation with 
Pakistan.39  
Each of these potential policy options falls along a continuum of military intensity, or in 
Schelling’s lexicon, different escalatory thresholds.40 Some military actions may be considered 
less aggressive and escalatory because they involve less potent uses of force – conducting a single 
precision missile strike rather than a massive area bombing campaign. Others actions might be 
seen as less hostile due to the location of forces involved. Positioning gunboats or an aircraft carrier 
off a country’s coast avoids the affront of placing troops on a rival’s territory and violating a state’s 
sovereignty. Finally, some types of military capabilities may be considered less escalatory than 
                                                        
39 Mark Bowden, The Finish: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden (New York: Grove Press, 2013), chap. 6; Robert M. 
Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 540. 
40 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 135. 
 13 
others. For instance, the use of special operations forces or troops without visible military 
identification – like Russia’s “little green men” in Crimea and Ukraine – is more concealed and 
deniable than a large-scale ground invasion. To be sure, those on the receiving end of a military 
action may perceive the action as more escalatory than decisionmakers on the sending side.41 Still, 
a continuum exists in which targeted actors view some actions as more escalatory than others. 
Strategies on the lower end of this continuum may not trigger domestic calls for further escalation 
or international criticism that generate significant global attention.42 To be sure, these thresholds 
likely vary across time and actors as escalation is a context-dependent process. Decisionmakers 
may interpret the actions of their rivals based on their past interactions or biased perceptions.43 
Under the logic of policy substitution, drones expand a decisionmaker’s set of military 
options. In some cases, drones offer an alternative to taking no action, potentially increasing the 
frequency of crisis onset. In other cases, drones may offer a less aggressive alternative to deploying 
inhabited assets or ground forces. Deploying and targeted states may perceive an asset without 
crew members onboard as a less significant infringement of sovereignty than the deployment of 
ground forces or manned aircraft. In the event of a shootdown or accident, the lack of captured or 
dead personnel makes it easier for states to simply deny or ignore a mission gone awry – mitigating 
the risk of further escalation. The Pentagon, for instance, took months to acknowledge that Syrian 
                                                        
41 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 
42 Austin Carson, “Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,” 
International Organization; Cambridge 70, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 103–31; Dan Altman, “Advancing without 
Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force,” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 58–88. 
43 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary. 
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forces had shot down a U.S. Air Force drone in 2015.44 Captured or killed crew members preclude 
this deniability, ratcheting up tensions, as the Soviet Union’s 1960 shootdown of U-2 pilot Gary 
Powers illustrates. Further, the lower unit cost of most remotely piloted aircraft compared to 
manned aircraft, makes it less financially costly to lose a drone than a manned aircraft. 
In addition to the lower human risk of drone operations, the unit cost of drones is generally 
lower than those of manned aircraft.45 For instance, the unit cost of an F-35 fighter is $115.5 
million.46 In comparison, the long-range, stealthy, and near-supersonic XQ-58 combat drone has 
an expected unit cost of  just $2 million.47 Indeed, the XQ-58 was developed as part of the U.S. 
Air Force’s Low Cost Attritable Aircraft Technology program, highlighting the U.S. government’s 
desire to develop systems that are intentionally attritable – or designed to be lost in combat.48  
While the F-35 and XQ-58 have different capabilities, they are potentially substitutable in several 
missions as both are designed to carry out a range of operations.49 To be sure, operating 
“unmanned” systems often requires hundreds of personnel and complex communication networks, 
driving up operating costs.  
                                                        
44 Brian Everstine, “Air Force: Lost Predator Was Shot down in Syria,” Air Force Times, June 29, 2015, 
https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2015/06/29/air-force-lost-predator-was-shot-down-in-
syria/. 
45 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural 
Constraints,” Security Studies 25, no. 1 (January 2016): 50–84. 
46 “Producing, Operating and Supporting a 5th Generation Fighter,” Lockheed Martin: F-35 Lightning II, n.d., 
https://www.f35.com/about/cost. 
47 William Kucinski, “The Air Force’s New Unmanned Wingmate Completes Inaugural Flight,” SAE International, 
March 20, 2019, https://www.sae.org/news/2019/03/the-air-force%E2%80%99s-new-unmanned-wingmate-
completes-inaugural-flight. 
48 “XQ-58A Valkyrie Demonstrator Completes Inaugural Flight,” Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, March 6, 2019, 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1777743/xq-58a-valkyrie-demonstrator-completes-
inaugural-flight. 
49 Although the XQ-58 was designed to operate alongside fifth-generation fighters, it could also operate independently. 
Kucinski, “The Air Force’s New Unmanned Wingmate Completes Inaugural Flight.” 
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In an effort to avoid the cost and risk of military operations and the associated escalation 
risks, states are increasingly turning to remotely operated systems instead of inhabited ones. To 
fully substitute for an inhabited system drones would ideally have the same likelihood of 
successfully completing a given mission. In some areas – such as intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance – drones have been nearly as effective as manned assets. In other areas, drone 
capabilities in stealth, payload, and maneuverability continue to improve, but have yet to establish 
parity with manned assets.50 The United States has, however, already developed drones that are 
stealthier and more maneuverable than current platforms like the slow-moving Predator and 
Reaper, which are vulnerable to enemy fire in contested airspace.51 
Decisionmakers are therefore often forced to wrestle the tradeoff between risk reduction, 
cost and operational effectiveness.  In other words, decisionmakers need to decide whether to 
accept a lower likelihood of success in exchange for deploying an asset that is cheaper or less risky 
to deploy. These tradeoffs, however will likely decrease as drone capabilities continue to increase. 
Indeed, remotely operated systems will likely supplant manned ones in an ever-growing number 
of mission areas. Even without parity in capabilities, however, drones have provided militaries 
with an alternative to manned assets on a range of missions. Indeed, as one British Ministry of 
Defense official explained, drones “increase the policy menu” for decisionmakers.52  
                                                        
50 U.S. Department of Defense plans indicate drone capabilities will continue to advance in these areas, see Unmanned 
Systems Integrated Roadmap: 2017-2042 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2016). 
51 John Reed, “Predator Drones ‘Useless’ in Most Wars, Top Air Force General Says,” Foreign Policy, September 19, 
2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/19/predator-drones-useless-in-most-wars-top-air-force-general-says/; 
Valerie Insinna, “Kratos Gets Green Light to Market Potentially-Armed Mako ‘Loyal Wingman’ Drone to Allies,” 
Defense News, May 1, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/05/01/kratos-gets-green-light-to-market-
potentially-armed-mako-loyal-wingman-drone-to-allies/; Colin Clark, “US ‘Loyal Wingman’ Takes Flight: AFRL & 
Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie,” Breaking Defense, March 7, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/us-loyal-
wingman-takes-flight-afrl-kratos-xq-58a-valkyrie/. 
52 Interview with UK Ministry of Defense Official, London UK, 9 September 2016. 
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Critics might question the utility of a project that studies a single class of weapons. To be 
sure, the project’s focus on drones may limit the generalizability of its findings. Yet, the endeavor 
is valuable for several reasons. First, as I describe above, drones are becoming an increasingly 
common tool in military operations around the world. They have fundamentally reshaped how and 
when states conduct military operations. This makes understanding their effects important for 
national security policy. Second, elements of technology-enabled escalation control theory can be 
applied to military systems beyond drones. For instance, several mechanisms of the theory should 
apply to cyber warfare, another realm where warfighters are removed from harm’s way. I explore 
these broader applications of technology-enabled escalation control in the dissertation’s 
concluding chapter. Finally, research on a single type of weapon is not uncommon in the fields of 
international relations and security studies. Hundreds of works, for instance, probe the 
development and effectiveness of nuclear weapons, strategic airpower, and submarines.53  
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF: TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED ESCALATION CONTROL  
To identify the effect of drones on crisis escalation dynamics, I develop and test an original 
theory of technology-enabled escalation control. This theory expects that when used as a substitute 
for manned assets during crises, remotely operated weapons allow decisionmakers to increase the 
frequency with which states deploy military forces during crises, but can limit the intensity of these 
crisis deployments in ways not possible when manned platforms are used – preventing crises from 
spiraling into broader conflicts. In other words, there will be more, but milder conflicts. In contrast 
                                                        
53 For recent examples, see Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change 
Foreign Policy,” International Security 40, no. 1 (July 1, 2015): 87–119; Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power 
and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew, and Annette 
Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story Of American Submarine Espionage (New York: PublicAffairs, 
1998); Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International 
Security 38, no. 2 (October 1, 2013): 41–73; Phil Haun and Colin Jackson, “Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the 
Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War,” International Security 40, no. 3 (January 
1, 2016): 139–78. 
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to this stabilizing outlook on drones, many scholars and policymakers fear these weapons will 
destabilize international security by allowing states to launch military operations without the 
political risk of sending troops into battle. These claims are often grounded in theories that predict 
greater levels of conflict onset when military action is perceived to entail low-risks. As a result, 
analysts have suggested that drones, particularly armed ones capable of launching airstrikes, will 
be used more frequently to carry out attacks or other intrusive missions, potentially destabilizing 
border and maritime disputes or violating human rights.54 
While drones may indeed increase the likelihood that states will cross the threshold of 
deploying military force, existing theories have not adequately explored the subsequent escalatory 
dynamics that ultimately dictate whether an encounter triggers an immediate crisis, and whether 
localized crises spiral into broader and more destabilizing conflicts. To be clear, I do not argue that 
drones are a panacea to escalation. Actions carried out by drones can indeed be escalatory and 
escalation may still occur due to misperceptions and accidents. But drones possess important 
characteristics that can help mitigate escalatory spirals in a way not possible when manned assets 
are involved. Indeed, the historical record yields no cases where major escalation followed the an 
attack on a remotely operated drone.  
On one hand, drones may increase initiation rates of military operations.  By removing 
warfighters from the front lines, drones are generally thought to reduce the human cost of military 
operations to a deploying state or non-state actor. This reduced risk mitigates the political obstacles 
often associated with sending troops into harm’s way. In turn, these reduced risks are generally 
                                                        
54 Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
June 2014), http://www.cfr.org/drones/limiting-armed-drone-proliferation/p33127; “IntelBrief: The Rising Threat 
from Armed Drones,” The Soufan Center (blog), January 12, 2018, https://thesoufancenter.org/tsc-intelbrief-rising-
threat-armed-drones/. 
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seen as lowering the threshold for deploying forces and enabling states to launch military 
operations – ranging from peacetime reconnaissance missions to airstrikes on adversary personnel 
and infrastructure – in cases where the risk might otherwise be considered too high for the 
objectives at stake.55 This willingness to initiate operations that would have been avoided absent 
remotely operated systems should increase the frequency with which states use military forces to 
monitor, probe, or attack their rivals.56  
Even though drones may increase the frequency of military activity, these deployments 
need not lead to highly escalatory confrontations. First, drones expand the menu of available 
military options during crises, allowing leaders to deploy drones instead of taking an alternative 
action – such as a ground incursion or special operations raid – that could lead to higher casualties 
of friendly forces, greater damage to a rival’s infrastructure, or simply be perceived by actors in 
the target country as more aggressive.57  
At the same time drones can ameliorate escalation dynamics. Selecting remote warfighting 
technologies with low human and domestic political risks can limit escalation – relative to similar 
actions using manned aircraft – in two primary ways. First, drones can help temper or tailor 
targeting. Drones deployed on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions 
collect intelligence that can, under certain conditions, temper escalation. For example, drones may 
collect information that reveals an adversary either has more limited capabilities or less hostile 
intent than initially assessed. In other cases, drones may gather intelligence that reveals an 
                                                        
55 Kaag and Kreps, Drone Warfare.  
56 For empirical assessments that support this claim see, James Igoe Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, The Ethics of Drone 
Strikes: Does Reducing the Cost of Conflict Encourage War? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College 
Press, 2015). 
57 Some studies find that certain types of actions may be considered less escalatory than others, helping to manage 
escalation. See, Carson, “Facing Off and Saving Face”; Carson, Secret Wars. 
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adversary is far more capable that originally assessed. In both situations, the use of drones may 
ameliorate information asymmetries that otherwise lead to escalation and conflict. Drones can 
tailor targeting by collecting intelligence that leads operations to be more precise, potentially 
limiting the amount of destruction in a way that prevents retaliatory escalation.  
Second, when drones are attacked, their owners may exercise restrained retaliation. 
Relative to an attack on a traditionally inhabited (manned) system, the loss of a drone to hostile 
action is less likely to trigger the sort of rationalist and emotional reactions among a target state’s 
military decisionmakers and general public that lend themselves to escalatory decisions. Without 
the loss of lives, the population may not experience the same degree of anger that can lead to acts 
of revenge or the belief that significant military action is needed to prevent subsequent attacks.58 
Indeed, an attack on a drone may be viewed as falling below the threshold needed to justify a 
military or diplomatic response – a limit that some political scientists have referred to as a salience 
criterion.59  
The belief that rivals will restrain retaliation after attacks on drones may lead 
decisionmakers on the receiving end of drone operations to take acts of amplified aggression – 
intentionally more aggressive action against a rival’s drones than against their manned assets. 
These actions may be aimed at stopping a rival from using drones to carry out attacks or from 
gathering intelligence. At the surface, amplified aggression challenges the notion that drones 
enable escalation control. To be sure, these attacks represent a use of force that they might not 
                                                        
58 Analysis of emotions in conflict include Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and 
Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Rose McDermott, 
Anthony C. Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi, “‘Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It’: The Psychology of Revenge and 
Deterrence,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 1 (December 2017): 68–88. 
59 Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977) uses the 
terminology "salience criterion"; Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018) introduces the term "salience threshold". 
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otherwise take. However, those taking defensive measures against drones do so only because they 
anticipate a limited response. These types of interactions may be less likely to escalate into broader 
conflicts, thus contributing to greater escalation control.  
Scope Conditions 
  Technology-enabled escalation control theory explains how drones affect escalatory 
dynamics during crises between actors with relatively symmetric military capabilities. Escalation 
involving actors with symmetric capabilities can be more destabilizing than escalation between 
actors with uneven military capabilities. When actors have roughly equal capabilities, they are 
better able to hold each other’s assets and interests at risk. This means they climb vertically up the 
escalation ladder, and intensify crises through the use of additional firepower and forces. They are 
also more able to horizontally escalate crises into new theaters or geographic areas. This type of 
escalation can prevent actors from easily deescalating and lead them to escalate small localized 
crises into broader regional or global conflicts. 
In contrast, a weaker actor may be less able to directly retaliate and escalate vis-à-vis a 
stronger rival.  Weaker actors might carry out limited attacks in an existing theater of operations 
or attempt to project power into new theaters of operations using unconventional means. For 
instance, in 2010 the Pakistani Taliban attempted to detonate a car bomb in New York City as 
retaliation for American drone attacks in Pakistan.60 While these sorts of actions can damage 
infrastructure and cause casualties, they generally do not result in the more extensive (and even 
existential) security risks that can follow actions taken by more capable actors. The potential for 
                                                        
60 Lorraine Adams and Ayesha Nasir, “Inside the Mind of the Times Square Bomber,” The Guardian, September 18, 
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significant escalation and instability makes understanding escalatory dynamics in symmetric 
contexts particularly important.  
The proliferation of drones increases the likelihood that they will be used in crises where 
actors have parity in military capability. Dozens of states and non-state actors around the world 
have acquired drones, and their proliferation continues.61 Many of these actors have operationally 
employed drones against rivals, which, in many cases, also operate drones. China, for instance, 
routinely operates drones near the contested Senkaku Islands, triggering intercepts by Japan Air 
Self Defense Force fighter jets.62 Iran has flown drones into Israeli and Pakistani airspace, 
prompting intercepts and shootdowns.63 And, India and Pakistan rely on reconnaissance drones to 
gather intelligence on each other.64 Although technology-enabled escalation control applies 
primarily to symmetric contexts, I explore whether elements of the theory apply asymmetric 
conflicts in the dissertation’s concluding chapter.   
TESTING THE THEORY 
To test technology-enabled escalation control, I use a mixed-method research design that 
leverages both experimental and observational approaches. I combine experiments embedded in 
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military wargames, survey experiments fielded on expert and public samples in the United States, 
and nested case studies of U.S. and Israeli drone operations. The various components of the 
research design allow me to probe and compare how drones affect preferences for escalation across 
different groups of actors in different countries. Wargames and surveys fielded on military officers 
allow me to test if and how drones affect military decision-making on escalation. Surveys fielded 
on public samples allow me to assess whether members of the public are more supportive of 
operations carried out by drones than those conducted using manned assets, and whether they 
demand different reactions after a rival’s attack on a manned aircraft than an attack on a remotely 
operated one. Case studies allow me to move beyond hypothetical experimental scenarios to 
investigate whether and how drones shape decisions made by actual senior civilian and military 
leaders during real world crises. By examining drone use by both the United States and Israel, the 
case studies allow me to compare whether different political, security, and cultural contexts 
influence the effect of drones on escalation.  
The project draws from fieldwork in Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas, where I 
gathered archival materials and conducted extensive interviews that provide firsthand insights into 
national security decision-making. During research at military and presidential archives, I 
unearthed documentary evidence of how drones affected decisions on escalation and the use of 
force from the tactical to strategic levels. I discovered numerous records including assessments of 
drone missions over China and minutes of National Security Council meetings where Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson discussed whether to launch drones or 
manned aircraft on missions over Cuba. I also conducted over 70 interviews with subjects ranging 
from drone operators and intelligence analysts to former national security advisors, generals, and 
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senior defense officials from more than a dozen states including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, China, and Israel.  
While interview and archival materials shed light on how decisionmakers factor drones 
into strategic and operational planning, these observational data alone are insufficient for assessing 
whether drones contribute to more or less escalation than manned assets. This is because real world 
events do not allow us to observe both an incident where a drone is involved and the counterfactual: 
the exact same incident, but where a manned aircraft is involved instead of the drone. More 
formally, the observational data suffer from the fundamental problem of causal inference: It is 
impossible to observe the degree of escalation following an incident involving a drone and the 
same incident involving a manned aircraft. As a result, it is impossible to measure the causal effect 
of drones on escalatory dynamics on the basis of such data alone.65 
To overcome this challenge, I use a variety of experimental approaches to generate original 
data that I use to identify the causal effect of drones on escalatory dynamics. I rely on survey 
experiments in which military officers and members of the public answer questions about 
preferences for escalation in a variety of hypothetical crises, where I vary whether drones or 
manned assets are involved. These survey instruments also collect qualitative inputs from free 
response questions that allow me to assess the mechanisms underlying respondent preferences.  I 
also introduce a methodological approach that is new to the social sciences – embedding 
experimental manipulations into wargames played by teams of military personnel.  
As chapter three describes in greater detail, I design a scenario-based exercise in which 
participants are exposed to various crises that have the potential to escalate: the shootdown of a 
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U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane, the intrusion of an adversary’s attack aircraft into friendly 
airspace, and an operation to strike a rival’s chemical weapons facility. In each of these scenarios 
I randomly vary whether a drone or manned assets are involved and ask participants to develop a 
response to the crisis. By holding all other elements of the scenario constant across the wargaming 
teams (i.e. treatment groups), the research design allows me to identify how drones affect decisions 
on escalation. Interaction between participants during the wargames also provides rich qualitative 
insights on the assumptions and logics that inform decisions on the use of force. I replicate the 
wargames multiple times to explore and document trends in decision-making among military 
personnel.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The findings offer support for technology-enabled escalation control theory and yield 
theoretical and policy contributions. In short, the experiments, wargames, and case studies 
demonstrate that drones simultaneously enable policymakers to deploy military force more 
frequently and to prevent significant escalation during crises. In line with the increased initiation 
logic, members of the public, military officers, and senior civilian national security officials are 
generally more willing to deploy remotely operated platforms than manned assets on risky 
missions. Survey respondents, on average, provide greater support for risky missions carried out 
by drones than the same missions carried out using manned assets. These results, however, are 
premised on the systems having roughly equivalent capabilities and being similarly able to 
successfully complete an operation. When drones are less capable than their manned counterparts, 
both members of the public and national security practitioners are typically willing to accept the 
human and political risk associated with a manned deployment. For instance, drones were 
frequently considered as low risk means to collect intelligence over Cuba, North Korea, and China 
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during the Cold War, but decisionmakers typically settled on manned aircraft as a more capable 
and efficient means of conducting reconnaissance operations.  
Survey respondents and wargame participants were also more willing to take aggressive 
action against a rival’s drones than their manned assets. Experimental participants generally 
decided to shoot down a drone that violated friendly airspace, but opted for less escalatory action 
against manned aircraft, providing support for the amplified aggression logic. Indeed, many 
wargaming teams searched for ways to avoid engaging the intruding manned aircraft. Underlying 
these preferences was the belief – shared between military members and civilians – that losing a 
machine fell at a fundamentally lower threshold than losing a crewmember. As a result, 
participants in the experiments and real-world decisionmakers generally restrained retaliation after 
the loss of drones, opting to initiate no significant retaliatory action or only minor shows of force 
or diplomatic action. 
The findings also demonstrate how states like Israel use drones specifically to tailor 
targeting in a way that controls escalation. As part of Israel’s national security strategy, the military 
and intelligence community use remotely operated weapon systems to carry out precision strikes 
on their rival’s critical infrastructure or leadership figures before the outbreak of large-scale 
hostilities. The intent of these strikes is twofold. First, limited strikes using systems like drones 
reduce the risk of collateral damage and reduces exposure of Israeli forces to hostile fire. Second, 
the strikes are thought to lengthen the periods of relative stability between conflicts. By striking 
adversary targets during these “campaigns between wars,” Israel prevents the development of 
capabilities or enemy plans that could pose a more significant threat or conventional conflict.    
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP AND POLICY 
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Technology-enabled escalation control complements and builds upon existing theories that 
probe the relationship between technology and conflict escalation in three two ways. First, it better 
explains previously sidelined questions about escalation dynamics. Existing scholarship on 
technology and conflict generally predict more conflict when military action is perceived to entail 
low costs and risks, in part because of technologies that reduce the costs of military operations.66 
Indeed, weapons that reduce the risk of projecting power are often characterized as particularly 
destabilizing.67 These theories, however, focus primarily on the initiation of the use of force, and 
do not fully consider how weapons that significantly reduce the human cost of military operations 
affect the potential for subsequent escalation. 
Second, the theory accounts for a class of technologies – remotely operated weapons – that 
are widely used today, but were not prevalent when most existing escalation theories first emerged 
during the Cold War. Much existing literature on escalation emerged during the Cold War and 
studies how crises between two superpowers could spiral toward nuclear Armageddon.68 These 
older theories overlook the emergence of new warfighting technologies and the shift toward more 
limited military operations in the post-Cold War era.69 Specifically, drones have features and 
capabilities that are often associated with escalation control and the prevention of conflict: they 
can help overcome information control, can conduct precision targeting, and can be attacked 
                                                        
66 For example see, Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 
1978): 167–214; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
67 Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” 
International Security 28, no. 3 (2003): 45–83. 
68 Kahn, On Escalation; Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation; Posen, Inadvertent Escalation. 
69 On the shift toward more limited military operations see, Micah Zenko, Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete 
Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Thomas J. Wright, 
All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2017). 
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without endangering friendly personnel. This project broadens our understanding of whether and 
how remote warfighting technology may redefine escalation thresholds, contribute to inadvertent 
escalation, and create off-ramps that help control or de-escalate crises. Although the empirical 
findings shed light on the specific effects of drones, the theory itself may have broader 
applicability, something I explore in the concluding chapter. 
In addition to contributing to theoretical debates, the project helps inform policy debates 
about drones and international security. As the number of states and non-state actors operating 
remotely operated weapons increases, so too will the need for research that explains how these 
systems affect escalatory dynamics. Existing policy studies on drones have concentrated largely 
on moral questions,70 issues of drone proliferation,71 and on public support for the initiation of 
drone operations.72 Important questions about their effects on decision-making around escalation 
are often overlooked. Understanding how drones may reduce the risk of crises spiraling into 
broader conflicts can inform national security policies in a way that promotes escalation control.  
My findings have several important policy implications. The wargames and survey 
experiments offer insights on how real-world crises might play out. As remotely operated – and 
eventually, fully autonomous – systems become more common, so too does the likelihood of 
interstate crises involving remotely operated assets. Indeed, in some mission areas, choosing 
between use of a manned platform and a remotely piloted one may soon be only a hypothetical 
                                                        
70 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 
(2013): 32–43; Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 
(2013): 44–54; Kaag and Kreps, Drone Warfare. 
71 Fuhrmann and Horowitz, “Droning On,” Spring 2017. 
72 Walsh and Schulzke, The Ethics of Drone Strikes: Does Reducing the Cost of Conflict Encourage War?; Julia 
Macdonald and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions: The Case of 
Unmanned Weaponry,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 3 (March 2017): 511–36. 
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issue. As the use of remotely operated weapon systems becomes more pervasive, the world might 
see more confrontations of military assets during crises. 
Because of the frequency of militarized disputes will likely increase as drones proliferate, 
states and militaries would likely benefit from establishing doctrine, rules of engagement, and 
international agreements that distinguish drones from manned assets. Although both manned and 
remotely piloted craft are equivalent under international law, in practice, military commanders 
respond differently to drones than manned aircraft. Developing clear policies that govern 
interactions involving remotely operated assets could help guide military decisionmakers, and 
avoid accidents or inadvertent escalation. The findings may also influence the domestic and 
international agreements used to regulate drone exports. Limitations on drone proliferation are 
often motivated by a desire to avoid the destabilization thought to be associated with drone use. If 
drones can – at times – maintain stability rather than decrease it, states may be willing to loosen 
export restrictions and transfer drones to other states.  
In addition to the project’s substantive contributions, it also makes a methodological 
contribution. While militaries have long used wargaming to prepare for contingencies, this is the 
first known scholarly social science work to embed experimental manipulations in wargames 
played by military personnel.73 Introducing experimental manipulations helps overcome selection 
issues present in observational research and allows researchers to assess the causal effect of 
                                                        
73 Past scholarly use of wargames have often drawn from declassified records of past wargames without experimental 
manipulations, or include experimental manipulations fielded on public samples participating in the wargames 
remotely. Jacquelyn Schneider, “Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure: Insights from War Gaming,” War on the 
Rocks, July 26, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/cyber-attacks-on-critical-infrastructure-insights-from-war-
gaming/; Reid Pauly, “Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint,” 
International Security 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 151–92; Andrew W. Reddie et al., “Next-Generation Wargames,” Science 
362, no. 6421 (December 21, 2018): 1362–64. 
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variables of interest during crises and conflicts, a task that would be difficult using purely 
observational methods.   
DISSERTATION ROADMAP 
The next six chapters lay out the dissertation’s theory, research design, and findings of a 
variety of empirical tests. Chapter 2 introduces technology-enabled escalation control theory. I 
describe what constitutes a drone and define the key concepts of escalation.  In developing my 
theory, I draw from literature on crisis bargaining, political psychology, and security studies to 
argue that drones increase the frequency with which actors resort to military force during crises, 
but enable escalation control by limiting the intensity of crises if force is employed. I outline the 
four mechanisms that undergird the theory – increased initiation, tempered/tailored targeting, 
restrained retaliation, and amplified aggression – and connect the theory to existing scholarly 
work on escalation, technology, and the use of force.  
Chapter 3 describes the dissertation’s multi-method research design. I provide a 
justification for a methodological approach that layers survey experiments, case studies, with 
wargames played by national security practitioners. I lay out the case selection and sampling 
strategy, describe experimental manipulations and the design of the survey instruments and 
wargames, and most importantly, explain the comparative advantage of each line of research. The 
chapter argues that the synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data collected from a variety of 
sources and using different data generating processes allows for more robust tests of technology-
enabled escalation control.  
Chapters 4 and 5 use a variety of experimental and wargaming approaches to test the 
mechanisms associated with technology-enabled escalation control theory. Chapter four focuses 
on the increased initiation mechanism and explores whether drones contribute to an uptick in the 
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frequency with which states take military action. Chapter give pivots to the elements of the 
stabilizing elements of theory: tempered/tailored targeting, restrained retaliation, and amplified 
aggression. In both of these chapters I leverage original data from survey experiments fielded on 
public and expert samples and from wargames played by national security practitioners. I evaluate 
both qualitative and quantitative data and compare responses from civilian and military 
respondents. In each of these chapters I explore how drones affect conflict dynamics and why they 
have these effects.   
In chapters 6 and 7, I build upon the findings from chapters 4 and 5 by testing the 
mechanisms associated with technology-enabled escalation control theory in real world contexts. 
A series of nested case studies of U.S. drone use during the Cold War and Israeli drone use from 
the late 1960s to mid-2010s explores how drones have influenced the use of force by states with a 
long and active history of drone operations. Drawing data from archival materials and interviews 
I map the decision-making processes surrounding the development and deployment of military 
drones. I assess the factors military and civilian leaders consider when choosing between 
employing drones and alternative manned assets, and compare their responses to adversary action 
against drones and manned assets. This series of nested sub-cases across several decades allows 
me to assess patterns of change and stability in drone use as leaders, threat conditions, and 
technology evolve, and also to probe similarities and differences between the effect of drones on 
American and Israeli conflict decision-making.  
MOVING FORWARD 
 As with any study, scope conditions limit the generalizability of findings that can be 
gleaned from a given project. The empirical tests in the following chapters, for instance, primarily 
feature drone use by democratic states during interstate crises. But how well does the theory of 
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technology-enabled escalation control travel beyond these conditions? How might drones affect 
conflict dynamics in situations other those examined in the experimental tests and case studies? 
Do non-state actors think about the use of force with and against drones in the same way as state 
actors? Do other military technologies that remove personnel from the physical front lines 
influence escalatory dynamics in the same way as drones? Finding answers to these questions is 
important given the proliferation of drone technology to non-state actors and the development and 
spread of other military technologies – like cyber warfare – that allow actors to carry out military 
operations without placing troops in harm’s way.  
 To begin exploring these questions, the dissertation’s concluding chapter pushes the 
application of the theory into new domains. The chapter considers how the growing role of 
remotely operated weapons and the emergence of autonomous weapons might change the nature 
of escalation and the norms and laws governing the use of force. It also assesses the generalizability 
of the theory to different operational contexts. I probe the theory’s applicability to offensive cyber 
operations by examining how the United States reportedly used cyber operations to degrade North 
Korea’s long-range missile program. I also explore Hezbollah’s drone use to assess whether 
elements of technology-enabled escalation control apply to non-state actors. These cases suggest 
that aspects of technology-enabled escalation control apply across a variety of operational 
domains. In addition to these extensions, the final chapter summarizes core features of my 
argument, reviews the empirical findings and discusses the scholarly and policy implications of 
technology-escalation control. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Technology-Enabled Escalation Control  
 
 
The relatively low-cost, unmanned aircraft offered the possibility of using large numbers to overwhelm 
defensive systems as well as single entry into sensitive areas, with a reduced probability or precipitating 
open hostilities. 
 
                 U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command Assessment, 19791 
 
 
Scholars and practitioners view technology as an important factor underlying the causes, 
conduct, and effects of armed conflict.2 Militaries and other armed actors acquire new technologies 
to gain tactical and strategic advantages over adversaries, increase power projection capabilities, 
and reduce risk to friendly personnel. On the battlefield, military technology can shape the 
intensity of fighting, influence the tactics employed by combatants, and determine conflict 
outcomes.3 Beyond the front lines, military technologies often influence when states decide to use 
force, influence the structure of military organizations, and inform a state’s national security 
                                                        
1 John Lumpkin, Tactical Air Command Drones/RPVs 1966-1968, February 1979 (Secret); K417.042-22 66-78; Air 
Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, iii. 
2 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1976); William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 1984); Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, 
Revised Ed. (New York: Touchstone, 1991); Alex Roland, “Science, Technology, and War,” Technology and Culture 
36, no. 2 (1995): S83–100; Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 37–54. For 
critiques, see Keir A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2008); Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
3 Biddle, Military Power; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, no. 1 (January 2009): 67–106; Jonathan D. Caverley and 
Todd S. Sechser, “Military Technology and the Duration of Civil Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 3 
(September 2017): 704–20. 
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doctrine and strategy.4  While much has been written on these topics, relatively little attention has 
focused on how the introduction of new technologies may influence escalation dynamics – the 
patterns by which crises can expand in intensity or scope.5 At the core of this project is a theory of 
technology-enabled escalation control. The central argument is that technologies that remove 
warfighters from the battlefield – like drones – allow states to use force more frequently, but 
decrease the intensity of military operations when used in lieu of inhabited platforms.  
In this chapter, I seek to contribute to three ongoing debates in the international relations 
and security studies literatures. First, studies on conflict often examine the onset and termination 
of military operations, sidelining questions about the factors that drive escalation or de-escalation.6 
Second, studies on military technologies typically focus on issues of strategy and doctrine, 
organizational and combat effectiveness, and organizational dynamics – again overlooking how 
specific types of technology influence escalation.7 Third, the burgeoning body of literature on 
                                                        
4 On the interaction of military technology and military organizations see, Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military 
Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and 
Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). For assessments of how 
technology can affect military doctrine, see Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second 
Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (January 2, 2015): 
38–73; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of 
Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (April 1, 2017): 9–49. 
5 Kahn, On Escalation; Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds. 
6 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”; Mesquita, The War Trap; Richard K. Betts, “Must War Find a 
Way?: A Review Essay,” International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 166–98; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Alex Weisiger, Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited 
Conflicts, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
7 Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” 
International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1984): 219–38; Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare”; Lieber, War and the 
Engineers; Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation; Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power. 
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drones often examines decisions on their initial use and their proliferation, without fully exploring 
their effect on escalation dynamics during crises.8 
Studying the effect of military technology on escalation is critical to understanding 
interstate relations. Scholars have long deliberated whether certain technologies increase the 
likelihood of armed conflict, but these debates typically sideline important questions about the arc 
of a crisis or conflict after the initial use of force.9 Although technologies that make power 
projection and offensive action less costly – in blood and treasure – incentivize states to launch 
military operations, how these systems shape subsequent escalation dynamics needs additional 
theorization.10 This theorization is particularly necessary given the proliferation of systems that 
reduce the risks and costs of military operations. This project attempts to provide a framework by 
examining how one class of increasingly common military technologies – remotely operated 
weapon systems – shape escalation dynamics.  
 On one hand, drones arguably reduce the financial costs of operations and the risk to 
friendly forces by introducing the capacity to carry out operations without putting personnel in 
harm’s way. In turn, this may lower the associated political barriers to using force. In sum, all else 
equal, we can expect the availability of drones to increase an actor’s propensity to initiate military 
operations. At the same time, the lack of a human in harm’s way and the lower unit cost of drones 
                                                        
8 Sarah Kreps and Micah Zenko, “The Next Drone Wars: Preparing for Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 2 (April 
2014): 68–79; Kaag and Kreps, Drone Warfare; Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? 
Industrial, Organizational and Infrastructural Constraints: Military Innovations and the Ecosystem Challenge,” SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, March 18, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2425750; Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz, “Droning On: Explaining the 
Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Organization 71, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 397–418. 
9 Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology”; Van Evera, Causes of War; Adams, “Attack and 
Conquer?”; Lieber, War and the Engineers. 
10 For a study that examines how the lower cost of military operations allows states to carry out military operations, 
see Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016). 
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may make states on the receiving end of such operations more willing to take deliberate defensive 
actions against their rivals’ drones. 
Despite this increased propensity of initiating military operations, drones can contribute to 
other processes that reduce the potential for situations to escalate in two key ways. First, drones 
allow states to gather intelligence that overcomes information asymmetries. Decisionmakers often 
launch military operations when they have incomplete information about a rival’s capabilities and 
intentions. If decisionmakers are more willing to deploy drones than manned platforms, this may 
increase collection of intelligence that helps reduce information asymmetries. This intelligence 
can prevent decisionmakers from launching conflicts due to faulty information. In the event of 
conflict, however, the vast amounts of intelligence that drones can gather can help make targeting 
more precise – potentially reducing the risks of inaccurate targeting and collateral damage.11 
Drones can therefore help temper or tailor targeting of rivals. 
 Second, the lack of friendly personnel onboard drones and, in some cases their lower unit 
cost than manned platforms, allows decisionmakers to restrain retaliation after a rival attacks a 
drone. In comparison, decisionmakers may feel more obligated to retaliate after an attack on a 
manned asset.  The death or capture of crewmembers can generate demands for retaliation from 
the population or lead military decisionmakers to take more aggressive actions to prevent future 
losses. These two mechanisms may prevent crises from spiraling into broader and more 
destabilizing conflicts. This logic of technology-enabled escalation control runs counter to the 
                                                        
11 Avery Plaw, “Counting the Dead: The Proportionality of Predation in Pakistan,” in Killing by Remote Control: The 
Ethics of an Unmanned Military, ed. Bradley Jay Strawser and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 126–53. 
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policy and scholarly discourse that suggests military technologies that reduce operational risk and 
costs are necessarily destabilizing.12 
The theory best explains escalation dynamics when systems like drones – that allow 
decisionmakers to launch operations without exposing friendly personnel to direct harm – are used 
in a substitutive manner in lieu of a manned asset. In some of these cases, remotely operated 
weapons are used on missions that would not have been launched in their absence. In other cases, 
missions arguably would happen, but remotely operated weapons are used in place of manned 
ones. The subsequent discussion focuses on drone use by and against actors with relatively 
symmetric capabilities. These represent the most dangerous cases as these actors are more able to 
both use drones and attack their rivals’ drones and have a greater potential to generate extensive 
damage. Even so, elements of technology-enabled escalation control theory can be applied to other 
technologies and to operations between rivals with asymmetric capabilities. I explain scope 
conditions of the inquiry later in this chapter. The concluding chapter also explores the theory’s 
generalizability to cyber operations and to the use of drones by and against non-state actors.  
This chapter begins by charting existing research that links military technology to conflict 
dynamics, paying particular attention to studies that examine technologies that take friendly troops 
off the battlefield. Next, I provide a more detailed discussion of technology-enabled escalation 
control theory and its foundations in international relations theory, crisis bargaining, and political 
psychology. I then describe how three distinct groups of decision-making agents – the public, the 
military, and elite civilian decisionmakers – influence decisions about conflict escalation. I 
                                                        
12 For instance, capabilities that provide offensive advantages contribute to more “dangerous” threat environments 
according to Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” 
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conclude by briefly assessing challenges to technology-enabled escalation control, highlighting 
conditions where drones might contribute to, rather than control, escalation dynamics.   
EXISTING RESEARCH ON TECHNOLOGY AND ESCALATION 
The term “drone” describes a range of surveillance and combat systems that are remotely 
operated, meaning that crew members are not physically onboard the system.13 They can operate 
in the air, sea, and land domains. They can be armed or unarmed. To be sure, drones are not the 
first technology that has decreased risks to friendly forces. Militaries have historically sought to 
decrease the risks of operations by developing or acquiring weapons that increase the distance 
between friendly and hostile forces or increase survivability by using stealth technology or other 
countermeasures. Weapons like rifles, long-range artillery, and bomber jets have allowed 
adversaries to engage from greater distances and stealth materials allow ships and planes to evade 
radar detection. However, these technologies still require human operators to be physically present 
on the battlefield. Remotely operated systems like drones enable military operations that do not 
place friendly personnel in the direct line of fire. Removing friendly forces from the battlefield 
fundamentally shifts calculations on when and how to use force, and when and how to escalate 
confrontations involving armed force.14 
The use of drones by states around the world swelled in the years following 9/11. So too 
did the body of drone-focused research. Much of this work traces the history of drone operations, 
or analyzes the United States’ controversial use of drones to carry out targeted killings in places 
                                                        
13 To reiterate a point from Chapter 1, I use the terms drone, remotely piloted aircraft, and remotely operated weapon 
system interchangeably. I do not engage in parochial debates over the terminology used to describe systems that are 
remotely operated. To be clear, however, I do not use the terms here to describe fully autonomous weapons, systems 
that are able to make decisions on the use of force without real-time inputs from a human operator.  
14 Erik Gartzke, “No Humans Were Harmed in the Making of This War: On the Nature and Consequences of Costless 
Combat” (UC San Diego Working Paper, December 24, 2016). 
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like Yemen and Pakistan.15 Other studies probe normative issues surrounding the use of robotic 
weapons against human targets, raising important questions about chivalry, fairness, and the nature 
of modern combat.16 These studies generally agree that removing pilots from harm’s way lowers 
the political obstacles to launching military operations, leading drones to be viewed increasingly 
as “one-size-fits-all” solution to a variety of national security policies.17 Indeed, some scholars 
have characterized drones as creating a moral hazard that enables states to launch risky operations 
that they might otherwise avoid.18 
Empirical analyses have tested these claims using a variety of approaches and find that 
U.S. presidents, members of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, and the American public are, 
in most instances, more likely to support the deployment of drones than manned platforms. 
Members of the public and government decisionmakers often view drones as a more prudent 
means of carrying out military operations as they reduce the risk to friendly personnel. 19 Civilian 
                                                        
15 Richard Whittle, Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution by Richard Whittle (Picador, 2015); Woods, 
Sudden Justice. 
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Employment Decisions: The Case of Unmanned Weaponry”; Walsh and Schulzke, The Ethics of Drone Strikes: Does 
Reducing the Cost of Conflict Encourage War?; Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald, U.S. Public Support for 
Drone Strikes: When Do Americans Prefer Unmanned over Manned Platforms (Washington, D.C.: Center for New 
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leaders – who are subject to domestic public opinion – view drones as particularly attractive as 
they reduce the political risk attached to incurring casualties during military operations.20 
These studies have generally examined how the availability of drones increases the 
likelihood that the public and decisionmakers will launch military operations – particularly those 
that involve launching strikes on adversaries, paying little attention to their effect on subsequent 
escalatory dynamics. In one notable exception, Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, examine how 
drone proliferation affects conflict dynamics and stability across a range of operational contexts. 
Their analysis identifies heterogeneous effects: the availability of drones may allow states to 
launch military operations with greater ease, but the operational context can dictate whether drones 
have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect. In the context of counterterrorism and civil wars, for 
instance, drones may enable leaders to more easily carry out strikes in otherwise hard to reach 
regions. In contrast, when deployed during crises, drones may have a stabilizing effect by revealing 
information about adversary capabilities and by enabling de-escalation in the event of 
confrontations.21 Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann’s analysis provides a solid foundation for 
additional theorization and testing of the mechanisms that determine the effect of drones on 
escalation and stability.22  
The broader international relations and security studies literature also yields few direct 
insights on how technologies – like drones – that reduce the risks and costs of fighting affect 
                                                        
20 Schulman, Weird Birds: Working Paper on Policymaker Perspectives on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Their 
Impact on National Security Decision-Making, 14. 
21 Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation.” 
22 In Chapters 3 through 7 of this dissertation I describe and employ a variety of methods to empirically test the 
arguments that Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann introduce. 
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escalation dynamics.23 Theoretical and empirical work on military technology has studied the 
development of new technologies and the diffusion of these innovations. Historians and scholars 
of military strategy have traced the role of weapons in changing the nature of warfare, often 
studying how specific weapons – like the machine gun or strategic bombers – altered the face of 
combat or the projection of state power.24 Political scientists have examined variation in the 
process of technological innovation,25 the integration of new technology,26 and the effects of 
technology on combat effectiveness.27  Studies that explicitly tie military technology to escalation 
are less common and generally focus on conflict onset – the initial decision to escalate and use 
military force – without fully considering subsequent escalatory dynamics.  
One notable exception where scholars have explicitly studied the effects of a specific 
technology on escalation dynamics is the literature on nuclear weapons and deterrence. One view 
on nuclear deterrence is premised in part on the concept that nuclear weapons enable mutually 
assured destruction. Under this logic, the devastating consequences of a nuclear exchange lead 
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decisionmakers to avoid escalating interstate disputes.28 According to this argument, nuclear 
weapons can prevent unlimited escalation through the threat of massive losses. In contrast, drones 
and other remote warfighting technologies may help prevent escalation by offering small losses 
by deploying machines instead of personnel and by enabling more precise targeting. To be sure, 
some theories of nuclear escalation suggest that limited nuclear options such as the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons can help prevent escalation.29 Still, these weapons would likely generate larger 
numbers of casualties than drones carrying out conventional airstrikes, and would be viewed as 
violating a taboo that could lead the international community to impose military or diplomatic 
consequences.30  Further, nuclear weapons have changed escalation dynamics only among the 
small group of states that possess them. Drones, however can affect escalation dynamics among a 
far larger number of actors given their rapid and widespread proliferation  
Central within the work on conflict onset is the debate surrounding offense-defense 
theory.31 Proponents of the theory argue that technology plays a significant role in shaping the 
likelihood of wars by affecting the ability to conduct offensive operations.32 When technologies 
that increase firepower and mobility are in widespread use, decisionmakers often perceive 
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offensive action and conquest as easy. As a result, the risk of conflict increases. In contrast, when 
technologies are believed to make defensive action less costly and more effective, actors avoid 
initiating conflicts.33 Although the theory tells us about onset, it yields few predictions about the 
degree of escalation that is expected after the initial use of force. If we apply the offense-defense 
logic to escalation, we would expect decisionmakers to continue escalating so long as the perceived 
cost of military operations remained low. Yet crises and conflicts often vary significantly in their 
intensity and scope – in part due to decisions that those conducting and overseeing operations 
make, and how adversaries respond.34  
Critics have raised several challenges to offense-defense theory. First, they argue that 
technologies that favor defense are often indistinguishable from those that favor the offense.35 The 
inability to distinguish between these types of technologies makes it difficult to estimate how they 
might affect strategy and risk-taking. Second, offense-defense theory is generally considered a 
systemic theory that focuses on “the gross ‘state of the art’ in the international system at any given 
time, rather than the particulars of individual states’ holdings.”36 This can limit the theory’s ability 
to explain the dynamics of a specific conflict.   
While not explicitly citing technology, rational choice theorists draw similar conclusions 
as proponents of offense-defense theory. Scholars in this camp, including Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita and James Fearon, formalize conflict as an expected utility calculation in which actors 
initiate and continue conflicts so long as the expected benefits of victory are perceived to exceed 
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the cost of fighting.37 To be sure, states would be better off negotiating a mutually acceptable 
settlement before launching military operations, rather than suffering the costs of fighting, but 
incentives for actors to misrepresent their willingness to fight can make these settlements difficult 
to achieve.38 As a result, actors initiate fighting when they perceive a positive expected value for 
doing so.  Under this logic, technologies that lower the perceived material and human costs of 
military operations should increase the expected payoffs for fighting, and incentivize actors to 
more frequently start (and continue) fights.  
Rational choice logics also differ from offense-defense theory by taking a dyadic approach, 
rather than a systemic one. This arguably provides greater insight into the onset and duration of 
specific conflicts as researchers can assess the specific costs and benefits of conflict between two 
parties at a given time. Even so, work in the rational choice framework has not yet explored why 
and how crises escalate, and how technology affects these calculations.  
Other studies have examined the role of technology in areas beyond conflict onset – such 
as combat effectiveness and outcomes – and produced divergent conclusions on the effect of 
technology. Stephen Biddle, for instance, argues that technology has a less significant effect on 
combat than force employment, the way in which an actor uses its forces.39 Technology can make 
military operations more accurate and precise, but Biddle suggests even advanced weapons can be 
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overcome by adversary countermeasures or environmental factors.40 On the other hand, Jonathan 
Caverley and Todd Sechser suggest that military technology plays a more important role. They 
contend technology shortens the length of wars by mitigating information asymmetries that can 
prolong conflicts.41 Although these studies more explicitly assess the role of military technology 
on conflict duration and combat effectiveness, they still do not fully explore the relationship 
between technology and escalation.   
If military technology can influence decisions on initial deployment of forces,42 strategy 
and doctrine,43 crisis bargaining, combat effectiveness, and organizational dynamics,44 it should 
also affect decisions on escalation. New military technologies can affect when, where, and how 
actors deploy military forces, potentially generating far-reaching impacts on battlefield and 
political outcomes. It is critical to note, however, that “weapons don’t make war.” Although 
technology has been described as one of the most important influences on warfare, its effect on 
conflict dynamics is not deterministic. Instead, military technology is an instrument of policy.45 
Militaries generally acquire and employ weapons in line with bureaucratic preferences and in 
accordance with orders from government decisionmakers, who in turn are accountable to the actors 
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that enable them to maintain power.46 As anthropologist Hugh Gusterson argues, weapons like 
drones are “socio-technical ensembles” that “will be deployed to different effects in different 
cultural and organizational settings.”47 Policymakers and military officials thus mediate the effect 
of technology on conflict dynamics.  
This may raise concerns of endogeneity if actors’ desires to minimize escalation lead them 
to more actively employ drones when they seek to minimize escalation. In other words, what if 
leaders deploy drones only on peripheral missions where stakes are low? First, there are many 
examples of states deploying drones in cases with relatively high stakes: China, for instance, uses 
drones to monitor disputed territory in the East and South China Sea, and the United States has 
deployed drones to monitor Russian military in the Baltics and Central Europe.48 Second, I do not 
argue that military technology is fully exogenous. Conceptually, escalation dynamics involve 
interactions between actors. Even if one actor uses a technology with the intent of avoiding a 
military confrontation and escalation, the rival actor’s decisions also matter to whether a situation 
escalates.  
This dynamic is not purely a theoretical matter. During a high-level U.S. wargame during 
the Cold War, for instance, participants attempted to limit escalation through the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons. Wargame participants, which included Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed using low-yield tactical nuclear weapons 
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could minimize escalation during a conflict with the Soviet Union. Instead of de-escalation, 
however, the Soviet Union responded with a massive nuclear salvo that resulted in the destruction 
of large swaths of Europe and the United States.49  This suggests that even if one side views its 
choices of weapons and tactics as less escalatory than some alternatives, it does not necessarily 
follow that this will be perceived as such by an adversary, or that escalation will not occur. In 
chapters four and five I isolate the effect of technology on escalatory dynamics by controlling for 
the stakes of missions in the experimental designs.   
A THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED ESCALATION CONTROL 
Technology-enabled escalation control builds upon existing theories that link technology 
with conflict dynamics. It builds upon these theories by explaining how a specific class of 
technologies affects escalation in situations where the option often exists between whether to use 
unmanned or inhabited assets. The theory consists of two divergent, but related elements: 
technologies like drones can increase the frequency of military deployments. Simultaneously, the 
use of uninhabited assets can decrease the likelihood of escalation, relative to similar operations 
using manned assets. In the pages that follow, I map out the mechanisms that underlie the theory 
and propose several testable hypotheses.  
Decreasing Costs, Increasing Initiation of Military Operations 
 The first pillar of technology-enabled escalation control theory posits that drones lower the 
threshold for deploying forces, increasing the frequency at which states launch military operations 
relative to similar operations conducted with manned assets. These operations can include a range 
of missions such as reconnaissance flights or combat airstrikes.  Regardless of the mission type, 
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removing pilots from harm’s way decreases the risks and expected costs of military operations. 
This decreased cost then expands the range of issues for which states are willing to deploy force. 
This argument has dominated much of the existing scholarly and policy work on drones, with 
researchers and practitioners describing how the relatively costless nature of drone wars increases 
the propensity of leaders to launch military operations.50  
 Rational choice accounts suggest that actors initiate military operations when the expected 
gains of an operation exceed the expected costs.51 The costs of military operations encompass a 
variety of factors including treasure, reputation, and blood. First, military operations are financially 
costly. Maintaining overseas bases, acquiring new systems, and operating weapons are costly 
endeavors. The United States, for example, has poured over $5 trillion into its post-9/11 wars.52 
Even more limited deployments that rely on systems the public views as cheap, like drones, involve 
extensive infrastructure and maintenance that can drive up financial costs.53 Second, launching 
military operations can have reputational costs for the deploying state. Much of the international 
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community, for instance, criticized the United States for its 2003 invasion of Iraq.54 This sort of 
opposition can weaken a state’s international standing and stymie other efforts that require multi-
national collaboration. The Iraq War, for instance, strained ties between the United States and its 
NATO allies at a time when the Bush administration needed NATO support for ongoing operations 
in Afghanistan.55 Finally, military operations are inherently risky. When military personnel are at 
the front lines of these operations and are vulnerable to capture, injury, or death, the political costs 
of failure increase.56  
Decisionmakers consider all of these factors as they contemplate whether to initiate 
military action, but the potential cost in blood appears to be particularly salient.57 Casualties are 
often thought to diminish public support for military operations and reduce public approval of 
government leaders seen as responsible for the operations, although this is the subject of academic 
debate. 58 In turn, the fear of these political costs can lead policymakers to be casualty-averse when 
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weighing options for military action, particularly when it is unclear whether or to what degree an 
operation will serve a state’s vital interests.59 While the role of casualty aversion in non-democratic 
contexts is less understood, non-democratic leaders may be punished for launching unpopular 
military actions, just like their democratic counterparts.60 Even though autocrats may not be 
constrained by a voting public, the coalition that enables them to maintain power can hold them 
accountable for foreign policy and military blunders.61  
The political costs associated with incurring casualties have long led political and military 
leaders to pursue ways of conducting operations with less risk to friendly troops. These approaches 
generally involve either tactics or systems that can threaten adversaries while minimizing exposure 
to friendly forces. During Operation Allied Force, for instance, NATO relied on an air campaign, 
rather than ground forces, to strike Serbian military and strategic targets. To further minimize the 
risk posed by Serbian air defenses, many of these strikes were carried out from high-altitudes 
beyond the reach of anti-aircraft artillery, even though doing so came at the risk of accuracy and 
mission effectiveness.62  In other cases, specialized assets like stealth aircraft that can evade enemy 
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detection are used to mitigate risk to friendly forces.63 Drones represent one such risk-reducing 
technology. Indeed, the crews that fly platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft 
are typically located thousands of miles away from the battlefields where their aircraft are 
physically operating.64 Unlike many earlier forms of risk reducing technologies that still required 
personnel to be on the physical battlefield, remotely operated systems leave virtually no chance 
that friendly personnel will be captured or killed on the battlefield. 
Because drones substantially reduce the risk to friendly forces and to expensive platforms, 
they may allow decisionmakers to undertake military operations they might not otherwise conduct. 
Assuming that drones can accomplish the same mission with similar levels of efficacy, the lower 
overall expected human costs associated with missions conducted with drones (relative to manned 
assets) means that drones should offer a higher expected utility for completing a mission. This 
means that states with drones may launch military operations that would not be initiated if only 
manned systems or ground forces are available. This yields the first testable hypothesis:  
Increased Initiation (H1): All else equal, states are more likely to launch 
military operations when drones can substitute for manned assets or 
ground forces. 
 
This may be particularly true in cases where decisionmakers view the objective as insufficiently 
worthy of risking casualties of friendly forces and the loss of expensive assets. Yet drone use need 
not be limited to peripheral, low stakes cases. Drones can also substitute for manned assets on 
higher stakes crises. 
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 To be clear, the increased initiation logic does not suggest that decisionmakers will always 
deploy drones because they are a lower risk alternative to manned assets. In some cases, 
decisionmakers may select drones because of their operating characteristics. For instance, the 
longer endurance of drones vis-à-vis manned platforms make them well suited for dull or time-
intensive missions. Military planners, for instance, sometimes rely on drones rather than manned 
aircraft if missions must cover vast amounts of territory, traverse a long distance to a target area, 
or loiter over a target for many hours.65 In these cases, reduced risk to friendly forces comes as an 
incidental benefit of their selection. In other cases, a manned asset might have capabilities better 
suited to a given mission. For instance, if tasked to carry out an airstrike on a large, hardened 
target, planners may prefer a manned bomber over a drone because of the former’s higher weapons 
payload. The capabilities gap should decrease as drone capabilities increase. Indeed, the U.S. Air 
Force’s newest bomber, the B-21 Raider, is designed to be operated either as a traditionally 
inhabited aircraft or as a remotely piloted platform.66 Finally, decisionmakers may also be reluctant 
to deploy new technologies for fear of revealing sensitive capabilities to an adversary. Revealing 
emerging capabilities can eliminate the element of surprise associated with using a new system 
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Stabilizing Mechanism 1: Restrained Retaliation   
By lowering the cost of military operations, drones recalibrate the calculus on the use of 
force. The expected costs of conducting military operations affect not only decisions to initiate 
military operations – as existing theories contend –  but should also influence decisions on whether 
to escalate. The more actors value the object at stake, the more they will expend in effort and 
resources to obtain it from a rival, guard it from adversaries, or avenge its loss. When the perceived 
value is low, actors have fewer reasons to aggressively defend it or retaliate after it is attacked. 
Indeed, certain military operations may not meet what Richard Smoke called the “salience 
criterion,” falling below the threshold of escalation that warrants retaliation.68 Low-intensity 
attacks or covert action may even be tacitly accepted and publicly ignored – especially if the 
actions are not publicized or are plausibly deniable. These incidents often do not elicit direct 
retaliation, helping to control escalation or deescalate crises by providing off-ramps to escalatory 
spirals.69 A less intense response – or lack of a response – is subsequently less likely to trigger 
rival counter-reactions that could set off a destabilizing escalatory spiral.   
An attack on a drone may be more likely to fall below the salience criterion than an attack 
on an inhabited asset. Since no friendly pilot or crewmembers are captured or killed in the downing 
of a drone, military and civilian leaders may feel less of a need to punish a rival or launch an 
intrusive personnel recovery mission. Indeed, the loss of a drone might be ignored or disavowed 
in a way that is not possible when an inhabited asset is lost.  As one Air Force intelligence planner 
explained, when “there are [pilots] on the ground screaming in pain” there is an emotional reaction 
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that is not present in cases where a drone is lost.70 Incidents involving captured or killed crews can 
also stay in news headlines and generate public opinion that shapes military operations, something 
that is less likely when only a machine is lost.71 This higher risk of escalatory retaliation to the 
downing of a manned aircraft appears across regime types. As one retired Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army officer put it, “losing a machine is not the same as losing a life.”72 
Instrumental and emotional factors may create escalatory pressures after attacks on an 
actor’s military forces. On one hand, responses can be rationally motivated efforts to discourage 
future harm. These retaliatory measures are typically intended to degrade an adversary’s 
warfighting potential or threaten future damage by signaling the “power to hurt.”73 These 
responses, sometimes described as “negative reciprocity,” attempt to alter a rival’s behavior using  
a tit-for-tat logic to inflict a similar amount of harm to that of the initial transgression.74 To be 
effective, Schelling suggests these reprisals be unambiguously connected to and in the same scale 
– or “currency” – as the rival’s initial actions.75 Nikita Khrushchev, for instance, threatened to 
strike U-2 spy plane bases in Norway and Pakistan in response to repeated violations of Soviet 
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airspace by the aircraft.76 In 2018 Israeli forces destroyed Syrian air defense sites after a Syrian 
surface to air missile shot down an Israeli F-16 fighter jet.77  
As the perceived value of the asset attacked increases, actors may face pressure to escalate 
vertically or ratchet up the intensity of their response. Military and civilian leaders may believe 
more significant action is necessary to achieve an adequate tit-for-tat response. At the same time, 
the general public may demand more assertive forms of retaliation in the face of more costly 
losses.78 In turn, policymakers may be driven to action by the fear of the political costs for failing 
to respond sufficiently. These responses, in turn, have potential to elicit a more significant counter-
reaction that pushes interaction up the escalation ladder.  
 Another large body of research suggests responses to adversary activity also have 
emotional and psychological underpinnings. These studies are encapsulated by Neta Crawford’s 
argument that emotions are “institutionalized in the structures and processes of world politics.”79 
Emotions like anger serve as a “switch” that activates behavior that can lead decisionmakers to 
adopt non-instrumental behavior or take harsh action against adversaries.80 Practitioners like Carl 
von Clausewitz also acknowledge that “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity…are to be 
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regarded as a blind natural force” that play a central role in conflict.81 The death or capture of 
personnel is likely to trigger greater feelings of loss and anger than the loss of a machine.  
 Attacks carried out by adversaries can generate emotions of anger or perceptions that the 
honor of a targeted group is at stake. The emotions may trigger a behavioral reaction aimed at 
avenging a loss or providing defense.82 In addition, emotions may shape how actors interpret 
events and affect their decisions on the use of force.83 Anger, for instance, can lead to harsher 
policies in response to a rival’s actions.84 Adversary actions may also be perceived as an affront to 
national honor – a challenge to prestige that triggers a “don’t tread on me” mindset to defend one’s 
interests and avenge violations.85 Certain actions – including those that result in the loss of lives 
during crises – may be seen as particularly provocative and honor-infringing.86 It follows that 
actions that trigger negative or protective emotional responses are likely to trigger responses that 
can lead to escalation. 
Leaders frequently invoke the notion of state honor to justify escalatory behavior: President 
Johnson, for instance, characterized North Vietnam’s alleged attack on naval vessels in the Tonkin 
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Gulf as an attack on American honor.87 Responding to these attacks can then be regarded as 
avenging a perceived threat to one’s identity and standing. In extreme cases, the desire to defend 
honor and standing can lead states to pursue these goals at the expense of more instrumental 
objectives.88 In other words, prestige and honor sometimes supplant material objectives as the ends 
of military operations. 
Just as greater perceived losses trigger larger instrumentally-driven responses, they should 
also result in larger emotionally-driven reactions. Psychologists argue that the intensity of an 
actor’s behavior is defined in part by the external events that elicit the behavior.89 In other words, 
more offensive or damaging provocations evoke more intense reactions. When an affront is 
perceived as particularly grievous, actors may carry out emotion-driven acts of revenge that are 
disproportionate to the initial harm. This clearly presents a risk of further escalation.90 Indeed, 
Tversky and Kahneman’s seminal research on prospect theory finds that actors take riskier actions 
when faced with significant perceived losses than when seeking comparable gains.91 Scholars 
applying prospect theory to international relations find that states are likely to initiate risky military 
escalation when responding to acts that are perceived as grievous affronts to national honor or 
reputation. 92 When actions are seen as less of an affront, actors may avoid recognizing the incident 
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as a challenge and minimize their response, helping to deescalate the situation.93 By removing 
friendly personnel from the front lines and by putting an asset with a lower unit cost on the front 
lines, the loss of a drone should be less likely to trigger the emotional and instrumental responses 
as an  attack on a manned asset. 
Restrained Retaliation (H2): Actors will take more restrained retaliation 
after the loss of a drone to enemy activity than to the loss of a manned 
asset.  
 
The lower value attached to drones may not only restrain retaliation after they are lost to 
enemy action, but may also affect how actors use force against their rivals’ drones. Since 
decisionmakers often practice mirror imaging, they may assume their rivals will respond in the 
same way following the loss of a drone.94 If an actor anticipates its adversary will take a limited 
response to the downing of a remotely piloted aircraft, the actor may make the calculated decision 
to take more aggressive action against an intruding rival drone. In the minds of military 
decisionmakers, taking action against drones may provide a relatively low risk means to conduct 
strategic signaling or generate military effects. Attacking drones that have violated national 
airspace or territorial waters can eliminate a threat, signal displeasure with a rival’s policies or 
operations, and provide an opportunity to seize a rival’s equipment to obtain intelligence 
information or a physical bargaining chip – all with a perceived lower risk of adversary retaliation 
than interfering with a rival’s manned assets. Indeed, taking aggressive action against drones, but 
not manned assets may demonstrate an actor’s decision to not cross an escalatory threshold. This 
yields a third testable hypothesis:  
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Amplified Aggression (H3):  Actors will take more aggressive action 
against remotely operated assets (drones) than against manned assets 
because they anticipate a less aggressive adversary reaction.  
 
It is worth noting that actors on the receiving end of drone missions might perceive an 
armed drone as more threatening than a reconnaissance drone. Armed aircraft possess the 
capability to carry out strikes, and therefore might be interpreted as more aggressive than their 
unarmed counterparts. Indeed, many military shows of force missions are conducted using aircraft 
like bombers and fighters, not unarmed reconnaissance assets.95 As a result, states on the receiving 
end may be more prone to take escalatory actions against an armed drone than against an unarmed 
one. Yet, states on the receiving end of drone missions may still initiate escalatory action regardless 
of whether a drone is armed or unarmed. Military decisionmakers may be unable to distinguish 
armed from unarmed drones. Many remotely piloted aircraft are multiple-role platforms capable 
of conducting reconnaissance and strike missions – often simultaneously. While radars and other 
detection systems should be able to distinguish between manned and unmanned aircraft, they may 
be unable to distinguish whether an aircraft is armed or the purpose of its mission.96 Over time, 
the distinction between armed and unarmed drones will likely become less salient as states acquire 
increasingly advanced multirole drones capable of conducting a range of missions.  
Further, actors may not always take action against a rival’s remotely operated assets. A 
broader set of international factors, domestic political conditions, and the preferences of leaders 
involved with each potential incident ultimately shape whether states will take aggressive, 
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defensive measures. Holding all of these factors equal, however, actors will take more aggressive 
action against drones than manned platforms. The logic underlying the amplified aggression 
hypothesis should also apply beyond purely defensive actions. If actors believe that taking strikes 
on unmanned assets is unlikely to trigger a significant response, they may be willing to initiate 
aggressive action against these platforms in a variety of circumstances. For example, a state might 
target a rival’s drones operating in international airspace or on the high seas – an act that would 
generally not be considered defensive under international law. A targeted state might, however, 
view this type of offensive attack as more threatening than a narrow defensive attack of a drone. 
Attacks on the drones in international airspace and waters may increase the risk of subsequent 
escalation, yet less than a similar attack on a manned asset.  
Stabilizing Mechanism 2: Overcoming Information Asymmetries  
 International relations scholars widely agree that conflicts erupt when states disagree or 
misperceive their relative strength vis-à-vis a rival.97 States initiate the use of force when they 
believe an adversary lacks the capability or will to put up a fight, or when they perceive the stakes 
involved to outweigh the expected costs of fighting. They come to negotiated settlements once 
actual expectations about the consequences of fighting are revealed – often through combat. In 
theory, states can avoid fighting altogether and proceed directly to a peaceful settlement if both 
sides know their rival’s true capabilities and intentions. This, however, is far easier said than done. 
States have incentives to mask and misrepresent their willingness and ability to fight in order to 
protect their future bargaining position.98 
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 Technologies that help overcome information asymmetries concerning states’ capabilities 
and resolve can enable escalation control in three primary ways: revealing that a potential rival has 
no hostile intent or capability; providing information that reveals the adversary has a military 
advantage, deterring action by the threat of denial; and by providing information that allows actors 
to target rivals in a more precise manner. Technology can therefore promote transparency in a way 
that tempers and/or tailors the use of force. However, at times transparency can generate 
incentives for the use of force, something I explain below. 
 Drones provide an excellent means of collecting information on a potential rival’s 
capabilities and even its intentions. Platforms like the U.S. Air Force’s RQ-4 Global Hawk high 
altitude remotely piloted aircraft can simultaneously collect geospatial intelligence (imagery that 
can pinpoint the disposition of forces and shed light on a rival’s military capabilities) and signals 
intelligence (intercepts of communications and electronic emissions that can yield insight on a 
rival’s plans and operations).99 To be sure, states typically possess a host of intelligence collection 
capabilities to collect this sort of information including spies, satellites, and manned 
reconnaissance aircraft and ships.100 Drones, however, can overcome several limitations associated 
with other intelligence collection systems. 101  For instance, drones may be able to operate below 
cloud cover that can prevent some satellites from gathering imagery of targets.102 In addition, many 
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drones can also loiter over and track targets for periods far longer than their manned counterparts 
or satellites. Unlike these “transient observers,” which have difficulty monitoring and tacking 
targets, the persistence of drones allows decisionmakers to track mobile targets and military 
leaders or monitor facilities like missile sites or command and control centers for evidence of 
changes in operational status.103  
 More importantly, drones may allow for continued intelligence collection in high-risk 
areas. These high-risk areas are often precisely where the need to overcome information 
asymmetries is most important for helping to control escalation. High risk areas may be where the 
most important information about a state’s capabilities and intentions are located, but also present 
the highest costs of entry due to the risk of hostile action.104 Although adversaries might be more 
prone to shoot down a drone than a manned asset, intelligence collection need not be permanently 
degraded. While the downing of a drone may temporarily hamper or halt intelligence gathering, 
the option to restart drone operations may exist even after an adversary takes hostile action. This 
contrasts with attacks on manned platforms, which have historically led to the suspension of 
reconnaissance operations, attacks on drones do not involve the loss of friendly personnel.105  
States may subsequently be more willing to continue drone reconnaissance missions after 
a shootdown. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the lower costs associated with drone 
losses provide a “sustainability” that is absent after attacks on manned platforms.106 While military 
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planners argue that the loss of a remotely piloted aircraft “isn’t costless,” they are often viewed as 
more expendable than manned ones.107 The sustainability of intelligence gathering can also be 
increased by enhancing the survivability of drones in contested environments. The U.S. military, 
for instance, developed the RQ-170, a low-observable remotely piloted reconnaissance aircraft 
that was reportedly used to penetrate deep into well-defended Pakistani airspace during the Osama 
Bin Laden raid and to spy on Iran’s nuclear program.108  
If drones provide decisionmakers with intelligence that overcomes information 
asymmetries, they may help temper escalatory dynamics. On one hand, drones might reveal that a 
potential rival harbors no hostile intent or limited military capability. If a rival harbors no ill will 
or is not preparing for an attack, intelligence may lessen fears of aggression and eliminate the need 
for preemptive military action. This reasoning played a role in the Eisenhower administration’s 
attempts to establish an Open Skies program during the height of the Cold War.109 The program 
called for the United States and Soviet Union to overtly fly reconnaissance aircraft through each 
other’s airspace as a transparency-promoting confidence building measure. The hope was that 
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transparency would reduce information asymmetries between the rival superpowers and prevent 
surprise attacks.110  
On the other hand, drone-gathered intelligence might reveal that an adversary is more 
capable than initially thought. This could result in what deterrence expert Glenn Snyder termed 
“deterrence by denial.”111 Under this logic, the revelation that a rival has greater relative military 
capabilities or will to fight changes the cost-benefit calculus for conflict. A potential attacker 
should be deterred from taking action if the defender can raise the cost of fighting to the point that 
victory cannot be achieved without suffering high costs.112   
Tempered Targeting (H4A): All else equal, states are more likely to 
deploy drones than inhabited assets on reconnaissance missions, 
providing information that reduces the likelihood of large-scale military 
operations. 
 
In some cases, drone-gathered intelligence might not temper conflict dynamics, but instead 
make targeting more tailored or precise. This assumes, however, that intelligence is analyzed 
accurately, something that rivals may try to make difficult through the use of denial and deception 
techniques.  Although militaries have long had the ability to launch accurate strikes – using tools 
like precision guided munitions or special operations forces – drones have helped refine the 
targeting process. One of the key challenges of military operations is target acquisition.113  
Commanders must locate and track targets before striking them with munitions. This can be 
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difficult when state and non-state actors adopt what Stephen Biddle calls the “modern system” – 
an approach to warfighting that involves concealing and camouflaging troop movements and 
employing highly maneuverable forces.114 Drones may help overcome this challenge. Coupling 
persistent, accurate intelligence with enhanced strike capabilities enables decisionmakers to use 
force more discriminately. More accurate intelligence can reduce the likelihood of flawed targeting 
that can result in unnecessary destruction. Or, it can help commanders employ their forces more 
efficiently and precisely. For instance, drones might be used as an alternative to a large ground 
operation to eliminate an adversary leader, or a mobile target. 
Tailored Targeting (H4B): All else equal, states are more likely to deploy 
drones than inhabited assets on reconnaissance missions, providing 
information that makes targeting more precise and discriminate.  
 
Remaining Restrained? 
Although drones can enable more tailored targeting or allow for more restrained retaliation 
than attacks on manned assets, there are circumstances where drones may not have escalation 
ameliorating effects. Repeated attacks on drones, destruction of drone-related infrastructure that is 
tied to broader command and control networks, and drone-launched strikes that a targeted actor 
perceives as posing an existential threat may all lead to crisis escalation.  
First, what happens when an adversary attacks multiple drones – either simultaneously or 
over time? Can these repeated attacks cross a threshold or ratchet up pressure that triggers a less 
restrained response? No actor enjoys losing military assets, regardless of whether they are 
inhabited or remotely operated. Even though losing a drone does not involve the loss of life and 
the associated political consequences, it is not costless and can leave an actor without the capacity 
to conduct military operations. Losing multiple drones can exacerbate these issues. Even so, 
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having multiple drone losses is still more conducive to a restrained response than the loss of 
multiple manned assets. Regardless of how many drones are lost, the number of killed or captured 
crew members remains at zero. Under the logic of restrained retaliation, actors will, at worst, adopt 
a tit-for-tat response to repeated drone shootdowns.115 Demand for escalation may be further 
dampened as the length of time between incidents increases.  
A second way that drones may contribute to escalation is by making it easier for states to 
carry out strikes on adversary targets. Unfortunately, the same type of transparency that helps to 
temper or tailor targeting may not always contribute to stability. As one leading scholar of 
transparency in international relations argues, “transparency is not an unmitigated good.”116 
Another scholar suggests “information is good on average, but can be good, bad, or neutral in any 
particular instance.”117 Drone gathered intelligence might provide decisionmakers with 
information that leads them to initiate attacks they otherwise would not have.  Intelligence, for 
instance, might reveal that an adversary has crossed a red line that triggers military action. Or, 
drones might collect intelligence that allows a state to launch preemptive strikes or to adopt a 
counter-force nuclear strategy. Launching a first strike or targeting a rival’s nuclear arsenal 
demands vast amounts of intelligence: stationary and mobile targets must be located and tracked 
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and command and control networks monitored.118 Drones can play an important role in the 
intelligence infrastructure required to launch this type of destabilizing operation.119  
Increasing the frequency of strikes can increase the number of instances in which a targeted 
state could take retaliatory action – complete with legal justification to use military force in self-
defense. Attacks on a state’s infrastructure or citizenry might spur public demands for retaliation 
– with little thought given to whether inhabited or remotely operated systems launched the strikes. 
Retaliation may be particularly likely if strikes cause significant civilian casualties or destroy 
critical infrastructure – like command and control nodes and leadership – that play a key role in 
national defense.120 
 A third way that drone operations can contribute to escalation is through inadvertent 
actions. Thus far, escalation has been treated as a strategic process that results from the calculated 
decisions of statesmen and military officials. History, however, tells us that chance events, 
misperception, and accidents often dictate whether a crisis escalates or fizzles out.121 The Cold 
War was rife with unplanned events that could have – and sometimes did – set off escalatory 
spirals. At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance, a direct confrontation between U.S. 
and Soviet forces almost erupted when Soviet fighter jets were dispatched to intercept a U.S. Air 
Force U-2 reconnaissance plane that had unintentionally penetrated deep into Soviet airspace 
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during an air sampling mission.122 Defense analysts have also expressed concern that attacks on 
dual-use military infrastructure – like communication satellites and military command and control 
facilities – that support both conventional and nuclear operations could be perceived as the start of 
a preemptive nuclear strike, even if a rival’s intentions are more limited. This misperception could 
lead targeted states to initiate significant – and even potentially nuclear – retaliation in response.123  
 The nature and organization of drone operations raise similar concerns of inadvertent 
escalation. First, the purpose and intentions behind drone missions may be misperceived. Drones 
are capable of carrying out a variety of missions ranging from peacetime intelligence gathering to 
airstrikes in combat settings. Since states often assume the worst of their adversaries, leaders might 
assume that a rival’s drone operations pose a more significant threat than they actually do.124 As a 
result – and because of the lower perceived risk of escalation associated with targeting drones – 
military decisionmakers may be less cautious about ascribing hostile intent to their rival’s drones, 
potentially leading them to take hostile action.  In the worst case, decisionmakers could assume 
that a rival’s drone operations signal the start of a broader offensive mission, triggering a 
destabilizing preemptive strike. Second, attacks on a drone system may be misperceived as more 
escalatory than the attacking state intended. Most remote warfighting technologies, like drones, 
are complex systems with several interconnected nodes. In the case of drones, for instance, this 
network includes not only a remotely piloted aircraft, but also a geographically distributed 
command facilities, intelligence analysis centers, and communications nodes. Striking one of these 
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nodes might be viewed as a more significant attack that (unintentionally) crosses an escalation 
threshold, triggering a significant response from the rival. Similar risks, however, exist even 
without the introduction of remotely operated assets.125 
The Multiple Actors Shaping Escalation Dynamics 
 As described earlier, weapons do not make war. Instead, decisions about the use of force 
are the result of choices made by civilian and military decisionmakers, who frequently take into 
account the preferences of the domestic public. For drones to increase the frequency with which 
military forces are deployed, but decrease the likelihood of broader escalation, members of all 
three groups must believe in the tenets that underpin technology-enabled escalation control theory. 
This does not mean that preferences of civilian decisionmakers, military leaders, and the public 
must be perfectly aligned. Indeed, disagreement over policy preferences can easily exist among 
members of each group. The theory, however, is based largely on the preference for reducing the 
risk of casualties and the cost of war – principles that should be broadly shared.126  
 One body of literature suggests that members of the public can influence the policies that 
government decisionmakers adopt – in both democratic and non-democratic settings.127 Leaders 
are accountable to their supporters, and implementing policies that are incongruent with 
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constituent preferences can lead to political consequences: elected officials can be retrospectively 
punished by being voted out of office, while leaders in non-democratic settings can be sanctioned 
by the coalition that guarantees their grasp on power.128  Foreign policy, in particular, appears to 
be an important issue area for the public in both democratic states129 and autocratic ones.130  
Because of the importance of foreign policy to the selectorate, government leaders often enact 
policies that are congruent with public preferences.131  
 While some scholars have argued that governments are relatively impervious to 
constituent opinion, the actions of policymakers across time and space tell a different story.132 
Instead of ignoring the public, government officials appear to dedicate significant time and 
resources to monitoring the opinions of the average citizen. President George W. Bush established 
the White House Office of Strategic Initiatives to track public opinion polls, and President Donald 
Trump often appears responsive to the preferences of his political base.133 Given the costs 
associated with monitoring public opinion and the ability of the domestic public to constrain policy 
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implementation, leaders almost certainly at least consider constituent preferences prior to making 
major foreign policy decisions.  
 In addition to public opinion, military decisionmakers also shape state behavior. At the 
strategic level, military practitioners advise senior civilian leaders on national security policy and 
military operations. Their guidance, which is generally based on extensive operational expertise, 
can inform the policies that a state ultimately adopts. 134 Even at the tactical and operational levels, 
the actions of military officers can have far reaching consequences that shape strategic interaction 
between states. A decision by a mid-grade officer to shoot down an adversary aircraft, for instance, 
can lead to the ratcheting up of tensions between states. At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
for instance, a Soviet Air Defense officer deployed in Cuba made the decision to shoot down a 
U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflying the island, without the approval of his 
superiors in Moscow. This decision, made by a single military officer operating at the tactical 
level, led to deliberations at the highest levels of the U.S. government on how to respond.135 
Although military officers are only one component of much broader national security 
bureaucracies, their advice and actions can have significant implications on the international 
security environment.  
 While decisionmakers and members of the public may hold preferences regarding when 
and how to employ drones and whether to take actions against a rival’s drones, several factors 
shape if and how these preferences are translated into action. First, decisionmakers face political 
                                                        
134 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises; H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998); Elizabeth N. Saunders, 
“Leaders, Advisers, and the Political Origins of Elite Support for War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 10 
(November 2018): 2118–49. 
135 Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 230–53. 
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constraints. Politically, decisionmakers may be concerned about the domestic political 
consequences of their actions. For instance, will deploying drones trigger domestic condemnation 
of a leader’s foreign policies? The U.S. intelligence community’s use of armed drones for targeted 
counter terrorism operations, for instance has garnered criticism from members of the American 
public. Decisionmakers may also be constrained by international norms and laws. For example, a 
nation might seek to launch drones into a rival’s airspace or attack a competitor’s drones in 
international airspace. Doing so, however, would – under most circumstances – violate 
international law and potentially generate adverse political consequences. This of course is not to 
say that decisionmakers will avoid initiating action using drones, but that they must consider the 
potential consequences before taking action. Indeed, as I explore in the conclusion chapter, drone 
use may redefine the international norms and customary international law related to the use of 
force.  
 Decisionmakers and the public must also contend with operational constraints. Although 
there may be broad support for taking military action, a state may simply lack the military 
capability to do so. For instance, a state might not have the air defense systems to down an 
intruding drone. Or, initiating military activity in a new theater might result in assets being shifted 
from another theater, potentially decreasing the state’s warfighting capability in the original 
theater. States may also have difficulty obtaining basing or overflight access for drones and other 
remotely operated systems, in part because their operating characteristics are a new concept to 
partner nation officials.136 Consequently, decisionmakers may be precluded from using drones, 
even if they seek to.  
 
                                                        
136 Interview with US Air Force airspace planner, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 2 June 2016.  
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SUMMARIZING TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED ESCALATION CONTROL 
Table 2.1: Summary of Hypotheses 
(H1): Increased Initiation All else equal, states are more likely to launch military operations when drones can substitute for manned assets or 
ground forces. 
(H2): Restrained Retaliation Actors will take more restrained retaliation after the loss of a 
drone to enemy activity than to the loss of a manned asset.  
(H3): Amplified Aggression 
Actors will take more aggressive action against remotely 
operated assets (drones) than against manned assets because 
they anticipate a less aggressive adversary reaction.  
(H4A): Tempered Targeting 
All else equal, states are more likely to deploy drones than 
inhabited assets on reconnaissance missions, providing 
information that reduces the likelihood of large-scale 
operations. 
(H4B): Tailored Targeting 
All else equal, states are more likely to deploy drones than 
inhabited assets on reconnaissance missions, providing 
information that makes targeting more precise and 
discriminate.  
 
I summarize key elements of technology-enabled escalation control theory in Figure 1. The 
decision tree captures the increased initiation, amplified aggression, and restrained retaliation 
hypotheses as decision points – or nodes – in a multi-stage game featuring inhabited and remotely 
piloted aircraft.137 It illustrates that the availability of drones expands a leader’s policy menu, 
increases the likelihood that a state will deploy military forces, and reduces the likelihood of 
escalation relative to the deployment of manned platforms. Drones make it easier for leaders to 
initiate crises, increasing the likelihood that they launch military operations in cases they would 
not have in the absence of drones. At the same time, escalation should be less likely conditional 
on the deployment of a drone rather than a manned asset.  
                                                        
137 I am grateful to Rex Brynen for using a similar game tree to describe an earlier iteration of this project. See, 
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2019/01/11/lin-greenberg-drones-escalation-and-experimental-wargames/. 
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Figure 2.1: Technology-Enabled Escalation Control as a Decision Tree 
 
At the first decision node, State 1 decides whether to launch an operation. Decisionmakers 
select from an increased menu of policy options that includes taking no action, deploying a manned 
aircraft, or deploying a remotely piloted aircraft. Under the increased initiation logic, I suggest 
that on this notional mission, leaders will be more likely to deploy a drone than a manned aircraft 
or taking no action. If State 1 chooses not to deploy an asset, the game ends with no escalation. If, 
however, State 1 launches a manned aircraft or drone, State 2 must then decide how to respond. 
 When confronted with a potentially threatening aircraft, State 2 selects from a set of options 
that ranges from doing nothing to shooting down the aircraft. I simplify the strategy set in the 
stylized game to include only shooting down the aircraft and not shooting down the aircraft. 
According to the amplified aggression logic, there is a higher probability an adversary will shoot 
down a drone than a manned asset. If State 2 chooses not to down the aircraft, the game ends with 
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no further escalation. If, however, State 2 downs the aircraft, State 1 must then decide how to 
respond. 
 In response to an attack on a drone, State 1 can then take a variety of responses. I simplify 
those response strategies into three categories: large retaliation, minor retaliation, or no action. If 
State 1 does not respond to the shootdown, the game ends with no further escalation. Yet large or 
minor retaliation can lead to major or minor escalation, respectively. According to the restrained 
retaliation logic, states are more likely to take large acts of retaliation than minor retaliation or no 
action when a manned asset is lost to enemy activity. In comparison, decisionmakers are more 
likely to take no action or minor retaliation than large retaliation in response to the shootdown of 
a drone. The stylized game illustrates how drones can affect escalation dynamics. In an actual 
contingency, several factors – including the threat environment and the risk tolerance of particular 
decisionmakers – may shape the probabilities with which these decisions play out. In the next 
chapter, I introduce a multi-method research design to test the theory, and then present the 
empirical findings in chapters 4 through 7. 
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 Studying the effect of new technology on interstate relations is a challenging endeavor, 
chiefly because the data on emerging military systems is scant. Because of their relative newness, 
emerging technologies have a limited operational history. Moreover, real world data that do exist 
often remain classified and hidden from researchers. In other words, the shorter operational history 
of emerging systems simply provides fewer cases to observe and analyze, and much of the 
documentary evidence associated with these systems remains locked in secret networks or 
archives. Indeed, militaries have incentives to mask information about their newest or most 
sensitive technologies to maintain an edge over rivals. As a result, research on emerging military 
technologies often abstracts from a limited number of cases, making it difficult to develop more 
generalizable inferences. 
Relying solely on observations of real-world deployments can therefore pose several 
challenges to research. First, when states publicize details on the development and employment of 
these systems, they often do so in a carefully calculated manner. States, for instance, may not 
release information about the operational failures or combat losses of these systems. This selective 
release of information can leave researchers with incomplete information with which to make 
assessments.138 Second, observational evidence does not allow researchers to observe the 
                                                        
138 The United States Government, for instance, kept information about its nuclear submarine and stealth aircraft 
programs under tight wraps for decades. Scholars interested in studying how these systems affected military 
operations, battlefield outcomes, and decision-making were hard pressed to do so until information about was 
declassified. For examples of this sort of work see Jasper Welch, “Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft and 
Cruise Missiles,” International Security 14, no. 2 (1989): 47–63; Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew, and Annette 
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counterfactual condition where the new technology is not present in a given instance. More 
formally, researchers face the fundamental problem of causal inference: they cannot see how a 
specific event or crisis plays out both with and without the new technology.139 Experimental 
approaches – in which researchers aim to simulate, or exploit, decision settings while varying the 
presence of a variable of interest – can overcome the fundamental problem of causal inference. 
However, experiments often prompt concerns about the external validity of their findings.  
To overcome these research challenges and to provide a richer and more theoretically 
driven analysis to test technology-enabled escalation control theory, I employ a mixed methods 
research design that features three distinct methodological approaches: original survey 
experiments, experimental manipulations embedded in wargames played by military 
professionals, and case studies of U.S. drone use during the Cold War and Israel’s use of drones 
from 1967 to the present.140 The survey experiments and wargames generate data intended to 
overcome the scarce publicly available data about situations where drone use is considered, albeit 
in a simulated operating environment. To move beyond hypothetical scenarios in the experimental 
components of the research design, the case studies draw from more than 80 interviews of national 
security practitioners and policymakers, together with archival materials – including some 
                                                        
Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story Of American Submarine Espionage (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 1998). 
139 For more on the potential outcomes framework and the fundamental problem of causal inference, see Paul W. 
Holland, “Statistics and Causal Inference,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 81, no. 396 (1986): 945–
60; Donald B. Rubin, “Causal Inference Using Potential Outcomes,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 
100, no. 469 (March 2005): 322–31. 
140 For discussion of multi-methods research approaches see, David Collier and Colin Elman, “Qualitative and 
Multimethod Research: Organizations, Publications, and Reflections on Integration,” in The Oxford Handbook on 
Political Methodology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 779–95; Jeb Barnes and Nicholas Weller, “Case 
Studies and Analytic Transparency in Causal-Oriented Mixed-Methods Research,” PS: Political Science & Politics 
50, no. 4 (October 2017): 1019–22. 
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declassified specifically for this project, and analysis of media reports and works of historians to 
provide the broader context needed for robust qualitative theory testing.  
These three components of the research design are important for two reasons. First, each 
methodological approach probes whether and how drones influence the preferences of different 
actors toward escalation. Second, the different approaches produce different types of data, yielding 
a more complete understanding of the effect of drones on escalation dynamics and stability. Survey 
experiments fielded on public samples in the United States and expert American military samples 
allow for precise measurement of the causal effect of drones on the escalation preferences of the 
general population and military decisionmakers. The wargames capture interaction between 
American military professionals and generate rich qualitative data that shed light on the 
mechanisms underlying technology-enabled escalation control – data that is not produced when 
respondents complete surveys fielded via the internet.  The case studies enable analysis of elite 
decision-making by civilian and military leaders in a real world setting.  
By triangulating data from each component of the multi-dimensional research design, I 
layer quantitative and qualitative data that allow me to identify both the effect of drones on 
escalation dynamics and the mechanisms that shape these effects.141 The remainder of this chapter 
describes the rationale and implementation of each element of the research design and discusses 
the trade-offs associated with each methodological approach.  
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES 
 As a first cut at testing technology-enabled escalation control theory, I use a variety of 
original experiments. Experimental approaches, which have become increasingly common in 
                                                        
141 On triangulation see, Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science,” The 
American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (1995): 473–74. 
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international relations research, are valuable in that they allow researchers to precisely control the 
variables to which subjects are exposed.142 Researchers can subsequently measure the effects of 
these variables on specific outcomes of interest. So long as experimental subjects are randomly 
assigned to control and treatment conditions that are identical other than presence or absence of 
treatment, the population of each of the groups is, in expectation, identical. As a result, any 
differences in the outcomes that exist between treatment and control groups can be attributed solely 
to the researcher’s manipulation of treatment. In other words, experiments overcome the 
fundamental problem of causal inference described earlier and allow researchers to measure the 
average treatment effect of a variable of interest. This precise causal inference enables more 
effective theory testing, particularly in situations where observational data is scarce or 
unavailable.143 
 In chapters four and five I use both survey experiments and experimental manipulations 
embedded in military wargames to test technology-enabled escalation control. The survey 
experiments ask respondents for their opinions on various crisis scenarios – including the hostile 
shootdown of a friendly reconnaissance aircraft, the initial use of force against a rival, and the 
penetration of friendly airspace by a rival’s attack aircraft. In these experiments, I randomly vary 
whether drones or manned assets are involved. Fielding the experiments on both expert and public 
                                                        
142 Some well known examples of experimental research in international relations are, Michael Tomz, “Domestic 
Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization 61, no. 4 (2007): 
821–40; Joshua D. Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); 
Michaela Mattes and Jessica L. P. Weeks, “Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach,” American Journal 
of Political Science 63, no. 1 (2019): 53–66. 
143 For a more in-depth discussion of experimental approaches in political science, see: Rebecca B. Morton and 
Kenneth C. Williams, “Experimentation in Political Science,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. 
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, 1st Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
339–56; Alan S Gerber and Donald P Green, Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2012). 
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samples allows me to compare how drones affect preferences on escalation and the use of force 
among different actors within a state – specifically military officials and the public. 
Because survey experiments are imperfect representations of reality, I design and field a 
series of wargames that feature interstate crises similar to those in the survey experiments. Like 
the survey instrument, I vary whether wargaming teams are exposed to crises featuring drones or 
manned aircraft. The wargames, however, allow for interaction between national security 
practitioners in a way not possible with a computer delivered survey, shedding light on group 
dynamics. While wargames do not fully capture reality, they help to overcome some of the 
limitations of survey experimental research and provide insight into crisis decision-making.  
Survey Experiments 
 Examining how drones shape the individual level preferences of the public and military 
decisionmakers toward the use of force is an important step in understanding how these systems 
affect the likelihood of conflict onset and escalation. Given that the intent of this project is to 
understand how technology affects state behavior, why begin empirical analysis and hypothesis 
testing at the micro level? First, government policies are informed – at least in part – by public 
opinion, which represents an aggregation of individual level preferences.144 Leaders who hope to 
maintain support of their constituents may choose whether to use and escalate force in a way that 
aligns with their constituents’ preferences. Because of this, researchers should care about whether 
drones shape how individuals perceive the conditions under which military action or escalation is 
warranted.  
                                                        
144 The degree to which public opinion drives policy is a matter of scholarly debate. One proponent of the argument 
that public opinion matters is Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. 
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 Second, individual level beliefs and experiences can shape the decisions of national 
security practitioners. Indeed, a growing number of studies argue that elites make decisions based, 
in part, on their individual level biases and experiences.145 Third, free response questions in 
experiments with a unit of analysis at the individual level allow researchers to collect data on the 
mechanisms that underlie policy preferences. In other words, why do participants hold the views 
they espouse?  Fielding the survey instrument on different segments of the population and in 
multiple states allows for comparison of these individual-level mechanisms across the civilian 
military divide and in different national contexts. 
 While scholars have adopted a range of experimental techniques including experiments 
held in laboratories, in field settings, and those that result from naturally occurring randomization, 
recent international relations projects have relied largely on experiments embedded within 
surveys.146 In a typical survey experiment, respondents are first randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions. They are then presented with a vignette; these scenarios are near-identical across 
treatment conditions, however, researchers manipulate variables of interest between each group. 
After reading the vignette, respondents are asked for their opinions and preferences related to the 
scenario, allowing researchers to measure the causal effect of manipulating variables of interest. 
Most surveys also collect additional data on respondent characteristics, soliciting information on 
covariates such as age, gender, race, income, education levels, or political views. These data allow 
researchers to study heterogeneous treatment effects – variation in the effect of a variable of 
                                                        
145 Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis, Why Leaders Fight (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015); Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Studying Leaders and Military Conflict: Conceptual 
Framework and Research Agenda,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 10 (November 2018): 2072–86; Saunders, 
“Leaders, Advisers, and the Political Origins of Elite Support for War”; Cathy Xuanxuan Wu and Scott Wolford, 
“Leaders, States, and Reputations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 10 (November 1, 2018): 2087–2117. 
146 For an overview of experimental research in international relations, see Susan D. Hyde, “Experiments in 
International Relations: Lab, Survey, and Field,” Annual Review of Political Science 18, no. 1 (2015): 403–24. 
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interest given respondent characteristics.147 This analysis enables more nuanced assessments of 
the conditions under which treatments have the greatest effect on outcomes of interest.  
 Survey experiments are especially useful in international relations research where 
manipulating the factors associated with war and peace is both unethical and impractical. Instead 
of engineering conflicts between states, researchers field surveys with embedded experiments that 
ask questions about hypothetical crises, wars, or foreign policies to respondents recruited by 
polling firms or online services. Although highly practical, these experiments are not without 
limitations. Most significantly, scholars have questioned the external validity of findings from 
survey experiments, challenging whether inferences drawn in experimental settings hold true in 
the real world. Participants in experimental samples may behave differently than the broader public 
either because they are not a representative sample of the population, or because survey 
experiments simply do not come close to simulating an actual crisis situation.148 
 Despite these limitations, survey experiments are a useful tool for assessing the effect of 
military technology on the likelihood of conflict onset and escalation. Experimental data helps 
substitute for limited observational data. Most existing studies draw primarily from anecdotal 
observations, making it difficult to rigorously assess whether and how technologies like drones 
shape a state’s propensity to conduct or escalate military operations.149 Further, most public 
opinion data on drones and the use of force focus on their employment in contentious counter-
terrorism operations in which armed drones are used to target suspected terrorists.150 Use of drones 
                                                        
147 Gerber and Green, Field Experiments, 289–317. 
148 Jack Snyder and Erica Borghard, “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound,” The American Political 
Science Review 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 437–56; Hyde, “Experiments in International Relations,” 407. 
149 Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation.” 
150 For a summary of public opinion polling toward drone strikes see, Sarah Kreps, “Flying under the Radar: A 
Study of Public Attitudes towards Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Research & Politics 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 4–7; 
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in this context involves a complex set of moral, practical, and legal issues that makes it difficult to 
assess support for drones in other political or operational contexts. Survey experiments permit 
researchers to create the environments in which they seek to assess drone use. 
 Survey experiments also have several analytic benefits. First, survey experiments in 
international relations are grounded in the plausible assumption that experimental subjects will 
apply conceptual and cognitive processes in a manner similar to non-experimental, real world 
actors.151 In other words, researchers can still gain valuable insights into respondent preferences 
toward the use of force from survey experiments. In particular, respondents in expert samples may 
express opinions toward the use of force that mirror the preferences that would shape their 
decision-making during actual crises. Second, the individual level responses gathered during the 
survey experiments allow me to assess the alignment of preferences between respondents from 
different backgrounds and countries. This enables me to examine whether the preferences of 
military personnel and the general public toward the use of force are congruent, and to test the 
generalizability of technology-enabled escalation control beyond the United States. Finally, an 
experimental approach allows me to solicit individual level micro-foundations – factors that 
“explain outcomes at the aggregate level via dynamics at a lower level” – to more satisfyingly 
examine why drones affect preferences toward escalation and the use of force.152  
                                                        
For studies that examine public preferences regarding drone use in contexts other than counterinsurgency and 
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Survey Design and Implementation 
 To test technology-enabled escalation control theory, I field four separate experiments on 
respondents recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online labor market and three 
experiments on an expert sample of U.S. military officers. I also field a non-experimental scenario-
based vignette on the military sample. The design of each experiment – which I describe in greater 
detail below – varies whether remote warfighting technologies or manned forces are employed, 
enabling me to identify the causal effect of remote systems on preferences toward the use of force. 
The first and second public experiments assess whether the availability of drones affects 
public support for the initial deployment of military forces. The experiments describe a scenario 
in which the United States might be asked to deploy military force against a rival state, and ask 
respondents whether they would support such a mission. The third and fourth experiments examine 
whether the use of remote warfighting technologies affects public preferences toward military 
escalation. In the third experiment, respondents are presented with the shootdown of a friendly 
military aircraft. Respondents in the fourth experiment are asked how they would respond to the 
penetration of an enemy aircraft into  friendly airspace.153 The military scenarios are similar, 
although I also field a non-experimental survey question that asks participants to select either a 
manned or remotely piloted aircraft to conduct a potentially high-risk mission. I solicit two types 
of data in both the public and military samples. First, I solicit preferences toward military action 
using a Likert scale. Second, I use free response questions to identify the reasons underlying 
respondent preferences.  These data allow me probe the increased initiation, amplified aggression, 
and restrained retaliation hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter. 
                                                        
153 To prevent priming, the survey software randomizes the order in which respondents receive the experimental 
vignettes.  
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 The scenarios are intended to be realistic and represent events that have played out in the 
post-Cold War era: strikes on a rival’s military facilities, the shootdown of a friendly 
reconnaissance aircraft, and responding to the penetration of a hostile aircraft into friendly 
airspace. Although the average respondent in the public samples may not have spent much time 
considering these sorts of events prior to exposure to the survey instrument, the scenarios are 
highly plausible. To provide further specificity and context to respondents, each vignette includes 
details about the circumstances surrounding the hypothetical crisis, the type of U.S. military forces 
involved, and information about the hypothetical rival. The vignettes, however, do not specifically 
name the rival country. Although this would enhance the context specificity of the scenario, it also 
risks introducing confounding variables if respondents express preferences toward the use of force 
based on preconceived notions and biases of a specific state or government rather than solely on 
the specific variables of interest. It is impossible, however, to entirely eliminate the possibility that 
respondents will assume that the fictional rival represents a specific real world actor. 
 The survey experiments involving public samples were fielded in August 2017 and October 
2018 on three groups. During the primary fielding (August 2017), the survey instrument was 
fielded on 1,609 adults from across the United States. I fielded a set of follow-up experiments 
involving public samples in October 2018 on 300 adults from the United States. Respondents were 
recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and randomly assigned into treatment groups 
using Qualtrics, the software platform used to implement the survey. Social scientists have 
increasingly turned to online convenience samples recruited through MTurk as a means of 
gathering data more quickly and inexpensively than traditional survey methods. While more 
representative than traditional convenience samples (like university undergraduates), MTurk 
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samples generally lack the representativeness of national probability samples.154 The primary U.S. 
MTurk sample for this experiment was relatively similar to a national sample, but 
underrepresented women, blacks, and Hispanics, overrepresented Asians, was more educated, less 
wealthy, and unsurprisingly, overrepresented younger Americans.155  
 Although respondents from MTurk are less representative than national probability 
samples, their distribution throughout the United States is roughly representative and their urban 
versus rural distribution is similar to a nationally stratified sample.156 Recent studies have used 
subjects recruited with MTurk in the United States to replicate results from several social science 
experiments on risk perception, and obtained results similar to those from nationally-representative 
samples.157 These findings suggest that cognitive processes of MTurk respondents – at least within 
the United States – are similar to those of the broader population. Because of this, MTurk samples 
have been used to conduct several recent international relations experiments.158 
 The expert sample consists of 98 commissioned U.S. military officers and defense 
department civilians. Respondents include mid and senior grade officers attending professional 
military education. To be sure, the sample is not fully representative of the Pentagon’s officer 
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corps. Because I recruited participants through the Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College 
(ACSC) and Air War College (AWC), the sample overrepresents Air Force officers and officers 
selected for intermediate or senior professional military education (PME). On one hand, this may 
raise questions of the external validity of findings. Past studies have shown that officers from 
different branches exhibit varying levels of hawkishness.159 Air Force officers may, therefore, hold 
different preferences toward escalation than officers from the other services.  
This overrepresentation of Air Force officers, however, is not necessarily problematic. 
First, Air Force officers are most likely to face crises involving remotely piloted aircraft like those 
put forth in the survey instrument. Second, PME graduates are likely to be the officers who would 
be charged with making decisions if the events in the experimental vignettes played out in the real 
world. In residence PME schools like ACSC and AWC are selectively manned programs that only 
a fraction of the total officer force attends.160 Officers who graduate from intermediate and senior 
PME are then generally selected for more advanced command, leadership, and planning roles, 
meaning that the respondents in the experimental sample are likely the officers who would be in 
critical decision-making roles during an actual contingency. To be sure, these practitioners would 
likely be constrained by rules of engagement and policies enacted by more senior military officers 
and civilian officials. This limits how much we can abstract from the survey findings. 
Experimental Wargames: Wargames as a Research Tool 
While the survey experiments allow for precise causal inference, survey instruments force 
subjects to make decisions without interacting with other national security practitioners, to choose 
                                                        
159 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 239–47. 
160 In 2018, for instance, the selection rate for in-residence senior developmental education (Air War College) was 
approximately 10-percent. E-mail exchange with Air Force officer, 21 January 2019.   
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from a finite set of strategies, and do not simulate the stressors of contingency operations planning. 
To create a more realistic testing ground for my argument, I employ a research method that has 
not been widely employed in the social sciences – experimental manipulations embedded in 
military wargames.161 Wargames are “simulation[s] of selected aspects of a military 
operation…[that] provide decision making experience, or decision making information that is 
applicable to real world situations” without the risk of real-world consequences if things go 
awry.162 Despite the negligible costs of losing a simulated war, participants generally take 
wargames seriously as players are generally national security professionals who may one day 
participate in real world operations that closely resemble those they previously wargamed. To be 
sure, the negligible costs of “losing” a wargame may lead participants to accept more risk than 
during an actual contingency. Yet, participants often draw from the same assumptions and 
experiences during both wargames and real world operations. Indeed, one Prussian Chief of 
General Staff touting the virtues of wargaming exclaimed, “It’s not a game at all, it’s a training for 
                                                        
161 The U.S. military has conducted wargames where “two or more versions are run allowing comparison between 
games.” For more on these structured comparisons see, Elizabeth Bartels, “Games as Structured Comparisons,” 
Conference Paper presented at International Stuides Association Conference 2018, San Francisco, CA, 7-8.  Some 
political scientists have relied on wargames, but they often draw from convenience samples or do not involve face-
to-face interaction between participants. For a study that fields wargames on a convenience sample of university 
students, see Dominic D.P Johnson et al., “Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, 
Aggression, Gender and Testosterone,” Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences 273, no. 1600 
(October 7, 2006): 2513–20. For a study that involves exposing military officers to a computer-based experiment, 
see Alex Mintz, Steven B. Redd, and Arnold Vedlitz, “Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real 
World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and International Relations?,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, 
no. 5 (2006): 757–76. 
162 Peter P. Perla, The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis, MD: US Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 7. Despite their name, wargames simulate not only combat operations but a range of peacetime 
and crisis scenarios. Contemporary wargaming encompasses a range of activities that span from hobbyist games to 
complex computerized simulations and political-military wargames that involve hundreds of senior civilian and 
uniformed decisionmakers, each with a specific training or planning purpose. Political-military wargames allow 
civilian and uniformed decisionmakers to work through strategic issues such as theater-level conflicts, tabletop 
exercises provide leaders an opportunity to rehearse crisis management and interagency coordination, while tactical 
wargames enhance the proficiency of military forces in handling specific contingencies. 
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war.”163  Since wargames require participants to employ many of the same thought processes and 
decision-making criteria as actual contingencies, they represent an important – and thus far 
underused tool – in the study of international relations.  
Drawing from best practices of experimental research, I compare a set of nearly identical, 
simultaneous wargames – a set of control games in which a variable of interest does not appear, 
and a set of treatment games in which it does. Because these wargames vary only the factor of 
interest and hold constant all other factors like the scenario, type of participants, and timing of the 
games, they help isolate the effect of the factor of interest. More traditional, “non-experimental” 
games often fail to hold these potentially confounding variables constant, meaning that decision-
making might be influenced by environmental factors or considerations other than the factor of 
interest. In some cases, traditional wargames are repeated on an iterative basis with the introduction 
of modified scenarios that feature different weapon systems or threat conditions. This approach, 
however, does not allow researchers to effectively study the effect of changing conditions because 
participants and the real-world strategic environment can change considerably between wargame 
iterations. To be sure, controlling for certain environmental and participant factors in wargames 
can be difficult, making it difficult to fully rule out the effects of covariates.164 Running multiple 
simultaneous “control” and “treatment” wargames can, however, identify trends in decision-
making behavior.   
Just as wargames allow militaries to evaluate strategy and tactics, they also offer 
researchers an opportunity to explore questions on decision-making, international security and 
                                                        
163 Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1979), 45. 
164 Elizabeth Bartels, “Games as Structured Comparisons: A Discussion of Methods” (International Studies 
Association Conference, San Francisco, CA, 2018). 
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foreign policy. Three characteristics make wargames an attractive data generating process. First, 
wargames enable significant researcher control over hypothetical crisis scenarios. Wargame 
designers manipulate the political or military circumstances of the crisis that participants face – 
something impossible to do in the real world for obvious practical and ethical reasons. 165 
Wargames also typically offer far more detailed information than other approaches such as survey 
experiments, which often provide only minimal description of crisis conditions. Manipulating 
these details allows researchers to study how specific factors – such as variation in weapons 
technology or adversary actions – shape decision-making. 
Second, wargames account for some common validity concerns associated with 
experimental social science research. International relations scholars often recruit easily accessible 
convenience samples, such as university students, who are unlikely to behave in the same way as 
actual military and civilian leaders. 166  In contrast, wargame participants generally have significant 
technical expertise with the role they are asked to assume. During wargames, players can draw 
from the same type of expertise and background that they would apply during an actual 
contingency. Wargames also place these participants in collaborative environments that better 
mirror real world decision-making settings than survey experiments, where participation is 
normally at the individual level. This interaction and the excitement once absorbed in the scenario 
sparks the development of plans and policy decisions. Thomas Schelling, an enthusiastic advocate 
of wargaming, once argued that collaborative nature of games is valuable because, “one thing a 
                                                        
165 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 075-003 (Belgium, 
2013); UK Ministry of Defence, Wargaming Handbook (Swindon, UK: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 
2017), 7. 
166 Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz, “Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, 
Military Affairs, and International Relations?”; Hyde, “Experiments in International Relations,” 407. 
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person cannot do, no matter how rigorous his analysis or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a 
list of things that would never occur to him.”167 Finally, unlike most survey experiments, the 
wargames do not provide a limited set of options. Instead, participants can design their own 
response options. To be sure, these wargames still involve a convenience sample in conditions that 
do not perfectly mirror reality, but they still offer a better representation of the kinds of people 
who would offering military guidance during an actual crisis.   
Third, wargames generate two types of data: a set of final outcomes and a rich narrative 
that reveals how participants settle on decisions. The final decisions of wargaming teams, which 
take the form of specific military plans, reveal how leaders might act in a given situation. Indeed, 
wargames often foretell how actual operations unfold. For instance, the German blitzkrieg 
campaigns that Germany launched in Europe and Africa were first played out in wargames during 
the interwar period.168 Similarly, U.S. anti-submarine operations during World War Two closely 
mirrored those wargamed years earlier at the Naval War College.169 In addition to the outcomes, 
the discussions and debates between wargame participants helps identify the assumptions and 
logics used in developing decisions. This provides detailed narratives that allow researchers to 
trace decision-making and to more closely probe the mechanisms that shape decisions. 
                                                        
167 Thomas C. Schelling, “The Role of Wargames and Exercises,” in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton 
Carter, John D. Steinburner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 436. 
168 Milan Vego, “German War Gaming,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 130; UK Ministry of 
Defence, Wargaming Handbook, 26. Wargames were of particular importance in Germany due to stipulations of the 
Versailles Treaty which limited access to real world exercises and training.  
169 Brewer and Shubik, The War Game, 48. 
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Like any tool, wargaming has its limitations.  First, wargames are only approximations of 
reality and involve simplifications or compressed timelines.170 However, by requiring interaction 
between participants with operational experience and inducing stress through enforced time 
constraints, wargames better simulate reality than other experimental approaches. Second, 
wargames are not predictive. Wargames can reveal that a certain action is plausible, but cannot 
definitively predict the course of actual contingencies given the role of chance and the decisions 
of specific policymakers.171 To overcome this, wargames can be repeated with different 
participants to identify trends in decision-making.172 These trends are still enlightening even 
though, as some professional wargamers correctly contend, wargames do not allow researchers to 
make causal claims.173  Finally, critics may suggest that wargames are prone to groupthink in 
which participants simply adopt the preferences of senior personnel. This actually adds to the 
validity of the approach as junior personnel often exhibit deference to superiors in actual crisis 
settings.174  
Despite the promise of wargames as tools for academic research, few social scientists have 
adopted the approach.175 The most promising work uses wargames as an archival source to pull 
                                                        
170 Francis J. McHugh, Fundamentals of War Gaming, 3rd ed. (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 1966); Philip 
Sabin, Simulating War: Studying Conflict through Simulation Games (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 5. 
171 UK Ministry of Defence, Wargaming Handbook, 12–13. 
172 UK Ministry of Defence, 13. 
173 Bartels, “Games as Structured Comparisons: A Discussion of Methods.” 
174 Recent research suggests that player background can have a significant effect on wargame outcomes, see Elizabeth 
M. Bartels et al., Do Differing Analyses Change the Decision?: Using a Game to Assess Whether Differing Analytic 
Approaches Improve Decisionmaking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2735.html. 
175 Some historians have promoted wargames as a means of gaining additional insight into past conflicts. See, Stephen 
P. Glick and L. Ian Charters, “War, Games, and Military History,” Journal of Contemporary History 18, no. 4 (1983): 
567–82; Scholars have also fielded wargames on convenience samples without military experience. See, Dominic D.P 
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back the curtain on political and military decision-making. Reid Pauly examines declassified 
reports from Cold War-era wargames for evidence of the nuclear taboo.176 Studies of this sort offer 
valuable insight into how interactions between senior national security policymakers shape the use 
of force, but relying on declassified wargame data poses two limitations. First, researchers 
generally play no role in planning and executing past wargames, making it difficult to design 
experimental manipulations. In the few cases where scholars have exercised control over 
wargaming conditions, they have generally not varied treatments in an experimental manner. For 
instance, one project exposed all participants to identical scenarios, without assigning participants 
to distinct experimental groups.177 Without separate treatment and control groups, it is difficult to 
assess the effect of specific factors on decision-making. Indeed, exposing all respondents to the 
same treatments can prime participants and affect their decision-making. More recent work has 
introduced experimental manipulations into wargames, but does so using an internet-based 
environment in which participants are not necessarily national security practitioners and do not 
experience face-to-face interactions.178 
Second, governments selectively declassify wargame reports – typically after the passage 
of extended periods of time. This limited amount of openly available information can leave 
researchers with little data, particularly if they are studying recent innovations in military 
technology. Even when material is publicly released, researchers may only have access to selected 
wargames or heavily redacted materials. As a result, researchers are forced to draw inferences from 
                                                        
Johnson et al., “Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender and 
Testosterone,” Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences 273, no. 1600 (October 7, 2006): 2513–20.  
176 Pauly, “Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button?” 
177 Schneider, “Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure.” 
178 Reddie et al., “Next-Generation Wargames.” 
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incomplete information. Records that remain classified could offer alternative explanations or 
disprove a researcher’s hypotheses. Nonetheless, this work has advanced our understanding of 
substantive topics and highlighted the viability of wargaming as a data source for academic 
research. 
Wargame Design and Implementation  
 To test the increased initiation, restrained retaliation and amplified aggression 
hypotheses, I designed and fielded a series of seminar wargames with embedded experimental 
manipulations.179 Seminar games are one-sided wargames where small groups work 
collaboratively to complete a specific task. 180 The one-sided nature of seminar games allows the 
game to focus on eliciting expert judgments on crisis decision-making rather than on adjudicating 
outcomes between a friendly “blue team” and an adversary “red team,” a process that can introduce 
researcher bias.181 Participants included current and former military personnel who had served in 
the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or as Department of Defense civilians. 182 
Participants were randomly assigned to three to five member wargaming teams that represented 
U.S. military planning cells (block randomized by military rank) and simultaneously assigned to a 
                                                        
179 I fielded the wargames at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Lincoln Laboratories in November 2017. The locations were selected because of the high concentration 
of individuals with military experience who were willing to participate in an academic study. Participants received no 
compensation for participation. The project was approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board 
(IRB-AAR6211) and reviewed by the US Air Force Human Subjects Protection Office (DOD HRPO 
FSG20170044H). 
180 UK Ministry of Defence, Wargaming Handbook, 39. 
181 Richard E. Darilek et al., Issues and Insights from the Army Technology Seminar Game (Washington, D.C.: RAND 
Corporation, 2001), 2, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1299.html. Rather than assigning 
participants to an adversary “red team”, adversary actions are dictated in the researcher-designed vignettes. 
Additionally, eliminating the need to assign participants to a red team, doubled the number of one-sided wargames I 
was able to run.  
182 Participants were recruited through veteran’s groups and included a total of 28 individuals. Appendix B provides 
additional demographic information. 
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treatment schedule.183 Randomization ensured each team received a mix of senior officers, junior 
officers, and non-commissioned personnel, and more importantly, created teams that are, in 
expectation, identical prior to receiving experimental treatment.184  
These relatively small teams do not perfectly mirror actual operational planning teams, 
which can be larger, more senior, and consist of members with certain career specialties (For 
instance, an air operations planning team might consist primarily of pilots and intelligence 
officers). The wargaming teams do, however, capture several important elements of actual military 
teams. First, they included participants representing multiple ranks and, reflecting hierarchical 
military organizations, generally included fewer senior personnel than junior personnel. Second, 
because all participants had military training, they shared a baseline understanding of military 
capabilities and understood how factors such as risk and the law of armed conflict factor into 
military planning. Finally, 50-percent of participants had operational expertise with air defense or 
drone operations. These participants helped answer questions about air operations, serving the 
same function as subject matter experts in actual military organizations.  
The wargame scenario involved an interstate crisis between the fictional Central Asian 
states of Katunia and Dakastan.185 Dakastan is a U.S. ally engaged in a territorial dispute with its 
                                                        
183 Participants were first coded as field grade officers (U.S. military pay grades O-4 through O-6: Major/Lieutenant 
Commander, Lieutenant Colonel/Commander, Colonel/Captain), company grade officers (U.S. military pay grades 
O-1 through O-3: Second Lieutenant/Ensign, First Lieutenant/Lieutenant Junior Grade, Captain/Lieutenant) or non-
commissioned (this category included all enlisted personnel including officer trainees who were not yet 
commissioned). Participants were then block randomized using the Randomizr package in R. To preserve the random 
assignment of participants to teams, I did not shift participants to balance the size of teams when participants failed to 
show up at the wargame (i.e. attrited) or when unexpected participants arrived. During one iteration of the wargame, 
four participants who had not previously registered arrived at the gaming session. Because registered participants had 
already been block randomized, I assigned the four new participants to their own gaming team. This gaming team had 
a composition that was similar to the randomized teams in terms of rank and service distribution. Participants received 
their team assignments upon arrival at the wargame. 
184 Gerber and Green, Field Experiments, 30–31. 
185 After consulting with wargaming experts, I opted to use fictional states so that participants were less constrained 
in their decision-making and discussions. Using actual states could cause participants to limit their comments for fear 
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autocratic neighbor Katunia over a resource rich border region. Dakastan, which hosts a U.S. 
airbase, is increasingly subjected to attacks by Katunian-backed forces.186 During the wargame, 
participants were exposed to three crisis vignettes. The vignettes, which were provided in hard 
copy, describe incidents that occur during the crisis. The response to intrusion vignette is intended 
to test amplified aggression. It features a threatening Katunian military aircraft flying toward the 
U.S. air base in Dakastan and asks participants to develop a plan to respond to the intruding plane. 
Some wargaming teams received a vignette that features an inhabited adversary aircraft, while 
other teams received a vignette that is identical, except the intruder is a remotely piloted drone. 
The response to shootdown vignette tests restrained retaliation. The scenario involves the 
downing of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and asks participants to develop a plan that responds to 
the aircraft loss. Again, I vary whether the plane is inhabited or remotely piloted.  
The initial deployment and show of force vignettes are designed to explore the increased 
initiation hypothesis. In these scenarios, participants decide whether to launch a manned aircraft 
or a remotely piloted one either to gather intelligence on a rival’s military installations or as a show 
of force after a rival tests a long-range missile. Neither of these vignettes are experimental, but are 
intended to assess what type of assets military decisionmakers choose to employ on these 
potentially risky missions. While the vignettes focus on seemingly tactical acts of battlefield 
escalation, they speak to broader escalatory dynamics. Tactical escalation can spiral into regional 
escalation and the same logics that inform tactical escalation may inform conflict dynamics at a 
more strategic level.  
                                                        
of revealing sensitive or classified information about contingency and operations plans. Several days before the 
wargame, participants received preparatory material that described the hypothetical interstate crisis that they would 
encounter during the wargame. 
186 Appendix A includes the complete road to war and wargaming vignettes. 
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A team of rapporteurs with backgrounds in international relations or military operations 
facilitated each wargame and documented wargame proceedings.187 All teams first received the initial 
deployment vignette. The treatment schedule then varied which vignette was presented first to 
account for any priming of participants.188 Finally, all teams received the show of force vignette. 
Participants were told that two to three months had passed between the rounds. Teams had 30 minutes 
to work through each scenario, helping to simulate the time-constrained decision-making cycles 
common in real-world contingencies.189 As participants worked through each vignette, rapporteurs 
took detailed notes documenting the deliberations and discussions of each team. Rapporteurs observed 
group dynamics, recorded a chronology of when decisions were made, took notes on disagreements 
between team members, and logged each team’s response plan in the scenarios. Rapporteurs paid 
particular attention to participants’ word choice and argumentation.190 At the end of each 30-minute 
gaming period, participants presented their plan to the rapporteur. Although the response plans in each 
scenario are important, the rapporteurs’ observations of the decision-making process allow me to more 
thoroughly assess the mechanisms associated with technology-enabled escalation control theory.  
A few challenges with data collection and analysis are worth noting. First, wargame 
participants were aware they were under observation and may have behaved differently than if 
they were not being observed.191 Military personnel, however, are accustomed to having others 
                                                        
187 Rapporteurs included individuals with graduate level international relations and/or at least four years of military 
experience. Rapporteurs closely reviewed all wargame materials, assisted with the development of note-taking 
procedures, and reviewed their notes with the principal investigator after the wargame. 
188 Appendix B includes the treatment schedule. 
189 Wargames run by the U.S. military and other organizations routinely feature compressed decision-making periods 
in which each “round” of the board game might represent several hours or days.  
190 For more on applying ethnographic methods to political science see, Lisa Wedeen, “Reflections on Ethnographic 
Work in Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 (2010): 255–72. 
191 Schelling, “Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory,” 61. 
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present when making decisions, thus minimizing the effect on participant behavior. Second, 
rapporteur field notes inherently involve selection and interpretation: observers’ background and 
individual experiences lead them to write down certain observations and frame these observations 
in certain ways, omitting other potential observations.192 To account for this, I compare field notes 
from all of the rapporteurs, and find several similarities that appear across wargaming teams. In 
addition to their wargame notes, the analysis also incorporates data from rapporteur-led group 
interviews during which all teams were asked the same questions. Recording direct interview 
responses requires less interpretative discretion than documenting wargame observations.  
CASE STUDIES 
 The survey experiments and wargames provide valuable insight into the effect of drones 
on conflict dynamics, but do so using scripted, hypothetical scenarios. While these approaches 
shed light on how and why drones can temper escalation dynamics, there are legitimate questions 
to the external validity and generalizability of findings based on hypothetical scenarios.193 To 
complement the experimental approaches, I draw from two sets of nested case studies that explore 
drone use by the United States and Israel.194 I draw data from archival materials, recently 
declassified military documents, interviews, and the works of historians to probe each of the 
mechanisms associated with technology-enabled escalation control in a real world context. 
Case studies are an ideal complement to the experiments and wargames for several reasons. 
Most importantly, case studies enable a detailed analysis of drone development and deployments. 
                                                        
192 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation Of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. 
Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw, Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes, Second Edition, 2d Edition (Chicago: University Of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 13. 
193 Hyde, “Experiments in International Relations.” 
194 For another study that employs a nested case study design see, Carson, Secret Wars. 
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Given the relative paucity of openly available data on drone operations, large-N approaches are 
not well suited to assessing the effect of drones on conflict onset and escalation.195 Further, the 
context dependent nature of escalation demands close attention to case specific details. 
Understanding why and how socio-technical artifacts like drones shape conflict dynamics requires 
careful examination of the decision-making process surrounding decisions on the use of force – a 
task that is best accomplished by studying archival materials such as minutes of National Security 
Council meetings. The richness of qualitative data from these sources sheds light on internal 
debates and uncovers evidence on causal mechanisms.196   
In addition, case studies allow researchers to examine political decisions both within and 
across states. Studying whether drones have similar effects in multiple operational and political 
contexts helps examine the limits and generalizability of technology-enabled escalation control 
theory. Finally, case studies help provide the “general conceptual models” needed to help inform 
policymaking.197 Although the findings of the experiments and wargames provide useful insights 
with policy-relevant implications, policymakers can often more readily absorb evidence from 
actual historical contexts.198  
I select the United States and Israel as cases to study the effects of drones on conflict 
dynamics for several reasons. First, the United States and Israel are among the most active drone 
users. Since the advent of military drone use, these two states have employed drones in a variety 
                                                        
195 John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,” The American Political Science Review 98, no. 
2 (May 2004): 341–54; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005). 
196 Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,” 348–49. 
197 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 270. 
198 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). 
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of operational contexts ranging from reconnaissance to armed strikes. This provides several cases 
with which to test technology-enabled escalation control. Second, both states have long histories 
of drone use. The United States launched its first military drones against an adversary during World 
War II, and the Israelis did so in the mid-1960s. This long period of use allows for variation along 
several dimensions including the strength and type of adversary threat over time, changing 
domestic political context, and the evolving relative capabilities of manned assets vis-à-vis drones. 
This variation allows me to probe how drones affect decision-making and escalation in multiple 
environmental contexts. Third, although Israel and the United States are both democracies, they 
have vastly different domestic politics, national security bureaucracies, and exist in different threat 
environments. Examining two countries allows for cross-national comparison and probes the 
generalizability of technology-enabled escalation control in different operational contexts.  
In both the United States and Israeli case studies, I explore both the development of drones 
and the effects their use has on conflict dynamics. Studying the origins of the drone programs in 
each state sheds light on the motivations for the development of weapon systems that remove 
friendly troops from the battlefield. Documentary evidence and interviews of military planners 
suggest that both Israel and the United States developed drone capabilities primarily to reduce risk 
to their own personnel.199  I then examine a series of crises where the United States and Israel 
deployed or considered the deployment of drones. I map how deployment decisions were made, 
identify the factors that drove these decisions, and assess how states reacted to the losses of 
remotely piloted aircraft. I compare these crises to crises in which manned aircraft are deployed or 
                                                        
199 As I discuss in greater detail in the case studies, other factors that contributed to the development of remotely 
piloted aircraft capabilities included the need to conduct more politically sensitive operations in denied territory (i.e. 
missions that violated the sovereignty of a rival) and, later, to develop systems capable of operating for longer 
durations than manned assets on “dull, dirty, or dangerous” missions.  
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lost, to help identify whether and how drones affect conflict dynamics and to probe the hypotheses 
laid out in chapter two. I focus particularly on crisis situations for both theoretical and practical 
reasons. For theory, interstate crises place decisionmakers in a position where they must choose 
how to employ instruments of power against a rival. As international relations scholars Glenn 
Snyder and Paul Diesing note, “a crisis distills many of the elements that make up the essence of 
politics in the international system.”200 From a practical standpoint, there is typically more 
documentary and historical evidence on crisis situations to draw from for analysis.  
To conduct this analysis, I rely on process tracing within each crisis.  Process tracing 
examines a chronological series of events for observable evidence of causal mechanisms, allowing 
researchers to make inferences about competing hypotheses or explanations.201 A key 
characteristic of process tracing is that the timing and sequencing of events is critical to making 
inferences about causal relationships. Chronology alone, however, is insufficient for effective 
process tracing; researchers must look for evidence that confirms that temporally prior events 
actually shaped subsequent decisions.202 Additionally, process tracing must take into account the 
normative and international context surrounding decision-making.203  For instance, statements or 
writings by policymakers should reveal the role that technological progression and the 
international environment played in driving their decisions.  
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Together, each of the three methodological approaches helps explore the preferences and 
decisions of different actors whose opinions or actions can shape whether a crisis escalates. This 
mixed method approach yields two important benefits. First, it allows me to compare the 
preferences and reactions of senior civilian decisionmakers, the American public, and military 
practitioners. This sheds light on how drones influence decisions among each of these groups. 
Second, the approach allows me to triangulate findings from historical cases and hypothetical, 
experimental scenarios. This allows me to compensate for the inherent limitations of each 
methodological approach.  
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In June 2017, Pakistan Air Force fighter jets downed an Iranian drone that had penetrated 
“deep inside Pakistani airspace” on an intelligence-gathering mission.1 The June overflight was 
just one of several Iranian drone incursions into Pakistan that year.2 Prior to these incidents, Iran 
rarely violated Pakistan’s airspace, despite having hundreds of manned aircraft capable of 
conducting reconnaissance missions.3 Throughout the 2010s, however, Iran had expanded its 
arsenal of remotely piloted aircraft, indigenously developing reconnaissance and attack drones. 
This growing drone fleet may have enabled Tehran to initiate military intelligence operations 
against neighboring Pakistan that it was unwilling to launch using manned platforms.  
Scholarly theories tell us that this should be expected.  Technologies that decrease the risks 
and costs of military operations should logically increase the likelihood of conflict. These logics 
assume that decisionmakers are rational actors that seek to maximize the payoffs of employing 
military force. The payoff for obtaining an objective increases as the cost of obtaining it decreases, 
assuming the objective has a fixed value. While armed groups have long tried to reduce the costs 
and risks of military operations, drones have slashed these costs. Drones allow actors to project 
power without putting friendly personnel in harm’s way, and often cost far less to acquire and 
                                                        
1 Siddiqui, “Iranian Drone Shot down by PAF, Confirms FO.” 
2 Dewan, “Why Are Iran’s Drones Crossing into Pakistani Airspace?” 
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operate than manned counterparts. Under the increased initiation hypothesis introduced in Chapter 
2, these reduced costs make actors more likely to launch military operations when drones can 
substitute for manned assets or ground forces. 
To test the increased initiation hypothesis, I draw data from two original survey 
experiments and a wargame. Each of these empirical tests presents participants with a hypothetical, 
but plausible, situation in which the United States might be asked to use force. The empirical tests, 
which I detail below, help answer two questions. First, do drones lead decisionmakers to initiate 
military operations they otherwise would not? Second, what factors do national security 
practitioners and members of the American public consider when deciding whether and how to 
initiate military operations in the midst of a crisis?  
The first survey experiment explores whether military officers and members of the public 
would launch an operation against a rogue state, varying whether the mission is to be carried out 
using a drone, manned aircraft, or ground forces. I then field a second survey experiment on 
members of the public that measures approval for military operations, again varying the type of 
forces involved in the mission. Unlike the first experiment, the second experiment measures 
approval levels for a mission rather than a binary “launch” or “do not launch.”  The second 
experiment also varies the likelihood of operational success to assess how the expectations of 
battlefield success shape support for military deployments.  
I couple these survey experiments with a wargame in which national security practitioners 
consider whether to use a manned platform or a drone to initiate the use of military force. To be 
clear, these survey experiments and wargames with military participants offer valuable insights 
into crisis decision-making, however, many decisions on escalation during actual crises are made 
at far higher echelons by senior officers or civilian officials. These policymakers may establish 
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strategies, draft rules of engagement, or issue orders that limits the menu of options that military 
commanders at the operational or tactical levels. These experiments and wargame findings are, 
however, still useful in several ways. First, military officers at these lower echelons may make 
choices, including what platforms to deploy on missions, that may constrain or drive policy. For 
instance, a staff officer’s decision to substitute a remotely piloted reconnaissance aircraft for a 
manned one might have significant implications on the trajectory of a crisis if a rival intercepts or 
downs the aircraft. Second, the participants in the experiments and wargames may one day advise 
senior policymakers, or be policymakers themselves. Their preferences, beliefs, and past 
experiences may subsequently shape how they act in these future roles.4 The experiments do not 
test the increased initiation mechanism on civilian decisionmakers, but their role is explored using 
case studies in chapters 6 and 7.  
If the increased initiation hypothesis is valid, military decisionmakers should be more 
likely to launch missions when they can use remotely operated systems rather than placing friendly 
personnel and expensive platforms in harm’s way. At the same time, civilians should express 
greater levels of support for drone deployments than deployments of friendly personnel, assuming 
that all other factors – such as effectiveness and risk – are constant. To be sure, members of the 
public might not have a direct say in dictating whether a government initiates the use of military 
force. Yet, public opinion is often a cue to policymakers eager to evade negative political 
consequences for their decisions. As a result, decisionmakers may avoid the sorts of missions that 
are likely to generate low levels of public approval.  
The tests find support for the increased initiation hypothesis and shed light on the micro-
level foundations that lead military officers and the general public to more readily support 
                                                        
4 Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, Why Leaders Fight, chaps. 3–4. 
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initiating operations using drones than those launched with manned platforms or ground forces. 
Further, the experiments reveal that military decisionmakers and members of the public share a 
preference for drones when all other factors surrounding a crisis situation are held constant. This 
inclination is shaped in part by the reduced risk to friendly forces that drones provide. The 
experiments, however, also highlight that the availability of drones alone is not a sufficient 
condition to increase the frequency with which military force is used. Both military 
decisionmakers and members of the public consider other factors when deciding whether to initiate 
(or support the initiation) of military operations during crises. Indeed, operational context – 
specifically the likelihood of mission success – also shapes support for initiating the use of force. 
For instance, the public is more supportive of deploying manned aircraft or ground forces that 
offer a high likelihood of battlefield success than remotely piloted drones that offer a lower 
likelihood of success.  This suggests the operational context matters in these decisions on the use 
of force and escalation.  
EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY EXPERIMENTS 
Increased Initiation Experiment 1: To Launch, or Not to Launch? 
 As a first cut at testing the increased initiation hypothesis, I field a survey experiment that 
studies whether the availability of drones increases the likelihood that military decisionmakers and 
civilians will call for the initiation of military operations. The survey is fielded on an expert sample 
of military officers (n=78) and an online public sample of adults in the United States (n=303).5 In 
the crisis vignette, respondents are told that, “Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state 
                                                        
5 Military staff and students were recruited at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College and Air Command and Staff 
College in October 2018 (Appendix F includes the survey instrument). The public sample was recruited through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk in January 2019; respondents completed the survey using Qualtrics (Appendix E includes 
the survey instrument). 
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has started developing chemical weapons. The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical 
weapons against its neighbors.” The survey instrument features the development of a banned class 
of weapons to highlight the rival’s actions violate international law, and describes the rival’s past 
threats to emphasize potential hostile intent.6 These elements of the vignette are intended to reduce 
the likelihood that respondents question whether the use military force against the rival state is 
justified or permissible under international law.  
Respondents are then randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions. One group 
is told, “The United States plans to deploy special operations forces to destroy the rival state’s 
chemical weapons production facility.” Another group is told the United States plans to deploy 
“manned bomber aircraft”, and a third is informed that the United States plans to deploy “remotely 
piloted aircraft.”7 This manipulation captures variation in the level of exposure of friendly 
personnel to potential adversary action. Ground forces and drones represent the highest and lowest 
levels of exposure, respectively. To control for risk and mission effectiveness, all groups are told, 
“There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack” the U.S. forces (or bomber aircraft or 
RPAs) during the mission” and that “There is a moderate likelihood the mission will succeed.” 
Military respondents are told that they are assigned as “a planner in the operations division of this 
geographic combatant command” and are asked whether they would advise the director of 
operations to launch the operation. Members of the public sample are asked, “Do you think the 
                                                        
6 The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons 
by states parties.  
7 Balance tables and ordinary least squares models that regress assignment to treatment on a host of covariates find no 
statistically significant relationship between covariates and assignment to treatment. Because random assignment to 
treatment was achieved, the average change in support for launching a mission across the treatment can be attributed 
to the treatment (i.e. type of forces employed). See Appendix H, Sections 3.1-3.2. 
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United States should launch this operation?” Respondents choose either “launch operation” or “do 
not launch operation.” 
Military respondents are, on average, likely to initiate an operation when informed a drone 
will be used and unlikely to initiate an operation if it will be carried out using ground forces or a 
manned bomber (See Table 4.1). Support for launching the mission is highest when a drone will 
be used (63-pecent of respondents would initiate operations), and lowest when ground forces will 
be used (just 8-percent of respondents would initiate operations). These initial findings provide 
tentative support for the increased initiation hypothesis, although confidence intervals are large 
due to the small sample size. Despite the large confidence intervals, treatment (i.e. assignment to 
either the ground force, manned bomber, or RPA condition) has a statistically significant effect on 
initiating the use of force.8 The findings suggest military decisionmakers are more likely to initiate 
military operations during crises when they have drones than when drones are not an option on the 
policy menu. 
Table 4.1: Support for Initiating Military Operations (Experiment 1, Military Sample) 
Military Sample 


























                                                        
8 In the ground forces and RPA conditions, assignment to treatment is statistically significant to the p<.01 level. In the 
manned bomber condition, treatment is statistically significant to the p<.1 level. Covariates including service, military 
rank, gender, and experience with RPA, aviation, or air defense operations have no statistically significant effects. See 
Appendix H, Section 3.1 for the ordinary least squares models used for significance testing. 
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When facing the same scenario, civilian respondents are more supportive of initiating 
military operations than their military counterparts (See Table 4.2). Civilian respondents are, on 
average, more likely to initiate military operations than to not launch military operations – 
regardless of the type of forces employed. Indeed, assignment to different treatment conditions 
(i.e. type of force employed) has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of supporting 
the initiation of military operations. 9 Most covariates, including gender, age, race, education level, 
and income have no statistically significant effect on approval for initiating military operations. 
Respondents who report more conservative political ideologies (on a 1 to 5 scale, ranging from 
very liberal to very conservative) are more likely to support initiating the operation (b=-0.063, 
p<.05).10 This conservative preference for conflict initiation aligns with studies and public opinion 
polling that find conservatives are, on average, more hawkish in the foreign policy arena.11 
Interestingly, veterans are more likely to support initiating the operation than non-veterans (b=-
0.220, p<.01). This runs counter to the less hawkish posture adopted by respondents in the military 
sample. One possible explanation for this incongruity is that respondents in the military sample 
are all commissioned officers, while the 49 veterans in the public sample include individuals who 
served in enlisted ranks.12 More senior commissioned personnel may be less likely to initiate the 
                                                        
9 Assignment to treatment has no statistically significant effect. See Appendix H, Section 3.2 for the ordinary least 
squares models used for significance testing of treatment and the covariates described throughout this paragraph. 
10 The dependent variable for initiation is coded 1 for “launch operation” and 2 for “do not launch operation.” A 
negative coefficient therefore indicates support for launching the operation.  
11 Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War, 67–124; Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, 
“Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing 
Noncombatants,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 62. 
12 The survey instrument did not ask respondents whether they served as officers or enlisted personnel. Education 
level, however, serves as a useful proxy since a bachelor’s degree is a requirement to become a commissioned officer 
in the United States. Many of the veterans in the public sample reported that their highest level of education was below 
a bachelor’s degree. 
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use of military force because they would face greater political repercussions for failed military 
action than veterans who are no longer serving.    
Table 4.2: Support for Initiating Military Operations (Experiment 1, Public Sample) 
Public Sample 


























I turn to qualitative data collected as part of the survey instrument to more closely explore 
why drones increase support for initiating operations among military decisionmakers, but not 
among members of the U.S. public. After respondents specify whether they would launch 
operations, the survey instrument asks them to “write a sentence or two telling us why [they] 
disapproved or approved of the plan to handle the situation.” I code the free responses into one of 
six justification categories: the mission poses no/low risk to U.S. forces, the mission provides 
security, the mission is the best solution (with no additional information specifying why the 
mission was the best solution), the mission is too risky and poses little chance of success, that force 
should not be used in the situation, or that there was insufficient information to make a 
decision/had no opinion. This analysis is valuable because the increased initiation hypothesis 
(along with most existing theories on public support for the use of force) rest upon micro-level 





Table 4.3: Qualitative Justifications (Experiment 1, Military Sample) 
Justification Ground Forces Manned Bomber Remotely Piloted Aircraft 












































As Table 4.3 illustrates, military respondents’ decisions were informed in large part by 
perceptions of risk to U.S. forces and the likelihood of mission success. A third of the military 
respondents assigned to the RPA treatment condition, for instance, believed that deploying a drone 
posed no or little risk to U.S. forces. One U.S. Air Force major commented, “We stand to risk no 
loss of life by sending an RPA (at least until the enemy state responds) but stand to gain by 
potentially saving the lives of the neighboring [countries].” Another respondent believed “RPAs 
are expendable to achieve a national interest.” Drones were sometimes seen as a desirable and low-
risk first choice option that could be augmented by other forces if they failed to accomplish the 
mission.   One U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel, who previously worked with RPAs, for instance, 
noted that, “If this mission fails the [director of operations] retains the ability to engage this facility 
with other assets (cruise missiles/manned aircraft).”  
Military respondents assigned to the manned bomber and ground force conditions generally 
believed the operation involved too much risk or that the likelihood of success was too low. One 
officer assigned to the ground forces condition commented the “risk isn’t worth the reward.” Many 
respondents wanted a greater likelihood of success before committing to deploying ground forces 
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or manned aircraft.  Some military respondents assigned to the manned bomber and ground forces 
conditions suggested they would have supported initiating operations had they been carried out by 
a drone. For example, one Air Force major who opposed launching an operation using a manned 
bomber commented, “The operation can be delayed or a different asset could be utilized (RPA or 
stand-off weapons such as a cruise missile).” Some respondents, however, were willing to send 
pilots into harm’s way to prevent the use of chemical weapons despite the risk of incurring 
casualties. One officer who supported initiating operations using a manned bomber commented, 
“the risk of loss of one aircraft/crew for mission success for the defense of innocent lives is worth 
the cost risk.” The majority of respondents in the manned and ground force conditions, however, 
opted to avoid these risks by not initiating military operations. 
Risk, however, was not the sole factor driving the decision on whether to initiate military 
operations. Some respondents were concerned whether drones had the capabilities required to 
destroy the chemical weapons facility. One Marine Corps officer questioned the choice of drones. 
“Why RPAs?” he asked. “We may have other assets that have less likelihood of being targeted and 
could be more effective.” An Air Force lieutenant colonel similarly argued, “an attack by RPAs 
will not guarantee destruction of the facility.”  Other respondents feared that a failed mission could 
pose greater risks for the United States, regardless of the type of asset used to carry out the mission. 
One Air Force officer thought “the enemy’s reaction to a failed attempted mission could be more 
dangerous than the current situation.” Another lieutenant colonel expressed similar concerns, “A 
lack of success could trigger the use of chemical weapons the mission was intended to prevent.” 
For these respondents, the potential for second or third order consequences outweighed the reduced 
risk that drones offered.  
 112 
The higher likelihood of initiating operations in drone treatment stemmed in large part from 
the perception that drones offered a lower risk means of carrying out military options. At the same 
time, however, more than a third of respondents in the drone treatment condition still chose not 
initiate military operations. This suggests that risk alone does not drive decision-making by all 
military officers. The fear of an unsuccessful mission, possessing insufficient information about 
the vignette, and concerns about whether strikes were necessary all shaped decision-making among 
military officers. As a result, even with the reduced risk to friendly forces that drones offer, military 
officers did not always support initiating military operations.  
Within the public sample, Table 4.4 illustrates that respondent preferences were driven in 
large part by a belief that initiating military action provides security for the United States and its 
allies. Within each of the three treatment groups, “provides security” is the most commonly cited 
explanation for preferences toward the use of force. Respondents citing the need to provide 
security often described how the United States needed to take action to protect lives or to uphold 
international law. One respondent, for example, commented that the “Use of chemical weapons is 
wrong by international law. The US, being a leader in international affairs, should take the initial 
steps to mitigate their chances of using chemical weapons.” Another respondent argued that he 
“would approve this operation because the reward outweighs the risk….[If] this chemical facility 
was to be able to produce the chemical weapons, the damage that they could cause in the long run 
could be catastrophic.”  These responses suggest that many members of the public believe 






Table 4.4: Qualitative Justifications (Experiment 1, Public Sample) 
Justification Ground Forces Manned Bomber Remotely Piloted Aircraft 












































Like their military counterparts, many respondents were also concerned that the chances 
of success were too low to justify deploying forces. This made up the second most cited 
justification in each of the treatment conditions. Unlike the military respondents, however, the type 
of forces involved did not appear to affect whether respondents perceived the mission as too risky. 
One respondent in the RPA treatment condition commented, “The situation as described sounds 
dire and requires some action. However, the response described has too high of a possible failure 
rate to warrant moving ahead. I think another solution with a higher chance of success needs to be 
developed.” Another respondent in the ground forces treatment condition said he would “prefer a 
greater chance of the mission succeeding before recommending the attack.” Other respondents 
were, like some military officers, worried that an attack could set off an escalatory spiral. One 
respondent asserted that “we need to make sure the bombing cannot set off the chemical weapons,” 
while another was concerned that a rival state might “really attack us” in response to a strike on 
the chemical weapons facility. 
Some members of the public sample also factored risk considerations into their decision-
making logic. Respondents were, on average, more likely to view a drone mission as low risk than 
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a mission carried out by ground forces or manned aircraft. As one respondent noted, “they are 
remote piloted aircraft so no people will be harmed.” Another commented, “I approve of the 
mission because of the use of drones[,] the risk to life is low.” Some members of the public sample 
also suggested that they would have approved of the mission had it been carried out by a remotely 
piloted aircraft. One respondent who was told the mission would be carried out using a manned 
bomber explained his opposition to the mission: “The human risk on our part is too great for our 
rate of success. Unmanned aircraft should be used for this.” 
The different levels of support between the military and civilian samples raises questions 
about the increased initiation hypothesis. Although the hypothesis appears to explain behavior by 
military professionals, it does not seem to explain the behavior of respondents in the public sample. 
At the surface the findings align with past studies that suggest civilians often advocate for more 
hawkish positions than their military counterparts.13 But, why might members of the public sample 
seem to care little about the type of asset involved? It is possible that respondents in the public 
sample have a strong preference for countering the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. 
Indeed, many respondents suggested that some sort of action was necessary to defend international 
security or uphold international law. Or, they might lack the technical and military knowledge to 
assess the risks associated with each different types of operations. To be sure, the survey 
instrument in the public sample lacks validity since members of the public would generally never 
be asked whether to initiate military operations.14 As a result of the relatively unrealistic nature of 
                                                        
13 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. 
14 Past studies have suggested that members of the public hold different preferences than their military counterparts. 
Thus, researchers should be cautious when using public samples to study questions that apply in the real world to 
military decisionmakers. See, Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz, “Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real 
World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and International Relations?,” 769. 
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the question prompt, respondents may not have been positioned to fully think through the risks 
and benefits of the operation in the scenario. Indeed, military officers will face the consequences 
of a failed mission, whereas their civilian counterparts do not.15 It is also possible that some 
respondents demonstrated social desirability bias when entering the response. In other words, some 
respondents may have wanted to avoid being perceived as callous or careless for ignoring a 
situation where chemical weapons were being developed and potentially used.  
Even though the public appears no more supportive of initiating military operations with 
drones than with other types of military force, caution is needed before discounting the increased 
initiation hypothesis. First, the factors described above may limit the generalizations we can draw 
from the public sample. Second, the public is not the sole, or even dominant, voice in a state’s 
national-security decision-making process. Although public opinion can inform decisions, actual 
policies and actions are selected and implemented by civilian and military officials. Because of the 
limited applicability of the survey instrument to public respondents, I field a second survey on a 
public sample with a modified – and more realistic – outcome variable.  
Increased Initiation Experiment 2: Public Support for Initiation  
This second survey experiment, which was fielded on a separate sample of 1,609 adults in 
the United States, presents respondents with the same hypothetical mission to destroy a rival’s 
chemical weapons laboratory that was described in the first vignette. This experiment, however, is 
different in two important ways.  First, this experiment measures a different outcome of interest to 
test the increased initiation hypothesis to address some of the external validity concerns outlined 
above. Rather than asking respondents whether they would launch or not launch the operation as 
in the first experiment, this survey instrument asks respondents for their “opinion of the 
                                                        
15 Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz, 769. 
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government’s plan to handle the situation.” Respondents provide their opinion using a five-point 
Likert scale ranging from “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve.” For members of the public, 
this is perhaps a more realistic and appropriate dependent variable. Members of the public are 
generally not asked whether they would launch a military operation, but do frequently express 
their approval or disapproval of foreign policy.16 Therefore, this reframing of the dependent 
variable might allow for a more accurate measurement of public support toward initiating military 
operations.  
Second, I attempt to assess the extent to which the likelihood of mission effectiveness 
shapes public support for military operations by varying whether the mission has a “high” or “low” 
likelihood of success.17 This results in a 2 x 3 factorial design (Table 4.5). 18  
 
If respondents view drones as a less risky alternative to manned assets, they should be more 
approving of operations that deploy drones than those that involve manned bombers or ground 
forces. This should be true across both the high and low likelihood of success conditions. However, 
                                                        
16 Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. 
17 The smaller size of the military sample precluded this additional manipulation.  
18 Appendix D includes full text of the survey instrument.   
 
 Ground Forces Manned Aircraft Drone Aircraft 
Success: 
Low Likelihood n=274 n=261 n=269 
Success: 
High Likelihood n=268 n=266 n=271 
 
Note: n represents the number of respondents randomly assigned to each experimental condition. 
Table 4.5: Treatment Table (Experiment 2, Public Sample) 
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because Americans prefer successful military operations to unsuccessful ones, mean levels of 
support should be higher in the high likelihood of success treatment conditions.  
To examine the public’s preferences, I first compare the mean approval ratings across each 
of the six experimental conditions.19 As Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 show, public approval for 
initiating military operations is, on average, the highest when drones are employed on a mission 
with a high likelihood of success (µ=3.91) and lowest when ground forces are deployed on a 
mission with a low likelihood of success (µ=2.24). Within both the high likelihood of success and 
low likelihood of success conditions, public support is, on average, highest for drone deployments 
and lowest for ground force deployments. Mean public support for initiating military operations 
using inhabited aircraft falls between the mean levels of support for ground force and drone 
deployments in both the high and low likelihood of success conditions. These findings are in line 
with those of the military sample in the first experiment. To present the findings in a manner which 
more closely resemble those from the first experiment, Table 4.7 includes percentages of 




                                                        
19 Before assessing the effects of treatment, I use a series of ordinary least squares models to verify that the assignment 
of subjects into the six experimental conditions was random. Using ordinary least squares models, I predict assignment 
into the treatment groups as a function of covariates including age, gender, education level, income, political ideology, 
race, and veteran status. The models suggest that respondents were indeed randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions. Thus, any differences in outcomes of interest between the experimental groups can be attributed to the 
treatment they receive in the survey instrument. I also conduct a manipulation check that asks respondents to identify 
how the military operation would be carried out (i.e. ground forces, manned bomber, or drones) to ensure respondents 
received and internalized the intended treatment. Across each of treatment groups, at least 96-percent of respondents 
correctly recalled the treatment to which they were exposed. Appendix H, Section 3.3 includes regression results for 




Table 4.6: Mean Approval for Deploying Forces by Force Type (Experiment 2, Public Sample) 
Type of Military Force 
Low Likelihood of Success 
Mean Approval 
Rating1 
High Likelihood of Success 
Mean Approval 
Rating1 
Ground Forces 2.24 (.06) 
3.29 
(.07) 
Manned Aircraft 2.44 (.07) 
3.53 
(.07) 
Drone Aircraft 2.87 (.07) 
3.91 
(.06) 
1. Approval is measured on a five-point scale, where 1 is “strongly disapprove” and 5 is “strongly approve”. Standard errors in parentheses. 
The effect of experimental conditions on approval ratings is significant at the p<.001 level. 
 
Figure 4.1: Mean Approval for Deploying Forces by Force Type (Public Sample) 
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Table 4.7: Approval for Deploying Forces by Force Type, Proportion (Experiment 2, Public Sample) 20 
Type of Military Force 
Low Likelihood of Success High Likelihood of Success 
Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove 
Ground Forces 15.6% 72.3% 53% 28.4% 
Manned Aircraft 20.3% 69% 61.3% 22.3% 
Drone Aircraft 40.1% 50.6% 77.1% 12.2% 
 
Although respondents are more supportive of initiating operations involving drones, these 
effects are dwarfed by the effect of the likelihood of mission success treatment. For instance, the 
mean public approval level for a drone operation is approximately 19-percent higher than the mean 
approval level for a ground force deployment when the likelihood of mission success is high. In 
comparison, mean approval for a drone deployment under high conditions of success are 36-
percent higher than a drone deployment under low conditions of mission success.  These findings 
support Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s argument that American public support for war is shaped more 
by the likelihood of military success factors than by considerations about casualty and risk 
aversion.21  
To examine these findings more systematically, I employ a set of ordinary least squares 
models to test whether findings are statistically significant and to assess whether there are 
heterogeneous treatment effects depending on respondent characteristics. Unlike the public sample 
in the first experiment, both the type of forces involved and the likelihood of operational success 
have statistically significant effects on support for operations. Covariates including gender, race, 
education level, income level, and veteran status have no statistically significant effect on support 
                                                        
20 Respondents who either “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove” of the actions are considered to “Disapprove.” 
Respondents who either “strongly approve” or “approve” of the actions are considered to “Approve”  
21 Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War, 1-22. 
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for the military operation. Political ideology (on a five-point scale from very liberal to very 
conservative) has a positive and statistically significant effect on support for the military operation. 
This effect, however, disappears when ideology is interacted with treatment.22  
Respondents who have more interventionist foreign policy leanings are, unsurprisingly, 
more likely to support military operations against the chemical weapons lab (using ground forces, 
manned aircraft, or drones) than respondents with less interventionist views on foreign policy, so 
long as there is a high likelihood of success.23 Interestingly, interventionist respondents are, on 
average, likely to exhibit similar levels of support for operations carried out by ground forces or 
drones. These findings suggest that interventionist respondents are simply prone to support any 
form of military operation that eliminates a potential threat to international stability, with little 
regard for risk to military personnel. Across the full sample, however, support for operations 
conducted by drones remains higher than operations conducted by ground forces or manned 
aircraft, providing support for the increased initiation hypothesis. 
 To unpack why members of the public are, conditional on likelihood of success, more 
supportive of a military strike conducted by drones than an operation carried out by ground forces 
or manned bombers, I turn again to qualitative data. I use the same approach employed in the first 
experiment and ask respondents to provide a free text response explaining their approval of the 
proposed actions. These responses are then manually coded into one of six categories.24  
                                                        
22 Appendix H, Section 3.3 includes regression tables for these tests.  
23 To measure preferences toward intervention, the survey instrument asked respondents to rate (using a five-point 
scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) their agreement with the statement “The United States needs to play 
an active role in solving conflicts around the world.” Although respondents reported their attitude toward intervention 
post-treatment, an OLS model that regresses interventionism on treatment condition finds no statistically significant 
relationship. This suggest that treatment does not affect respondents’ preferences on intervention. See Appendix H.  
24 I am grateful to Edmund Brose for his assistance in coding these data. A second individual coded 100 randomly 
selected responses and achieved an 85 percent agreement rate with the primary coder.  
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The results (Table 4.8) suggest that higher levels of public support for operations conducted 
by drones is grounded in the perception that drones present less risk to friendly forces than using 
manned aircraft or ground forces. Indeed, among respondents in the “drone/high likelihood of 
success” treatment condition, over a third justified their support for the mission by citing low levels 
of risk to U.S. forces. In comparison, only 1.5-percent of respondents in the “ground forces/high 
likelihood of success” treatment condition viewed the operation as low risk. The findings are 
similar when respondents are told that there is a low likelihood the mission will succeed. In the 
“drone/low likelihood of success” treatment group, 15.6-percent of respondents support the 
operation because they perceive it to involve no or low risk, while only 2.2-percent in the 
“ground/low likelihood of success” treatment and 0.8-percent in the “manned aircraft/low 
likelihood of success” treatment base their support on the low risk incurred.  


































































































In the low likelihood conditions, respondents generally justified low levels of support by 
describing how the mission was too risky and had too low of a chance of success. This mirrored 
the responses of the respondents in the military sample. Similar to the respondents in the first 
experiment, several respondents assigned to the ground force and manned aircraft treatment 
conditions suggested they would have been more supportive had drones been used in lieu of 
manned assets. For instance, one respondent assigned to the manned aircraft/low likelihood of 
success condition said, “I do not approve because I would rather see a drone go in vs. a manned 
plane where more people could potentially die.” This suggests that some members of the general 
public now view drones as a low risk option on the menu of potential military instruments.  
Summary of Experimental Findings 
The survey experiments offer support for the increased initiation hypothesis. Military 
officers are, on average, more likely to initiate military operations during crises when they have 
access to drones than they are when they must rely on ground forces or manned aircraft. 
Underpinning this preference is a perception that drones allow actors to carry out military 
operations with lower levels of risk to friendly forces. Military officers, however, also consider 
other factors such as the necessity of a given mission and a mission’s likelihood of success before 
initiating operations. This means that drones are likely to increase the initiation of military 
operations when all other factors associated with a military operation (i.e. likelihood of success) 
are held constant. In the real world, however, crises vary. This can lead to variation in force 
requirements to respond appropriately. As a result, decisionmakers may need to balance the trade-
offs between capabilities, effectiveness, and risk when making decisions on if and how to initiate 
military operations. Members of the public seem to hold similar preferences toward the use of 
force, voicing greater approval for operations carried out by drones than deployments of manned 
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aircraft or ground forces. The perceived likelihood of mission success, however, has a far larger 
effect on approval levels for missions than the type of asset involved.  
EVIDENCE FROM WARGAMES 
 The survey experiments provide support for the increased initiation hypothesis and suggest 
that drones increase support for the initiation of military operations among the U.S. public and 
U.S. military officers. Yet, as chapter 3 notes, actual military decisions are not made by officers 
completing surveys in isolation. To gain richer insights into how the availability of drones shapes 
the frequency with which military operations are initiated during crises, I turn to the wargame 
featuring the hypothetical states of Katunia and Dakastan that was introduced in chapter 3. 
 The tabletop wargame asked participants to assume the role of U.S. Air Force planners 
responsible for Central Asia. Participants are informed that Dakastan received intelligence 
reporting that Katunia’s military was training personnel to carry out terrorist attacks on Dakastani 
oil infrastructure and the air base used by U.S. forces. The suspected training camp is just on the 
Katunian side of the contested border. Participants are also told that Katunia has increased the 
intensity of its military exercises and deployed short-range air defense systems near the contested 
region. The Katunian president announced that any Dakastani or U.S. military aircraft or personnel 
that approach the contested area are subject to “emergency defensive actions” by Katunian forces. 
Given these potential threats to both Dakastan and U.S. forces in Dakastan, participants are asked 
to plan an intelligence gathering mission over the contested border region. Specifically, they are 
asked to select between two aircraft – the unarmed manned MC-12 Liberty and the unarmed 
remotely piloted MQ-1 Predator – to fly a reconnaissance mission along the border to collect 
imagery of the site. Participants are informed they are limited to these two aircraft due to resource 
constraints and that both aircraft have similar intelligence collection capabilities. On the surface, 
 124 
the lack of variation in the capabilities of the manned aircraft and drone may appear to present 
decisionmakers without a tradeoff. By holding capabilities constant, however, the wargames allow 
us to evaluate whether national practitioners view the lack of a crew on board as the primary 
advantage of remotely piloted aircraft over manned ones, or if decisionmakers also take into 
account other factors. 
 Unlike the other wargames described in chapter 5 and the survey experiments above, this 
particular wargame vignette does not include experimental manipulations. Rather than varying 
whether teams initiate operations using manned forces or a remotely piloted aircraft, the wargame 
vignette presents military decisionmakers with a choice that often occurs in the real world: 
choosing between a drone and a manned aircraft for a given mission. In addition, the wargame 
presents participants with a different scenario than the survey experiments. Rather than being 
asked to consider a kinetic strike that violates a rival’s sovereignty and destroys a physical target 
(as in the survey experiments), wargame participants are asked to consider a reconnaissance 
mission that involves no violation of the rival’s sovereignty and causes no physical destruction of 
the rival state’s infrastructure.  
 To be sure, the set up described above – which requires participants to select one of two 
assets – does not allow for a direct test of whether drones increase the initiation of military 
operations during crisis. It does, however, shed light on how national security practitioners view 
and discuss the tradeoffs between manned and remotely operated systems. This approach helps to 
highlight the decision-making logics that underpin the increased initiation hypothesis. If the 
increased initiation hypothesis is valid, decisionmakers should deploy remote warfighting systems 
at a higher rate than manned assets. Underlying these decisions should be a desire to minimize the 
risk to human life and the associated risk of being forced to escalate if a servicemember is killed.   
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Of the seven wargaming teams, six (86%) chose to deploy the MQ-1 Predator RPA as the 
sole means of collecting intelligence. These teams based their decisions primarily on the 
assumption that RPA operations involved no risk to U.S. personnel. The team that opted for a 
manned aircraft paired a manned MC-12 with an MQ-1 Predator because they believed an 
adversary was less likely to shootdown a manned MC-12 than an RPA.  
Table 4.9: Initial Deployment of Force, Wargame Team Outcomes 
 Team 1 Team 2 Team 3 Team 4 Team 5 Team 6 Team 7  
Risk/Escalation        % 
Minimize Risk of 
US Casualties X X X X X X X 100% 
Take steps to 
minimize risk to 
drone 




 X    X  28.6% 
Adversary 
Reaction         
More Likely to 
Shoot Down 
Drone 
X  X   X X  57.1% 




  X X X   42.9% 




The wargame revealed that military decisionmakers are more likely to deploy drones than 
similarly capable manned assets into harm’s way. Indeed, participants in three of the seven teams 
(42.9%) suggested that the use of RPAs was an obvious choice. One Air Force aviator asked, 
“What’s missing here? Why wouldn’t you collect in an [unmanned] MQ-1?”25 Another Air Force 
officer questioned, “why even bother with the [manned] MC-12?”26 Underlying these reactions 
                                                        
25 Participant HB2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
26 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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was a strong desire to avoid the death or capture of friendly personnel. All seven teams, including 
the team that selected a manned aircraft for the mission, believed drones presented lower levels of 
risk to friendly forces than manned assets.  
When making their decisions, the teams generally first considered the threat posed by 
adversary air defense forces. Most teams described primary risk to reconnaissance operations was 
the loss of friendly forces, but one team tried to more precisely define risk as the loss of lives, 
equipment, and the financial investment in highly trained aircrew personnel.27 In line with this 
conception of risk, participants generally sought to minimize the potential of losing personnel. One 
naval officer captured the sentiment of many participants when advocating for a drone deployment: 
“Don’t risk a life, send unmanned.”28 Another participant – a retired colonel who previously 
commanded air defense artillery units – declared to his teammates that a “drone allows [for] no 
captured or killed pilot.”29 But what specific factors led to this degree of risk aversion? 
Some participants were particularly concerned that the downing of a manned aircraft would 
lead to a situation where captured American personnel could be used as a political bargaining chip. 
For instance, one participant with extensive experience in the special operations community 
explained, “If I lose a [remotely piloted aircraft], there are no prisoners of war. The MC-12 Liberty 
has U.S. personnel. I don’t want our troops to be paraded in front of the television. I don’t want a 
Gary Powers incident, and I don’t want the adversary to be able to embarrass us.”30 In contrast to 
concerns about personnel loses, many participants expressed a relatively indifferent attitude 
                                                        
27 Participant HA3 (U.S. Marine Corps Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017.  
28 Participant HA1 (U.S. Naval Officer), 17 November 2017. 
29 Participant LA4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
30 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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toward the loss of a drone. For instance, one military pilot emphasized the lack of a loss of human 
life by alluding to the practice of sending letters to next of kin following the on-duty death of a 
service member. He jokingly remarked, “who do you write a letter to if a drone is shot down?”31 
Another participant suggested that a remotely piloted Predator could be used as “bait to test 
adversary reactions.”32  
Other participants were concerned about the risks associated with actions that could follow 
an adversary’s downing of a manned U.S. military aircraft. First, two of the seven (28.6%) teams 
discussed the risky search and rescue missions that would likely be deployed after the loss of a 
manned aircraft. One officer commented, “the survivors of a shoot down would incur rescue 
mission costs.”33 Another member of the same team – an Air Force officer who helped coordinate 
search and rescue missions in Afghanistan – agreed with this assessment, and explained how the 
loss of a manned aircraft “exposes others to risk” during rescue operations.34 Deploying a RPA 
eliminated the possibility that additional personnel and assets would need to be dispatched on a 
high-risk rescue or recovery mission.  
Second, some wargame participants were concerned the death or capture of American 
crewmembers could escalate the crisis with Katunia. While participants in most teams discussed 
the risks associated with losing personnel in general terms without specifying the risks or costs 
associated with personnel losses, two teams (28.6%) explicitly considered the heightened potential 
                                                        
31 Participant HD2 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
32 Participant LB2 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
33 Participant HA1 (U.S. Naval Officer), 17 November 2017. 
34 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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for crisis escalation if a manned asset were lost.35 One Air Force F-16 pilot remarked, “political 
consequences matter and manned assets are dangerous.”36 One of the pilot’s teammates agreed, 
stating that the “risk of escalation is higher with manned [aircraft].”37 In an effort to avoid this sort 
of escalation, a member of another team advocating for drone use commented that it is “important 
not to create an incident by not having a pilot shot down.”38  
The risk of losing friendly forces, however, was not the sole focus of discussions during 
the wargame. One of the seven teams (14.3%) dived into a conversation about escalation control 
by debating whether drones offered a more covert means of conducting reconnaissance operations. 
According to this team, the downing of a drone not only avoided the loss of friendly personnel byt 
also helped avoid retaliatory escalation by being more plausibly deniable than the loss of a manned 
aircraft. By reducing the likelihood that the downed drone could be attributed to the United States, 
participant believed Katunia would be less inclined to retaliate with force. One participant 
suggested that, “if we use unmanned, we can deny U.S. involvement” and that drones “increase 
deniability to a greater extent than manned [aircraft].39 Another participant on the team agreed, 
acknowledging “drones are more covert.”40 Another Air Force officer commented that a drone 
offered “deniability” if it was shot down, helping to avoid an upward spiral in tensions.41 The team 
                                                        
35 Participant HC2 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017 
36 Participant HC2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017 
37 Participant HC1 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017 
38 Participant LD1 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
39 Participant HB1 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
40 Participant HB2 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
41 Participant HB4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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briefly considered whether using a manned aircraft painted in a civilian paint scheme would offer 
a similar degree of deniability, but later realized this sort of covert operation went beyond the 
scope of the wargame scenario and potentially violated the law of armed conflict. The team’s 
perception that drones provide deniability lends support to the notion that drones expand a state’s 
policy menu in a way that allows operations that are less confrontational than the deployment of 
manned assets. 
As in the survey experiments, participants also considered asset capabilities. Even though 
participants were told that the remotely piloted MQ-1 Predator and the traditionally manned MC-
12 Liberty had similar intelligence collection capabilities, three of the teams (42.9%) examined 
other aircraft characteristics such as speed, range, and detectability by adversary radars during 
their decision-making deliberations. For instance, some participants noted that the manned MC-
12 flies faster than the Predator, but participants generally agreed that endurance mattered more 
for the mission at hand. One Air Force aviator commented that the ability of a drone to remain on-
station above a target and to maintain a “persistent stare at a specific spot” made it better suited 
than a manned aircraft that lacked endurance.42 Even when aircraft characteristics were discussed, 
these factors were largely overshadowed by concerns about reducing the risk to human life, 
suggesting that decisionmakers view drones as a low-risk means of carrying out military 
operations.  
Despite the reduced risk associated with a drone deployment, teams voiced several 
concerns about sending remotely piloted aircraft into harm’s way – in line with the amplified 
aggression hypothesis. First, some participants believed that Katunian forces might be more 
inclined to shoot down a drone than a manned aircraft. One officer viewed this as posing a “much 
                                                        
42 Participant HB2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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higher risk of escalation[.]”43 In response, another member of the team suggested that should 
Katunia shoot down a drone, “we will likely let it slide,” commenting that the United States took 
little action after Iran reportedly downed an advanced U.S. RQ-170 drone in 2011 – providing 
support for the restrained retaliation hypothesis.44  Second, some participants feared the shootdown 
of a drone could lead sensitive technology to fall into the hands of adversaries.45 These risks were 
seen as lower than the risk of losing personnel, but three of the teams still contemplated plans to 
mitigate risk to the drones that were deployed to the Dakastan-Katunia border. One team briefly 
considered escorting the RPAs with fighter jets, but decided this would be too escalatory. Another 
team tried to minimize the amount of time the drone would be in harm’s way. A third team, 
developed a detailed risk mitigation strategy in which the drone approached from a direction that 
avoided Katunian air defense sites, operated at a relatively high altitude, and varied the times of 
day when the mission would fly. This team made a deliberate decision to reduce the risk to the 
drone, despite the likely degradation of intelligence by collecting imagery from further away from 
the target of interest.46 The decisions of these teams provide support for the increased initiation 
hypothesis, but also highlight that drones are not necessarily seen an expendable asset that can be 
deployed with little forethought.  
The sole team that opted to deploy the manned MC-12 coupled the manned deployment 
with the deployment of a remotely piloted Predator. The team believed an inhabited aircraft offered 
better intelligence gathering capabilities and was less likely to be shot down than a remotely piloted 
                                                        
43 Participant HD2 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
44 Participant HD4 (Department of Defense Civilian), 17 November 2017.  
45 Participant LC4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
46 Participant LC4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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aircraft. The team began their discussion in a manner similar to the teams that deployed remotely 
piloted aircraft. Participants described how manned deployments involved higher risk and 
appeared ready to settle on the deployment of a remotely piloted Predator. Indeed, one team 
member asked, “Any reason to use Liberty?”47 Another questioned whether there was any 
“advantage to manned aircraft?”48 The direction of the conversation shifted when a Special Forces 
veteran posited that “manned has better awareness than a limited sensor. Pilots have situational 
awareness that drones don’t have.”49 Some participants appeared to become more risk acceptant 
after being told that inhabited aircraft might provide better operational awareness. One Army non-
commissioned officer commented, “No one signs up for risk free. Calculated risk is what we do.”50  
Participants in this team soon began highlighting other perceived benefits of using manned 
aircraft. Specifically, participants suggested that adversaries “might be more reticent to shoot down 
a manned aircraft” and that an “adversary will see lower regret for firing on a drone.”51 Building 
on the belief that an adversary was less likely to target a manned aircraft, the participant suggested, 
“If [we’re] going to use manned, now is the time to do it,” given that the crisis was in a relatively 
early stage and risk levels were perceived to be low.52 The team eventually settled on deploying a 
drone as the primary intelligence collection asset, but also proposed an alternate plan of flying 
both a manned and remotely piloted aircraft in order to maximize intelligence collection.  
                                                        
47 Participant LD1(U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
48 Participant LD3 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
49 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
50 Participant LD1 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
51 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer) and Participant LD4 (U.S. Navy Petty Officer), 
17 November 2017. 
52 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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Summary of Wargame Findings 
The wargame findings generally align with those from the survey experiments, but 
demonstrated two noteworthy decision-making dynamics. First, despite the lower operational risk 
in the wargame scenario than in the survey experiment scenario (i.e. reconnaissance in friendly 
airspace versus a strike in a rival state’s territory), participants still opted to initiate military 
operations using drones instead of manned assets. The wargame discussions reveal that this 
preference for drones is driven in large part by the lack of friendly crewmember on board. 
Removing friendly forces from front lines not only reduces the risk of personnel losses, but also 
allows states to deny involvement in drone operations. Both of these mechanisms provide an off-
ramp to escalation that military decisionmakers take into account when making decisions on 
whether to initiate military operations.  
Second, the wargame outcomes highlight how interaction between decisionmakers can 
influence national security policymaking. Unlike the survey experiments which are completed in 
isolation, the wargame allowed for discussion between national security practitioners. Participants 
were able to draw upon the subject matter expertise of their teammates – which in some cases 
shifted decisions. For instance, the team that decided to deploy both manned and unmanned aircraft 
shifted their decision from a purely drone mission after a single participant expressed his belief 
that manned aircraft offered better situational awareness of the operational environment than a 
drone aircraft. In a real-world setting, a single practitioner – perhaps a senior officer or subject 
matter expert – could have a similar influence on shaping policy outcomes.  
CONCLUSION 
 The survey experiments and wargame provide significant support the increased-initiation 
hypothesis. The findings also align with existing theoretical and empirical studies that argue that 
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drones – and other technologies that lower the cost and risk of military operations – allow states 
to more frequently initiate military operations.53 The qualitative data gathered using the survey 
instruments and during wargaming sessions suggest that decisionmakers considered a host of 
related factors – including risk to friendly forces, likelihood of mission success, platform 
capabilities, and risk of escalation – when deciding whether to initiate or support the use of military 
operations during crises. The lower risk to friendly forces, however, generally made drones a 
preferred option. Unsurprisingly, neither military decisionmakers nor members of the public 
explicitly referenced the greater expected utility that drones offered relative to manned assets or 
ground forces. Many survey respondents and wargaming respondents, did however, describe how 
drones reduced the potential dangers and human costs of military operations – suggesting that 
technologies that remove warfighters from harm’s way actually do shift the decision-making 
calculus on the use of force.  
 The empirical tests presented in this chapter also address questions left unanswered by 
many previous studies on the effect that drones have on the initiation of military force. Specifically, 
how do drones affect decision-making by national security practitioners on the use of force? Most 
existing research on the effects of drones on conflict dynamics draws data from public samples, 
without exploring the preferences of military professionals who actually make decisions on the 
use of force.54 The assumption in these analyses is that increased support for drone operations 
among the public decreases political barriers to the use of force. In turn, policymakers are more 
                                                        
53 Kaag and Kreps, Drone Warfare; Walsh and Schulzke, The Ethics of Drone Strikes: Does Reducing the Cost of 
Conflict Encourage War?; Schneider and Macdonald, U.S. Public Support for Drone Strikes: When Do Americans 
Prefer Unmanned over Manned Platforms. 
54 One notable exception is Julia Macdonald and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Battlefield Responses to New Technologies: 
Views from the Ground on Unmanned Aircraft,” Security Studies (Forthcoming). Macdonald and Schneider examine 
the preferences of tactical level military joint terminal attack controllers during ongoing combat operations, rather 
than more strategic questions concerning the initiation of military operations.  
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prone to initiate military operations. These studies offer important insights as public opinion can 
cue foreign policy decisions. Yet, as chapter 2 lays out, military and civilian intelligence 
professionals also play a key role in decisions on the use of force: they provide civilian leaders 
with policy options and, as described earlier, may make tactical choices with strategic 
ramifications. 
 The experiments demonstrate that both military officers and members of the public 
generally prefer drone operations to those conducted by manned assets or ground forces. But there 
are important limitations to the increased initiation hypothesis. The hypothesis expects states to 
initiate military operations that they might not otherwise launch without access to drones only 
when all other features of the crisis scenario and potential military response are constant. That is, 
drones must have the same chance of carrying out a mission as other military approaches. If these 
factors vary, which is apt to happen in the real world, decisionmakers will be forced to make 
tradeoffs. Indeed, the findings here suggest that members of the public are more willing to deploy 
friendly troops into harm’s way on a mission that will be successful than a drone into a mission 
that is likely to fail. Still, the findings demonstrate that drones expand the policy menu for 
decisionmakers and allow them to initiate military operations they would otherwise avoid.  
What implications might these findings have on actual decisions surrounding the use of 
force? One important set of questions deals with how policymakers and national security 
decisionmakers will balance the tradeoff between effectiveness, risk to friendly forces, and 
financial costs. To what extent will civilian policymakers consider the opinions and preferences of 
the public? The public appears more supportive of deploying manned aircraft or ground forces that 
will successfully accomplish a mission than dispatching a drone, even if a manned deployment 
incurs greater risks and costs. Do civilian foreign policy elites hold the same preferences as 
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members of the public? Or, would policymakers – with their greater experience in national security 
affairs than the average survey respondent – be willing to support drone operations that are 
marginally less effective than manned or ground operations in an effort to avoid friendly force 
casualties and the associated political costs. The willingness to make this tradeoff would likely 
depend on the stakes associated with the mission. Leaders should logically be more likely to accept 
greater risk for missions with higher stakes. While the surveys and wargames do not test these 
questions and implications directly, I probe some of these issues in the case studies in chapters 6 
and 7. I also explore some of the questions highlighted above in the dissertation’s concluding 
chapter. 
The findings presented in this chapter also do not explore what happens once drones are 
deployed. Specifically, do drones can help control escalation dynamics once they are deployed in 
a crisis setting? To study how drones shape the trajectory of a crises after their initial deployment, 
the next chapter presents findings from several additional survey experiments and experimental 











The June 2017 intrusion of an Iranian drone into Pakistan’s airspace suggests states might 
more frequently initiate military operations when their arsenals include drones. But what can 
events like the Iranian drone incursion teach us about escalation control? On one hand, Pakistan 
quickly intercepted and downed the intruding drone – something it had avoided during the few 
earlier incidents where manned Iranian aircraft penetrated Pakistani airspace.55 At the same time, 
the downing of the drone did not trigger any escalation. Indeed, the Iranian government made no 
public comment about the loss of their drone.56 In stark contrast, Iranian officials publicly 
threatened to launch military strikes on Pakistani territory after Pakistan-based militants attacked 
Iranian security forces just one month earlier in May 2017.57 The Iran-Pakistan incident suggests 
that deployments involving drones are less likely to escalate into broader conflicts than those that 
place friendly personnel in harm’s way.  
The behavior of the Pakistani and Iranian governments is largely consistent with the 
restrained retaliation and amplified aggression logics introduced in chapter two. The restrained 
retaliation hypothesis posits that an actor’s response following an attack on its drones will be less 
                                                        
55 Siddiqui, “Iranian Drone Shot down by PAF, Confirms FO”; Baloch, “Iranian Helicopter Violates Pakistan 
Airspace.” 
56 Madeeha Anwar and Mehdi Jedinia, “Will Downing of Tehran Drone Hurt Pakistan-Iran Relations Further?,” Voice 
of America, June 24, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/will-downing-tehran-drone-hurt-pakistan-iran-relations-
further/3914553.html. 
57 Anwar and Jedinia. Pakistan and Iran eventually formed a joint commission to secure borders and control militant 
activity. 
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intense and escalatory than a response to an attack on manned assets or ground forces. Because 
attacks on remote warfighting systems generally do not endanger friendly personnel and because 
drones are typically less costly than their manned equivalents, military decisionmakers may see 
less need to carry out retaliatory strikes aimed at degrading a rival’s capabilities. At the same time, 
attacks on unmanned assets are less likely to trigger the types of emotions – like anger – that can 
drive retaliatory behavior. Beyond national security practitioners, members of the public may be 
less likely to support retaliation when only machines, and not women and men in uniform, are lost. 
Public opinion may subsequently shape the decisions of elected government officials.  
If military decisionmakers mirror their preferences onto a rival, and believe a rival will 
restrain retaliation following attacks on drones, they may be more likely amplify aggression by 
taking more forceful action against intruding drones than against manned platforms. This logic 
might explain why Pakistan targeted Iranian drones, but not manned Iranian aircraft, that 
penetrated into its airspace. Even though the availability of drones may allow states to more 
frequently initiate military operations and take action against intruding aircraft, these actions need 
not lead to escalatory spirals. Instead, decisionmakers may restrain retaliation after a confrontation 
involving a drone, providing an opportunity to deescalate otherwise tense confrontations.  
As in chapter 4, I use a series of survey experiments and wargames to test the restrained 
retaliation and amplified aggression hypotheses, and to probe whether the use of drones helps 
temper escalation during interstate crises. The survey experiments allow me to quantitatively 
measure escalation along a vertical scale and to compare the preferences of military professionals 
to those of members of the general public. The wargames provide rich qualitative data that shed 
light on the assumptions and decision-making processes of military officers. The survey 
experiments and wargames expose participants to an intrusion scenario and a shootdown scenario. 
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The intrusion vignette asks participants how they would respond to an armed adversary aircraft 
that penetrates friendly airspace, while the shootdown scenario examines what type of retaliation 
respondents call for after a rival shoots down an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. Using the same 
approach as in the previous chapter, I vary whether the aircraft involved in each of these scenarios 
is a manned aircraft or drone. 
The experiments and wargames find support for both the restrained retaliation and 
amplified aggression hypotheses. Military officers and members of the public are more likely to 
initiate or advocate for aggressive responses after the loss of a manned aircraft, citing the need to 
protect American pilots or to avenge their death. These reactions are more escalatory than those 
that follow attacks on remotely piloted drones. While the death of a friendly pilot dominated 
wargaming discussions and free form responses in the survey experiment, the data yield an 
interesting finding: even when a pilot is not killed in the shootdown of a manned aircraft, military 
officers and members of the public call for more escalatory responses than after an attack on a 
drone. This suggests respondents’ behavior is driven not only by the death of American 
servicemember, but rather because they view drones and manned aircraft as fundamentally 
different types of military technologies.  
The findings also provide support for the amplified aggression logic. Respondents were 
more apt to take aggressive actions against a rival’s drones than their manned platforms, believing 
that an attack on the former was less likely to result in broader escalation. The deployment of 








EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY EXPERIMENTS 
 
Testing Restrained Retaliation   
 The first set of experiments are designed to test the restrained retaliation hypothesis. They 
expose field grade military officers (n=78) to an attack on a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft operating 
in international airspace. Respondents are told, “A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air 
Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft (or remotely piloted U.S. Air Force Global Hawk 
reconnaissance drone) using a surface-to-air missile.” To make it clear the rival country violated 
international law and carried out an act of aggression, the vignette describes how the aircraft was 
“on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at the time of the shoot down.”58 
The vignette then describes what happened to the American aircraft and crewmember. 
Respondents in the drone condition are told, “The Global Hawk drone was destroyed and there 
was no loss of U.S. life because no pilot is onboard the Global Hawk.” Respondents in the manned 
aircraft condition are all told that the “U-2 was destroyed”, but I vary what happens to the pilot: 
“the American pilot was killed”, “adversary forces are currently holding the American pilot as a 
prisoner”, or “U.S. forces rescued the American pilot shortly after the shoot down.”59  This 
variation allows me to explore the extent to which the death of an American pilot shapes retaliatory 
behavior. To measure preferences for retaliation, the survey instrument asks, “Which of the 
following U.S. actions would you be most supportive of in response to the shoot down?” 
Respondents select from five options: 1) no action; 2) formal diplomatic protest; 3) economic 
                                                        
58 Under international law, state aircraft (which include military aircraft) can operate freely in international airspace, 
without interference from other states.  
59 Appendix F includes full text of the survey instrument.  Appendix H, Section 2.1 includes statistical checks to ensure 
assignment to treatment was random. I also conducted manipulation checks to see whether respondents recognized 
treatment; over 90-percent of respondents in each condition passed the manipulation check.  
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sanctions against the rival country; 4) show of U.S. military force in vicinity of the rival country; 
or 5) limited airstrike against the missile site that downed the aircraft. These are coded along an 
ordinal 5-point scale where no action is the least escalatory action (1) and limited airstrikes is the 
most escalatory (5).60  
 Consistent with the restrained retaliation logic, military officers, on average, call for less 
escalatory acts of retaliation following an attack on a remotely piloted drone than on a manned 
aircraft (See Table 5.1).  When a rival shoots down a drone, 36.9% of military respondents call for 
a military response (15.8% support a show of force and 21.1% support limited military strikes). In 
contrast, when a friendly pilot is killed in the rival’s shootdown of a manned aircraft, 80.9% of 
military respondents support a military response (23.8% support a show of force and 57.1% 
support limited military strikes).  
 At the surface, these findings suggest that military officers support less escalatory 
retaliation when a pilot is not killed. If true, responses to the downing of manned aircraft without 
the death of a pilot (i.e. the pilot is captured or rescued) should be just as restrained as responses 
to the loss of a drone. Table 5.1 reveals that military respondents, on average, call for less 
escalatory retaliation when a manned aircraft is shot down without the loss of life than when a 
pilot is killed during a shootdown. However, these responses are, on average, not as restrained as 
the response to the downing of a drone. This suggests that military officers respond not only to the 
death of a friendly servicemember, but treat drones and inhabited aircraft as qualitatively different  
types of systems.  
 
 
                                                        
60 To be sure, there exist response options that are more escalatory than a tit-for-tat use of force. Given the literature 
suggesting that reprisals are often of a tit-for-tat nature, the survey instrument’s most escalatory option  is a limited 
airstrike on the missile site responsible for the shootdown. Future studies could include a more escalatory response 
option to assess whether respondents are willing to launch disproportionate acts of retaliation. 
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Table 5.1: Mean Response Level to Shootdown (Military Sample) 
Type of Shootdown  Mean Response Level 
Manned Aircraft, Pilot Killed 4.238 (.238) 
Manned Aircraft, Pilot Captured 3.737 (.252) 
Manned Aircraft, Pilot Rescued 3.865  (.254) 
Drone (No pilot onboard) 3.106 (.295) 
Retaliatory preferences are measured on a five-point scale, where 1 is “no action” and 5 is “a limited airstrike against the missile site that downed 
the aircraft.” Standard errors in parentheses. The effect of experimental conditions on retaliatory preferences is significant at the p<.01 level for 




Table 5.2: Response to Shootdown, Percentages (Military Sample) 
Shoot Down Type Do Nothing Diplomatic Protest 
Economic 

























































Several factors may shape the divergent response to attacks on drones and manned systems 
in which crewmembers are not killed. First, military officers may perceive an attack on a manned 
system as signaling a rival’s intent and capability to kill U.S. servicemembers. Even if an attack 
results in no loss of life, the rival has demonstrated its willingness to use force against friendly 
personnel. Such a move might cross a salience threshold that an attack on a remotely piloted drone 
does not. The lack of casualties in these attacks on manned assets may not be seen as the result of 
the rival’s deliberate actions, but instead, as the result of chance – something beyond the rival’s 
control. As a result, military personnel may be less restrained in their retaliatory moves. Second, 
the loss of a manned aircraft may be seen as generating greater financial costs for the deploying 
state. Although remotely piloted assets are by no means cheap, they often have a lower per unit 
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cost than their manned counterparts.61 The higher cost of losing a manned asset may lead personnel 
to take more escalatory action aimed at deterring the rival from taking additional, costly actions.  
To unpack the factors that drive preferences toward retaliation, I turn to qualitative data 
collected from each respondent. As in the other survey experiments, I ask respondents to “write a 
sentence or two telling us why [they] chose [their] response.” I then manually code these responses 
into one of seven typologies. Although the small size of the military sample limits the 
generalizations that can be drawn from this analysis, military officers are more likely to believe 
they need to demonstrate American resolve and protect American military operations after an 
attack on a manned platform results in the death of a pilot than in response to attacks on manned 
or drone aircraft that do not result in deaths. The responses also highlight many of the instrumental 
factors associated with the restrained retaliation hypothesis.  
Table 5.3: Qualitative Justifications for Response to Shootdown (Military Sample) 
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61 The complex communication and support infrastructure supporting drone operations, can push up operating costs, 
even if unit costs remain low. For an assessment about the complexities and costs of systems like drones, see Gilli and 
Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?,” January 2016. 
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Attacks on manned aircraft generally focused on the need to degrade rival capabilities, to 
protect future operations, or to punish the rival for violating international law. One Air Force major 
who supported airstrikes after the death of a pilot explained, “As a military member, my response 
is inclined to support the removal of any future threat by a kinetic reaction against the missile 
strike.” Another officer who supported a show of force in response to the death of an American 
pilot argued that a response was necessary to punish the rival for its aggression and violation of 
international law: “Shooting down and killing a pilot in international [airspace] should be dealt 
with severely because of its aggressive nature and challenge to established international law and 
norms.” Surprisingly, the qualitative responses focused primarily on instrumental factors and made 
few references to emotions as a driver of retaliation. 
While many officers believed the death of a friendly pilot warranted a strong response, they 
also sought to minimize the risk of large-scale escalation. One respondent noted, a “limited 
airstrike is hardly limited when against sovereign…territory of a highly nationalistic regional 
power.” In explaining his support for a show of force, the respondent explained, “Economic 
sanctions are ‘easy’ and the competitor has likely accepted those costs…you have to show you do 
not accept their ‘sphere of influence’ attempt and…demonstrate power projection capability 
regardless of what they do.” Another respondent, an aviator, was more explicit about the risks of 
launching airstrikes in response to the death of a pilot: “The US conducting a limited airstrike on 
the enemy missile site would in fact violate that nation’s sovereignty and escalate the situation. A 
show of US military force in the vicinity of the country while remaining outside sovereign borders 
reinforces…that the US respects and is operating in accordance with international law and that the 
adversary is the nation who is in violation.”    
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Although attacks that killed an American pilot resulted in more escalatory retaliation than 
those that did not, military officers still often believed some response was necessary after attacks 
on drones and on manned aircraft that did not result in crewmember deaths. Indeed, one Air Force 
lieutenant colonel responding to the loss of a drone suggested that “whether it was an RPA or 
manned aircraft should be immaterial to the policy response. The loss of a life if it was manned 
would be far more tragic, but we should respond even if a pilot wasn’t killed.” There was, however, 
significant variation over the appropriate level of response in cases where the pilot was not killed 
or in response to an attack on a drone.  
One Air Force aviator with drone experience invoked the logic of tit-for-tat responses, 
stating that a retaliatory airstrike “is an immediate proportionate action to the aggressor.”  On the 
most aggressive end of the spectrum some respondents called for airstrikes. These officers 
generally believed that strong military actions were needed to punish the rival and prevent future 
attacks, even if a pilot was not killed in the shootdown. One lieutenant colonel suggested that an 
attack on manned aircraft “requires a response to both punish the perpetrator and deter other states 
from similar actions.” Another Air Force officer suggested that the strike should “take out the 
implement [that carried out] that attack to deter future strikes against similar missions” even if the 
pilot was captured by the rival. “Anything less would be an act of weakness and enable the rival 
power to continue being belligerent,” noted another respondent. 
While some military officers called for harsh retaliation even when no Americans were 
killed in the shootdown, loss of life appeared to be an important threshold for many respondents. 
One officer who supported a show of force in response to an attack on a drone explained that 
“retaliatory strikes would be more appropriate if US personnel were injured or killed.” Indeed, 
many military respondents explicitly sought to avoid escalation when a drone was attacked or 
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when there was no loss of life in a manned shootdown. In response to a drone shootdown, one 
lieutenant colonel called for diplomatic measures, arguing that “military retaliation is just going to 
escalate kinetic conflict and turn international support against you.”  
Others tried to identify responses that were – in Thomas Schelling’s language – in the 
“same currency” as the initial transgression, while still mitigating the risks of provoking larger 
escalation. For instance, an Air Force major who supported a show of force after a U-2 pilot was 
captured explained, “though justified in the limited strike we must consider is war or limited war 
a cost we fully want to engage.” Another officer who called for a show of force after the rescue of 
a downed pilot commented, “Economic sanctions are too loosely tied to the event, but an actual 
attack into another country would probably uncontrollably escalate the situation.” Efforts to 
prevent escalation were understandably quite present in cases where the pilot was captured. One 
officer commented, “Despite the fact that economic sanctions are not targeting the source of the 
issue, at a minimum [they demonstrate] a level of punishment on the government. It also allows 
time for diplomatic dialogue…The end goal is the release of the American servicemember, an 
attack would likely not bring that end state about.” Despite this variation, retaliation was, on 
average, less escalatory when a drone – rather than manned aircraft – was downed.  
The experimental findings from the military sample find support for the restrained 
retaliation hypothesis and the instrumental logics that underpin it. Yet as chapter 2 describes, 
military decisionmakers at the tactical and operational levels are only one set of actors that can 
influence whether a crisis escalates. Indeed, the preferences of the public may be particularly 
important cues for policymakers in a scenario where a state is the victim of attack by another state. 
In these cases, policymakers may fear political consequences for failing to meet the demands of 
their constituents.  
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In February 2019, for instance Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi faced significant 
public pressure to respond militarily to a terrorist attack on Indian troops carried out by a Pakistan-
based terrorist organization. Having criticized his predecessor for being weak against terror and 
having pledged to wage war on Pakistani-backed terrorists as part of his reelection campaign, Modi 
launched airstrikes that attempted to target a suspected terror camp in Pakistan.62 The strikes 
represented a significant escalation as it was the first time in five decades that Indian military 
aircraft had crossed into Pakistan’s airspace to carry out a combat mission.63 During the operation, 
Pakistan shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured its pilot. This event triggered additional 
pressure for Modi to take retaliation. As a result, India’s National Security Advisor reportedly 
spoke to the head of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence and threatened to launch additional 
mission strikes on Pakistan.64 Although Pakistan released the pilot before missile strikes could be 
carried out, India’s actions and threats provides evidence to suggest that leaders are responsive to 
public demands for retaliation to attacks on their personnel.  
                                                        
62 Whether India successfully struck a terrorist training camp is a matter of debate. Open source satellite imagery after 
the strikes revealed no significant damage, see Christopher Clary, “After Terrorist Attack in Kashmir, Will India Seek 
Vengeance or de-Escalation?,” The Washington Post, February 25, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/25/after-terrorists-attacked-kashmir-will-india-seek-vengeance-
or-de-escalation/?utm_term=.5fc89f44406a.mage in the target area. Vaibhav Tiwari, “‘Fire In My Heart...’: PM 
Modi’s Outrage On Pulwama Terror Attack,” NDTV.com, February 17, 2019, https://www.ndtv.com/india-
news/prime-minister-narendra-modis-outrage-on-pulwama-terror-attack-fire-in-my-heart-1994885; Maria Abi-Habib 
and Austin Ramzy, “Indian Jets Strike in Pakistan in Revenge for Kashmir Attack,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-jets.html. Whether India 
successfully struck a terrorist training camp is a matter of debate. Open source satellite imagery after the strikes 
revealed no significant damage, see Marcus Hellyer, Nathan Ruser, and Aakriti Bachhawat, “India’s Strike on Balakot: 
A Very Precise Miss?,” The Strategist, March 27, 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-strike-on-balakot-a-
very-precise-miss/. 
63 Maria Abi-Habib, “After India’s Strike on Pakistan, Both Sides Leave Room for De-Escalation,” The New York 
Times, February 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-airstrikes.html. 
64 Sanjeev Miglani and Drazen Jorgic, “India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at Each Other: Sources,” 
Reuters, March 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-crisis-insight-idUSKCN1QY03T. 
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To study whether the public calls for restrained retaliation after attacks on drones, I field a 
similar experiment on a public sample (n=1609). The vignette remains unchanged, but the larger 
sample allows me to add one additional experimental manipulation. Unlike the experiment fielded 
on the military sample, which holds the rival state’s strength constant (“The adversary is a 
militarily strong regional power”), this survey varies whether the adversary is militarily “strong” 
or “weak.” This additional information allows me to test whether and how relative power 
influences decisions on retaliation. Logically, respondents should be more likely to call for 
escalation against weaker adversaries than stronger ones, because their likelihood of success is 
higher. This results in the 2 x 4 factorial design depicted in Table 5.4, below. 
  
After verifying random assignment of subjects to experimental conditions and conducting 
a manipulation check, I compare the mean retaliation level across treatment conditions. Like their 
military counterparts, the public supports the most escalatory responses when an adversary attacks 
a manned aircraft and kills an American pilot. Preferences for retaliation among the public sample 
are most restrained when a strong adversary shoots down a drone (Table 5.5, Figure 5.1).  
As with the military sample, the mean retaliation for an attack on a manned aircraft in 
which the pilot is rescued lies between that of an attack that kills the pilot and an attack on a drone.  
Interestingly, however, respondents, on average, support similarly aggressive responses after a 
Table 5.4: Treatment Table (Public Sample) 
 








Weak Adversary n=200 n=203 n=201 n=203 
Strong Adversary n=196 n=200 n=203 n=203 
 
Note: n represents the number of respondents randomly assigned to each experimental condition in the U.S. public 
sample. 
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weak rival captures a downed pilot than when the pilot is killed in the shootdown.65 The experiment 
also finds that respondents are likely to support harsher retaliation against a weak regional power 
than against a strong regional power. These findings are not surprising, as respondents may fear 
that taking action against a strong regional power may be militarily riskier, incur more costs, and 
perhaps draw the United States into a broader conflict.  
Figure 5.1: Mean Response to Shootdown by Treatment (Public Sample) 
 
The similar mean level of escalation in the “manned aircraft/pilot killed, weak state” and 
“manned aircraft/pilot captured, weak state” conditions suggests members of the public might be 
punishing a weak rival for taking actions that could have resulted in the death of the pilot. Because 
the adversary is weak, respondents may believe that limited strikes are less likely to result in the 
broadening or intensification of a conflict in a way that threatens the United States.  To be sure, 
                                                        
65 There is no statistically significant difference between preferences for escalation between the “manned aircraft/pilot 
killed, weak state” and “manned aircraft/pilot captured, weak state” experimental conditions.  
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relatively few respondents ever call for the most escalatory response – strikes on the missile site 
that downed the aircraft – even when the pilot is killed. However, the percentage of respondents 
calling for a strike on the missile site is significantly lower when a drone – and not a manned 
aircraft - is attacked. These findings provide support for the restrained retaliation logic among 
members of the public. 








Manned, Pilot Killed 3.50 (.00) 
3.48 
(.08) 
Manned, Pilot Captured 3.52 (.08) 
3.36 
(.08) 
Manned, Pilot Rescued 3.27 (.08) 
3.18 
(.08) 
Drone 2.64 (.08) 
2.50 
(.07) 
Retaliatory preferences are measured on a five-point scale. 1 is “no action” and 5 is “a limited airstrike against the missile site that 
downed the aircraft”. Standard errors in parentheses. The effect of experimental conditions is significant at the p<.001 level. 
 
Table 5.6: Response to Shootdown, Percentage (Public Sample) 
Shoot Down Type Do Nothing Diplomatic Protest 
Economic 
Sanctions Show of Force 
Limited 
Strikes 










































































































I also examine data from the public sample for heterogeneous treatment effects.66 
Unsurprisingly, respondents with more conservative political leanings and those with more 
interventionist perceptions are more supportive or more escalatory acts of retaliation. Veteran 
status has no significant effect on support for retaliation.  
 To probe why respondents prefer more escalatory retaliation following an attack on a 
manned aircraft than on a remotely piloted drone, I again turn to analysis of responses to an open-
ended question. The qualitative data suggest respondents overwhelmingly view attacks on drones 
as falling below the threshold needed to justify significant use of force in retaliation. As a result, 
respondents are, on average, less likely to believe the United States must demonstrate resolve or 
take actions to defend its national interests after the downing of a drone. Since less is at stake when 
a drone is lost, the population is satisfied with less aggressive responses, limiting the potential that 
an isolated incident will spill over into a broader conflict. These responses largely align with those 
in the military sample, suggesting that military personnel and civilians have similar beliefs 
regarding restrained retaliation.  
 Like the military respondents, many members of the public sample viewed an attack on a 
drone as not requiring a significant military response. One respondent, for instance, explained, “It 
was simply a drone being destroyed. If it was an aircraft carrying soldiers, that would be a different 
story. No action needed because no harm done beyond the loss of a drone.”  Another commented, 
“No Blood, No Foul” suggesting that the attack on a drone as a non-issue since no American 
military personnel were injured or killed.   
                                                        
66 See Appendix H, Section 2.2 for analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects.  
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In contrast, one respondent noted that, “shooting down a [manned] spy plane over 
international waters is a clear act of aggression against my country. Anything short of a military 
show of force will show us as weak.” Another respondent commented, “Basically eye for an eye.” 
To be sure, not all respondents believed the death of an American pilot warranted a harsh response. 
Some respondents suggested the rival state was justified in shooting down the aircraft because “it 
posed a threat.” Others suggested hoped to avoid escalation. “One small incident does not need to 
escalate tensions,” argued one respondent. Arguments of this sort, however, were less common 
than calls for more aggressive responses.  
As with the military sample respondents supported more aggressive retaliation to the 
downing of manned aircraft, but also sought to avoid taking actions they believed had the potential 
to trigger a regional conflict. One respondent who called for a show of force after an attack that 
killed the U.S. pilot explained, “they used weapons and killed one of our men[.] It’s important to 
show that we won’t be bullied. Still, I would refrain from actions that might lead to immediate 
war.”  
 Although the findings presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that respondents are less likely 
to support hostile action against strong actors, there is little discussion of relative state power in 
the free text responses. Some respondents suggest that military action against weak states are more 
likely to be successful. For example, one respondent argued, “They have our prisoners under their 
control and are weak. US military is strong and can get these guys back home.”  Most references 
to power, however, often suggest that the United States should temper its responses when dealing 
a militarily weak rival. For instance, one respondent who recommended sanctions in response to 
an attack on manned aircraft (pilot rescued) commented, “The adversary is also weak militarily so 
I don't think they would think they could really take us on so if we do show military force, it may 
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look like overkill.” Another noted that, “There is nothing to be gained by a more drastic response” 
by carrying out military operations against a weak state that had downed an RPA. Thus, while 
strength of a rival actor plays a role in in informing preferences toward retaliation, the type of 
aircraft attack seems to carry more weight in influencing the formation of preferences.  
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Testing Amplified Aggression 
 Military officers and members of the public appear to exercise more restrained retaliation 
when responding to attacks on drones than to attacks on manned assets. If decisionmakers mirror 
image their beliefs and preferences onto potential rivals, they might think their adversaries will 
also launch less escalatory retaliation after attacks on drones. As a result of this mirror imaging, 
national security decisionmakers tactical and operational levels may be more prone to attack their 
rival’s drones than manned assets. More senior military officers who also hold these mirror-imaged 
beliefs may be more likely to establish rules of engagement or advise senior commanders and 
civilian leaders to take more aggressive responses to drones than to manned platforms.  
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 To test this logic of amplified aggression, I field an experiment that presents civilian and 
military respondents with a situation in which they must decide how to respond to an armed attack 
aircraft that has penetrated friendly airspace. The survey instrument introduces a scenario in which, 
“Air surveillance radars have detected an adversary’s [aircraft] approaching a coalition base in the 
Middle East. Over the past week, adversary aircraft have approached the base on five separate 
occasions. Today the [aircraft] has approached closer to the coalition base than previous flights. 
The aircraft has not responded to coalition radio calls.”  I vary whether the intruding aircraft is a 
“manned Su-25 attack aircraft” or a “remotely piloted Shahed 129 attack aircraft.” Respondents 
are then asked what they believe is the “highest level of U.S. response appropriate in this situation.” 
They choose from four increasingly escalatory options: 1) no action, 2) intercept with fighter jets, 
3) warning shots, 4) down the aircraft (using fighter jets or surface-to-air missiles). Respondents 
are also given the opportunity to provide an open-ended response if their preferred action is not 
listed.   
In line with the amplified aggression hypothesis, military officers, on average, take more 
aggressive actions against drones than against manned aircraft – even though both pose the same 
type and degree of threat in the crisis scenario.67 As Table 5.8 shows, the mean response to a drone 
intrusion is nearly 0.9-points higher on a 5-point scale. Indeed, 51.3% of military decisionmakers 
facing an intruding drone believed shooting it down was the most escalatory response. In contrast, 
just 10.3% of military officers facing a manned intruder would have chosen to shoot down the 
aircraft. In other words, military officers were, on average, approximately five times more likely 
to down a drone than a manned aircraft (See Table 5.9).  
                                                        
67 See Appendix H, Section 1.1 for balance tables, randomization checks, and regression analysis. Nearly all 
respondents passed a manipulation check. Within the manned condition 97.4-percent correctly identified the type of 
aircraft involved, and 94.8 percent within the drone condition correctly identified the aircraft type. 
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Table 5.8: Mean Response to Intruder (Military Sample) 
Intruder Type Mean Response Level 
Manned 2.333 (.127) 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft 3.205 (.173) 
1. 1-5 scale. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 5.9: Response to Intruder, Percentage (Military Sample) 






























 The divergent response to drones and manned intruders is puzzling. International law treats 
manned military aircraft and drones as equals, and states maintain the inherent right to self-defense. 
A violation of a state’s sovereign airspace represents an unambiguous case where the use of force 
in self-defense is fully justified under international law. Further, the scenario presents drones and 
manned aircraft as equally threatening (e.g. they are unresponsive to radio calls, have overflown 
military installations, etc.). To more closely explore why military respondents supported more 
aggressive action against drones than against inhabited aircraft, I again turn to the free text 
responses that military officers provided. I code the responses into one of eight categories: 1) 
response action incurs no/low risk; 2) response action incurs high risk; 3) the adversary poses 
hostile intent/must defend against the adversary; 4) the adversary poses no/low threat; 5) response 
seeks gradual escalation; 6) response is the best solution (without any additional information); 7) 
there is insufficient information/unintelligible response; 8) respondent is opposed to the use of 
force.  
 While the small military sample limits the conclusions that can be drawn from analysis of 
the qualitative responses, there are a few notable trends. First, compared to respondents facing a 
manned intruder, respondents facing a drone were, on average, more likely to assume the intruder 
has hostile intent and poses a threat. One Air Force officer described the intruding drone as “a 
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threat to coalition forces, especially if it is armed (though, if not armed still a threat for the 
intelligence it is collecting).” While many military respondents acknowledged that the manned 
aircraft had violated friendly airspace, they generally did not characterize a manned intruder as 
threatening in the same way as officers facing drones. Indeed, one officer suggested that the 
manned Su-25 attack aircraft might “be having radio problems.”  
Perhaps because participants initially perceived manned intruders as less threatening than 
drones, they were, on average, more likely to seek gradual escalation when responding to an 
intruding manned attack aircraft than to a remotely piloted attack drone. Many explicitly stated a 
need to avoid escalation, but to simultaneously “Show resolve” or “Send a very clear message.” 
Several respondents believed that intercepts or warning shots helped avoid the risks of escalation, 
while demonstrating the United States was capable of responding to a violation of friendly 
airspace. For instance, one Air Force major noted an “Intercept is a show of force that demonstrates 
capacity to engage without escalating conflict.” Another major suggested, “without directly 
engaging the adversary, warning shots send a message to ‘back off.’” As a result, many 
respondents proposed incremental responses in which escalation or de-escalation was based on the 
behavior of the intruding aircraft. These plans generally involved intercepts and did not “require 
hostilities unless the adversary acts first.” 
Although some respondents recommended gradual escalation against intruding drones,    
many military officers saw taking action against a drone as fundamentally different from taking 
action against a manned aircraft. One Air Force major explained that “shooting an RPA...down is 
destruction of equipment, and sends a message, but does so without loss of enemy life.” Another 
Air Force aviator suggested that shooting down the RPA was a non-escalatory means of deterring 
a rival from launching future incursions with manned or remotely piloted aircraft: “destroying this 
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RPA sends a clear message that hostile acts toward coalition troops will not be tolerated, without 
escalating the situation with an enemy [killed in action].” Because there was no risk of loss of life 
in downing a drone, tiered escalation was less likely when drones were involved.  
Table 5.10: Qualitative Justifications for Response to Intruder (Military Sample) 
Justification Manned Intruder Remotely Piloted Intruder 
Action incurs no/low risk 12.8% (n=5) 
10.3% 
(n=4) 
Action incurs high risk 0% (n=0) 
0% 
(n=0) 






Adversary poses no/low threat 15.4% (n=6) 
5.1% 
(n=2) 
Seek gradual escalation 25.6% (n=10) 
10.3% 
(n=4) 













Repeating the experiment on a public sample yields similar results and provides further 
support for the amplified aggression logic.68 Like their military counterparts, members of the 
public were, on average, likely to support more escalatory responses to a drone intrusion than to a 
manned intrusion. There was, however, a smaller difference in mean responses between the drone 
and manned treatment conditions in the public sample (.4 points in the public sample vs. .9 in the 
military sample). Members of the public called for more aggressive responses to manned intrusions 
than their military counterparts and less aggressive responses to drone aircraft, however, the 
                                                        
68 The sample consisted of 303 adults in the United States, recruited in January 2019 using Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
Results were statistically significant to the p=.001 level and greater than 90-percent of respondents passed a 
manipulation check (93.4% of those assigned to the manned condition and 90.8% of those assigned to the RPA 
condition). Further, respondents with interventionist leanings were more likely to support aggressive actions than 
those with less interventionist preferences.  Appendix H, Section 1.2 includes the OLS models used to conduct the 
significance tests and analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects. 
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experimental design does not allow me to fully explain why military and civilian respondents held 
slightly different preferences.  
Table 5.11: Mean Response to Intruder (Public Sample) 
Intruder Type Mean Response Level 
Manned 2.517 (.069) 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft 2.980 (.083) 
 
Table 5.12:  Response to Intruder, Percentage (Public Sample) 






























An analysis of qualitative responses from the public sample also aligns with the military 
sample. As Table 5.13 illustrates, respondents in the manned intruder condition are, on average, 
less likely to assign hostile intent to a manned intruder. They also are more likely to seek gradual 
escalation than their counterparts facing an intruding remotely piloted drone. Like their military 
counterparts, civilian respondents voiced their preferences for avoiding escalation while still 
taking some action. One respondent noted that “intercepting [a manned aircraft] with fighter jets 
shows that we mean business without actually engaging in battle.” Another suggested “We can’t 
just ignore it…but we shouldn’t go too far either and make a bad situation worse.” 
To be sure, many respondents sought to limit escalation even when a drone was involved. 
A few respondents suggested the drone could be ignored “as long as no one is getting hurt.” Others 
believed that no response was necessary because the rival’s previous penetrations of friendly 
airspace had not escalated. Most respondents seeking to minimize escalation, however, expressed 
preferences for tiered escalation. One respondent commented, “An intercept should tell them that 
what they are doing is not OK without causing any damage to their drone so it should not provoke 
an escalated response.” 
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Taking action against a drone, however, appeared to fall at a lower threshold in the minds 
the public than actions an inhabited aircraft. One respondent who supported shooting down a drone 
explained, “If this was a manned aircraft, I would have said, fire warning shots and then see if the 
aircraft turned tail and fled the area. However, since this is a drone that could be spying on our 
troops and base before an imminent attack, I say shoot the drone down.” Thus, even though the 
drone and manned aircraft posed the same type of threat, respondents were more willing to take 
action against remotely piloted assets. As with the military respondents, underlying these 
preferences was the lack of a pilot onboard a drone.  Respondents explained that “shooting them 
down does not cost anyone’s life but it gets the point across.” One respondent put it more bluntly, 
“There would be no loss of human life. Shoot it down.”   
 
Table 5.13: Qualitative Justifications for Response to Intruder (Public Sample) 
Decision Logic Manned Intruder Remotely Piloted Intruder 
Action incurs no/low risk 14.7% (n=22) 
15.8% 
(n=24) 
Action incurs high risk .7% (n=1) 
0% 
(n=0) 






Adversary poses no/low threat 8.7% (n=13) 
10.5% 
(n=16) 
Seek gradual escalation 22.7% (n=34) 
15.1% 
(n=23) 













EVIDENCE FROM EXPERIMENTAL WARGAMES 
 The survey experiments provide strong support for the restrained retaliation and amplified 
aggression underpinnings of technology-enabled escalation control. The quantitative survey data 
allow me to precisely measure the causal effect of drones on preferences toward escalation, while 
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the qualitative data shed light on the assumptions that inform these preferences. Experimental 
wargames complement these findings by allowing me to test the restrained retaliation and 
amplified aggression hypotheses in a setting that offers a higher degree of external validity. The 
interaction between wargame participants not only creates simulates a more realistic decision-
making environment, but should also provide greater insight into the assumptions and factors that 
inform the decision-making of national security practitioners. 
Testing Restrained Retaliation 
 To test the restrained retaliation hypothesis, the wargame simulated an adversary attack 
on a U.S. military aircraft. Participants were told that Katunian forces used a surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) to shoot down an unarmed U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane flying in Dakastani 
airspace. The aircraft crashes, with the wreckage landing in Katunian territory. Participants 
assigned to the four treatment games were told the downed aircraft was a MQ-1 Predator drone, 
while those in the three control games were told the aircraft was a manned MC-12 Liberty whose 
four-member American crew was killed. Teams were asked to develop a response plan. 
If the restrained retaliation hypothesis is valid, military decisionmakers will carry out less 
escalatory acts of retaliation after an attack on a drone than an attack on a similar, but traditionally 
manned asset. Decisionmakers should either ignore the loss of a drone or propose less aggressive 
(i.e. non-military) responses after a drone is attacked. The wargame should also reveal the a 
decreased desire for instrumental or emotionally driven responses temper retaliation following a 
drone loss. Since attacks on drones do not take American lives, discussion about punishing rivals 
or defending American honor should be less pronounced or absent when a drone is lost. Table 



















































Table 5.14: Summary of Findings – Response to Shootdown Wargame 
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Although all teams – regardless of experimental condition – exercised restraint in their 
responses, teams that lost drones avoided retaliating with military force. Underpinning this 
restrained retaliation was the lack of killed or captured personnel. Indeed, teams often explicitly 
joked about the fact that the drone had no humans onboard. “Where do you bury the survivors?” 
asked one participant.69 “The good thing is that there is no pilot being dragged along,” noted 
another. Another commented that the Katunians were “helping us out” in expediting the retirement 
of older drones.70 The lighthearted attitude suggests that attacks on drones are not perceived as 
crossing significant escalatory thresholds. Indeed, one participant recalled, “Predators have been 
lost before. It’s a mostly disposable asset.”71 
Since the downing of a drone was not seen as meeting a salience threshold that warranted 
a major response, plans avoided significant retaliation. None of the four teams that lost drones 
launched military strikes against Katunia, yet all believed some response was justified. Participants 
believed that failing to take any action could “give [Katunia] a win,”72 put U.S. resolve “in 
question[,]”73 or insufficiently “deter future activity.”74 Instead of punishment using military force, 
planning efforts emphasized political and military signaling aimed at preventing future attacks and 
painting Katunia as the aggressor.  
                                                        
69 Participant LC4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
70 Participant HD4 (Department of Defense Civilian), 17 November 2017. 
71 Participant LC1 (U.S. Army Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
72 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
73 Participant HC3 (U.S. Army Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
74 Participant HD3 (U.S. Army Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
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To prevent future attacks, teams typically coupled diplomatic efforts with shifts in military 
operations. One team recommended that civilian leaders use United Nations channels to condemn 
the attack and moved flight paths for future missions further from the Katunian border. Another 
team also proposed a condemnation at the United Nations, but recommended a threat of economic 
sanctions if Katunia failed to withdraw anti-aircraft systems from the contested border region. This 
team also planned to escort future drone missions with fighter jets and threatened armed retaliation 
for future attacks. A third team proposed issuing a diplomatic demarche, while simultaneously 
increasing the alert posture of U.S. forces in the region and flying another reconnaissance mission. 
The military component of this plan was intended to demonstrate that the United States would not 
back down following an attack on a drone.  The final team planned a purely military response by 
conducting a show of force mission designed to signal that Washington was capable of maintaining 
air superiority and destroying missile sites in the future.  
Although the teams settled on relatively limited responses, more escalatory military options 
were not immediately discounted. One of these teams even came to a consensus to destroy the 
missile site that shot down the Predator, but subsequently backed down to a show of force mission, 
fearful that a strike could escalate the situation. One member of this team suggested that 
demonstrating Washington’s ability to establish regional air superiority, but not launching strikes, 
was a “good way to…refuse to escalate.”75 In other teams, recommendations for armed retaliation 
were quelled before a plan was developed. One fighter pilot expressed concerns that airstrikes 
incurred a “high risk of casualties” among the Katunian population and could trigger broader 
regional escalation.76 On another team, a recommendation for military retaliation was quickly met 
                                                        
75 Participant LD1 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
76 Participant HC2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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with pushback from more senior members of the team. One Army aviator commented, “We want 
to avoid escalation – we want to control the escalation ladder.…We don’t want to start a war.”77  
Participants not only sought to minimize escalation in the retaliatory actions they 
developed, but also in their handling of the drone wreckage. Teams that lost drones seemed 
relatively unconcerned about recovering the downed plane. Two teams opted to leave the wreckage 
in Katunia, while the other two teams planned to ask Katunia to return it. Underlying these 
decisions was the perception that the wreckage of the Predator was a disposable asset where 
“technical loss is minimal.”78 It was not viewed as sufficiently valuable or sensitive to justify the 
escalation that could result from deploying a recovery team or carrying out an airstrike to destroy 
the wreckage. One officer suggested that, “If we lost an extremely sensitive aircraft, we could send 
in [Special Operations Forces] or carry out a strike. This is high risk in terms of escalation, but we 
could do this.” 79 The team agreed, however, there was “no return on investment” in taking action 
to recover or destroy the drone wreckage. 80  
In contrast to the limited recovery efforts, lighthearted jokes, and tempered military 
retaliation following an attack on a drone, teams took far more escalatory moves after attacks on 
manned aircraft. All three teams approved strikes on Katunian forces and two of these teams also 
deployed troops into Katunian territory to retrieve wreckage and crewmember remains. These 
more escalatory measures and greater risk acceptance appear driven by the belief that the loss of 
American lives demands a significant response to punish the adversary and deter future attacks. 
                                                        
77 Participant HD2 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
78 Participant LC2 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
79 Participant LC4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
80 Participant LC1 (U.S. Army Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
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Indeed, participants’ language often took on a passionate and emotive tone. One Air Force officer 
made this clear by proclaiming, “This represents a conflict. If they shot down our service members, 
we retaliate.”81 An Army colonel expressed a similar sentiment and signaled less restraint in the 
retaliatory measures he was willing to take: “The gloves are off.”82   
 When developing retaliatory options, teams understood their actions needed to support 
broader political and military objectives and expressed a desire to minimize escalation.83 One naval 
officer asked, “How much to retaliate?...What’s the endgame?”84 Another officer spelled out three 
possible degrees of response: tit for tat, above, or below the level of the Katunian attack.85 Unlike 
the responses to attacks on drones, which emphasized signaling and future punishment, teams 
concluded that a response to an attack on a manned aircraft should be forceful enough to degrade 
Katunian military capability. In an effort to reduce the likelihood that these retaliatory measures 
could spiral into a more significant conflict, some participants advocated non-kinetic means 
including sanctions, embargos, or cyber operations. Standalone non-kinetic responses, however, 
were seen as insufficient and were quickly discounted. One participant lamented that an “embargo 
makes us look weak, [we] must degrade [Katunia’s] capabilities to wage war.”86 The teams 
                                                        
81 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
82 Participant LB4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
83 Participants on all three teams recognized their military actions would be conducted as a component of a broader 
all-of-government response that might include parallel economic or diplomatic elements.   
84 Participant HA1 (U.S. Navy Officer), 17 November 2017. 
85 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
86 Participant HA3 (U.S. Marine Corps Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
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ultimately decided that retaliatory action should send the “message that you attack our people, 
[we] at least respond in kind.”87  
 After teams decided to launch military strikes, they carefully selected targets to minimize 
the potential for broader escalation. One team initially considered striking the SAM launchers 
responsible for downing the reconnaissance aircraft. After realizing that mobile SAMs are 
challenging to locate and could kill Katunian personnel, the team recommended striking Katunian 
Aerospace Force hangars as a means of degrading capabilities without significant risk of civilian 
or military casualties.88 These strikes were intended to “roll back options” that Katunia could use 
in future hostilities. Another team also decided to strike the SAM launchers, but planned to use 
assets such as cruise missiles or long-range stand-off munitions that would allow servicemembers 
to carry out strikes from well outside Katunian airspace to “avoid flaring things up” by violating 
Katunian sovereignty.89 The third team held off on launching punitive strikes, planning only to 
strike any threats that hampered efforts to recover crewmember remains.  
 In addition to their willingness to launch military strikes, teams that lost manned aircraft 
were adamant about the need to recover the remains of the downed crewmembers. Discussions 
surrounding recovery efforts invoked the hallowed military principle that America never abandons 
its fallen troops. As a result, two of the three teams deployed military forces into Katunian territory 
– an escalatory violation of international law – to recover remains and destroy any sensitive 
wreckage. One participant commented, “Get[ting] the bodies is an automatic choice. [It’s] just 
                                                        
87 Participant HB3 (U.S. Army Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
88 Participant LB3 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
89 Participant HB2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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what you do.”90 Even with the military risk associated with launching a recovery operation, 
participants agreed that recovering remains was “everything we stand for.”91 Indeed, one team was 
even willing to destroy any threat that stood in the way of recovery efforts.92 The team that did not 
deploy a military recovery operation opted to send a diplomatic request for the remains. This team 
considered “going in with rescue team to get remains and sensitive equipment and intelligence[,]” 
or bombing the wreckage, but believed that crossing into Katunian territory would be an “act of 
escalation” that could have adverse effects on world opinion toward the United States.93 The team 
did, however, back up its diplomatic request for the remains with a significant posturing of U.S. 
military forces in the region. In short, the opportunities for less escalatory responses that existed 
when drones were attacked were off the table once American lives were lost.   
Testing Amplified Aggression 
To test the amplified aggression hypothesis, I assess whether military decisionmakers react 
differently to incursions by drones than they do to similarly threatening incursions made by 
manned aircraft. To do this, the wargame included a crisis vignette that features an attack aircraft 
from rival Katunia on a direct course toward an airbase used by U.S. forces. The aircraft, which 
has already penetrated into Dakastan’s airspace, will reach the base in 30 minutes. The plane is 
not responding to radio calls and has already made several low passes over Dakastani military 
installations near the contested border region. All teams received the identical scenario, but I 
manipulated whether the intruding aircraft was a CH-4 attack drone or a manned Su-25 attack jet. 
                                                        
90 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
91 Participant HA3 (U.S. Marine Corps Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
92 Participant HA1 (U.S. Navy Officer), 17 November 2017. 
93 Participant HB2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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Teams were informed that the Dakastani government “asked the U.S. to carry out its obligations 
to provide integrated air defense” and were provided a list of assets at their disposal: U.S. Air 
Force F-16s fighters, Dakastan Air Force MiG-21 fighters, Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries, 
and Dakastan Air Force anti-aircraft artillery. The teams were asked to develop a response to the 
intruding aircraft.  
If the amplified aggression hypothesis is true, military decisionmakers will take more 
aggressive action against a drone than a manned aircraft, even if both pose an equivalent threat. 
Decisionmakers will make this calculated decision if they mirror their own preferences onto 
Katunian decisionmakers and anticipate an attack on a drone will trigger a less escalatory reaction 
than an attack on a manned aircraft. The fear that killing foreign military personnel operating 
manned assets could trigger significant escalation should lead to more restrained responses that 
minimize the risk of casualties. Discussions among planning teams should therefore explicitly 
mention the higher risk of escalation when an intruder is a traditionally manned asset. The findings 
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After receiving the vignette, most wargaming teams first tried to assess the intent of the 
intruding plane. All three teams facing a manned aircraft appeared hesitant to ascribe hostile intent. 
They questioned whether the incursion was deliberate and developed alternate explanations for 
why the aircraft had violated Dakastan’s airspace.  Two of the teams contemplated whether the 
Katunian pilot was defecting. One Air Force officer asked, “What is the intent of the adversary? 
We don’t know it. It could be a defector [since it is] only one plane.”94 A member of another team 
referenced historical aircraft defections and asked if this might be a similar case, or whether the 
pilot was simply lost.95 Another participant suggested that pilot could be in distress or have a faulty 
radio that prevented communication.96 Despite these initial efforts to find alternate explanations 
for the intrusion, all three teams eventually concluded the aircraft could pose a threat that required 
some form of defensive response.  
In contrast, teams facing an intruding drone were more likely to conclude that the drone 
had intentionally violated Dakastan’s airspace and had nefarious intent. For instance, moments 
after being presented with the vignette, one participant proclaimed the intrusion was a “unilateral 
attack.”97 Another participant with a background in air defense announced, “This is an armed threat 
in Dakastan’s airspace.”98 Participants on two of the four teams exposed to the drone treatment 
briefly raised questions about the drone’s intent. One participant asked, “How positive are we of 
                                                        
94 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
95 Participant HD1 (U.S. Air Force Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
96 Participant HA3 (U.S. Navy Officer), 17 November 2017. 
97 Participant LB3 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
98 Participant LC4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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its exact ID?”99 His teammates suggested they were “pretty sure[,]”100 which appeared to assuage 
the participant’s concerns as he responded with, “we should light it up” — a military colloquialism 
for illuminating a target with radar or opening fire.101 On another team, participants discussed the 
challenge in proving the drone was under Katunian government control or whether it was lost or 
malfunctioning. One member of the team suggested reaching out to the Katunian government to 
inform them their aircraft would be shot down if it did not change course.102 The team agreed to 
contact the Katunian government, but noted there was little time to wait for a formal response 
before taking action. 
Both the drone and manned plane were attack aircraft, made low altitude passes over 
military outposts, and were on a direct course toward a large air base. Despite this equivalence of 
threat, participants initially searched for ways to explain away the threat posed by the intruding 
manned aircraft. This reaction demonstrates that military decisionmakers think about manned and 
remotely operated technologies differently, even if the systems have similar capabilities and pose 
similar threats. Specifically, military decisionmakers seem to believe there are more significant 
consequences for taking actions against traditionally manned platforms.  
Once participants established the intruding aircraft was potentially threatening, they began 
developing plans to protect Dakastan and U.S. forces. The actions that teams adopted in response 
to the manned aircraft generally escalated gradually. Plans included steps to verify the identity of 
the intruder and provided ample escalation offramps – specifically teams allowed the manned 
                                                        
99 Participant HC3 (U.S. Army Enlisted Member), 17 November 2017 
100 Participant HC1 (U.S. Army Officer) and Participant HC2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017 
101 Participant HC3 (U.S. Army Enlisted Member), 17 November 2017 
102 Participant LC4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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aircraft to exit Dakastan’s airspace. One participant explicitly described the need “to minimize 
risk” by carrying out “tiered escalation” that “at any point in time gives [Katunia] the opportunity 
to deescalate.”103  To do this, teams generally tried to make, in the words of one participant, “every 
effort to deter the adversary aircraft” before taking action that could kill the pilot.104 The first step 
in this tiered approach was to launch fighter jets to intercept, identify, and monitor the aircraft. All 
teams hoped their fighters would escort the intruding Su-25 out of Dakastan’s airspace. One team 
also planned to simultaneously contact the Katunian Air Force to establish the aircraft’s intent. If 
the intruder did not comply with the orders of the intercepting fighters, one of the teams planned 
to continue escorting the intruder indefinitely and would only down the plane if it took a move – 
such as flying directly over population centers – that posed a direct threat to Dakastan or American 
forces. In the event of non-compliance, the two other teams planned to escalate to the next tier by 
firing warning shots at the Su-25. If the intruder failed to respond to the warning shots, one of the 
teams planned to down the intruder only if it was carrying munitions. If the intruding aircraft 
carried no weapons, the fighters would maintain an escort but not shoot it down. The other team 
that used warning shots ordered its Patriot air defense batteries to down the intruder if it 
disregarded the warnings. 
Teams facing an intruding drone typically developed response plans similar to those of 
teams facing manned intruders, but appeared more willing to destroy the intruding drone without 
a gradual, tiered escalation. They often skipped over steps that might have allowed the drone to 
exit Dakastan’s airspace and used more forceful language than participants responding to manned 
                                                        
103 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
104 Participant LD1 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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intrusions. As one participant bluntly stated: “Engage and destroy. That is our priority.”105  Other 
participants held similar positions, announcing they had “zero tolerance [for] this type of 
activity”106 and that, “We will respond.”107 To that end, one team quickly decided to place Patriot 
air defense and anti-aircraft artillery units on alert and to down the drone if it approached 
population centers or military installations. The team did not discuss the political or military 
ramifications of shooting down an intruding drone and even jokingly referred to the response as a 
“turkey shoot.”108  
 Not all teams facing drones were as carefree in deciding how to respond to the intruding 
drone. Just like teams facing a manned intruder, the other three teams first launched fighter jets to 
intercept the intruding drone. One of these teams even considered avoiding using kinetic actions 
by jamming the drone’s controls electronically rather than shooting it down, but shelved the plans 
as there was no indication that friendly forces had this sort of electronic warfare capability.109 
Instead, the same team planned to inform the Katunian government that the drone would be shot 
down if it did not change course, mirroring another team’s response to a manned intruder. The 
second of these teams launched fighters for the primary purpose of determining whether the 
intruding aircraft was armed or unarmed.110 The team made no effort to communicate with the 
intruding aircraft or with the Katunian government. They decided to down the aircraft if it was 
                                                        
105 Participant LC4 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
106 Participant LC1 (U.S. Army Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
107 Participant LC2 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
108 Participant LB2 (U.S. Navy Petty Officer), 17 November 2017. 
109 Participant LC3 (U.S. Air Force Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017.  
110 Participant HB2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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armed and to allow Dakastan’s Air Force to decide how to respond if the aircraft was unarmed. 
Participants on this team perceived an armed aircraft to be too much of a risk to U.S. personnel at 
the base to allow it to continue unimpeded. The third team launched fighter jets to intercept the 
intruding drone and escort it back to the border. If the drone failed to yield to the interceptor’s 
orders, the team ordered its shootdown using Dakastan’s anti-aircraft artillery. Many of these plans 
skipped over steps that were used in the manned vignettes – such as warning shots – that gave the 
intruding aircraft an opportunity to avoid being shot down.  
The more tempered response to a manned intrusion appears grounded in participants’ 
desire to avoid significant escalation. Indeed, participants on all three teams facing the Su-25 
voiced concerns that targeting a manned Katunian aircraft could lead to battlefield or regional 
escalation.   One participant on the team that chose not to fire warning shots opined that any actions 
that could kill a foreign pilot should be avoided as “there is too much risk, even though doing so 
is justified and lawful.”111 Another participant on the same team suggested that responding with 
force was “very risky and [involved] significant uncertainty.”112 Some participants feared that 
taking aggressive moves such as warning shots might provoke the intruding pilot to open fire or 
drop a bomb, potentially generating casualties and sparking further escalation.113 In comparison, 
only one of the four teams facing an intruding drone explicitly considered the risk of escalation 
associated with shooting down an adversary’s drone. One participant mentioned the decision to 
                                                        
111 Participant HA1 (U.S. Navy Officer), 17 November 2017. 
112 Participant HA3 (U.S. Marine Corps Enlisted), 17 November 2017. 
113 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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respond to the intruder as a “choice to risk escalating tensions in the region over drones[,]” but did 
not expand on the extent and nature of these risks.114  
 Participants provided deeper insight into their decision-making logic during post-wargame 
interviews. Teams that confronted a manned aircraft in the vignette suggested they would have 
acted far more aggressively had the intruder been a drone. One participant commented that, 
“human life really does change the calculus.”115 His teammates agreed, stating that “once [you] 
put the body into it, it changes interactions between states”116 and “when death becomes involved, 
it becomes tribal.”117 Without a pilot on board, the team agreed they would have “splash[ed]” a 
drone as soon as it violated Dakastan’s airspace.118 Participants on another team held similar views, 
stating they would have shot down an intruding drone as doing so incurred “no cost of taking a 
life”119 and was a “non-escalation.”120 In contrast, participants who faced drones during the 
wargame explained how they would have taken a more restrained response to a manned intruder 
because the “risk of escalation with manned is higher.”121 Despite the heightened risk, teams still 
believed a reaction was necessary, but sought ways to limit the use of force. One team suggested 
it would have only shot down a manned intruder if it targeted infrastructure or personnel. Another 
                                                        
114 Participant HB1 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
115 Participant LD3 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
116 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
117 Participant LD1 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
118 Participant LD2 (U.S. Army Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), 17 November 2017. 
119 Participant HA1 (U.S. Navy Officer), 17 November 2017. 
120 Participant HA4 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
121 Participant HB1 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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team suggested they would have attempted to redirect a manned intruder, rather than shooting it 
down.  
While concerns about the risk associated with killing a foreign pilot dominated 
participants’ decision-making logic, teams also considered several other complementary factors 
when deciding how to react to the intruding aircraft. In some cases, differences between the 
operating characteristics of drones and manned aircraft – and not differences in the risk of 
escalation – drove decisions on retaliation.  Participants on one team facing drone intruders 
suggested that “manned intercept strategies don’t work with drone[s].”122 An Air Force fighter 
pilot on the team confirmed that warning shots would have little effect on a drone as no pilot was 
onboard to observe the warning shots.123 As a result, this team escalated directly from an intercept 
to shootdown. During both the wargame and the post-game interviews, multiple teams proposed 
reactions that hinged not on whether the intruding aircraft was manned, but on whether it was 
armed or unarmed. During a post-game interview, one participant explained that it is 
“inconsequential that the pilot is on the ground. [It is] more about capability and degree of 
threat.”124 While threat perception mattered to some participants, it appeared to matter less than 
whether the aircraft was manned or unmanned. For example, one team that had ordered the 
shootdown of a drone if it failed to comply with instructions (regardless of whether it was armed 
or unarmed) said that it would “let [a manned aircraft] go” if it was unarmed.   
 
 
                                                        
122 Participant HC1 (U.S. Army Officer), 17 November 2017. 
123 Participant HC2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
124 Participant HB2 (U.S. Air Force Officer), 17 November 2017. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The survey experiments and experimental wargames provide compelling support for the 
restrained retaliation and amplified aggression hypotheses. On one hand, the lack of a pilot makes 
military decisionmakers more willing to restrain retaliation after an attack on a drone than an attack 
on a manned asset. Members of the public also hold similar preferences, potentially informing the 
policies that government officials – who are subject to punishment at the polls – eventually enact. 
This less aggressive retaliation can help control escalation by reducing the likelihood that a 
shootdown incident will trigger actions that spiral into a more intense or geographically broader 
conflict. In other words, if states opt to do nothing or take only limited action after the loss of a 
drone, they create escalation off-ramps that might not be available when a manned aircraft is lost.  
 On the other hand, military officers and members of the public appear more likely to take 
aggressive moves against drones than against manned aircraft. Although participants in the 
wargames and surveys never explicitly referenced mirror imaging, many assumed that a rival 
would also restrain retaliation after an attack on a drone. The belief that an attack on a drone 
represents a “non-escalation” reinforces the idea that downing a drone falls at a fundamentally 
lower escalation threshold than a similar attack on an inhabited platform. These findings contribute 
to the argument that drones may lead militaries to use force more frequently, but that these uses of 
force are unlikely to escalate into broader or more intense conflicts. 
 The survey experiments yield additional insights on the divergent perception of drones and 
manned aircraft. While the lack of a human onboard distinguishes drones from manned aircraft, it 
appears that military and civilian respondents support more aggressive retaliation against an 
adversary who shoots down a manned aircraft than a drone, even when the pilot of the manned 
aircraft is not killed. If preferences for retaliation are driven solely by a desire to punish an 
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adversary for killing a service member, respondents should, on average, demand similar responses 
following the downing of a drone and downing of a manned aircraft in which the pilot is rescued 
or captured – since there is no pilot death. The more escalatory preferences associated with a 
manned aircraft shootdown suggest that an attack on manned platforms reach a higher threshold 
than an attack on a drone, perhaps because of the potential loss of life associated with attacking an 
inhabited aircraft. 
The mixed methods approach presented in this chapter also highlights the value of coupling 
survey experiments with experimental manipulations embedded in wargames. First, the survey 
experiments force respondents to select from a relatively narrow set of military and policy options 
that are ordered along five-point scales. While this allows for the precise measurement of the causal 
effect that drones have on escalation in the simulated crises, it does not allow participants to 
develop their own plans – as they can in the wargames. Second, the wargames generate far richer 
data on the assumptions and drivers of decision-making than the surveys. While the survey’s free 
text responses provide some insight, the interaction between wargame participants sheds light on 
whether and how military decisionmakers consider factors such as risk, cost, effectiveness, and 
emotions into their planning efforts. For instance, the tone and content of discussions during the 
wargame provided insights on how emotional factors informed decisions on escalation. By 
coupling data generated through these two complementary approaches, I develop a richer 





Chapter 6  
 
U.S. Aerial Reconnaissance During the Cold War 
 
 Intelligence collection was a critical component of Cold War competition between the 
United States and its communist rivals. Intelligence operations helped monitor military and 
industrial capabilities, provided early warning of possible attacks, and pinpointed facilities that 
could be targeted in the event of war. This highly classified intelligence guided the development 
of tactics, shaped research and development, and informed military planning by the United States 
and its allies. This information was particularly important during crises, when it fueled decision-
making at the highest levels of the United States government. The intelligence community and 
military relied on a host of intelligence gathering methods ranging from human sources to 
satellites, but airborne reconnaissance operations played a central role throughout the Cold War.125 
The Central Intelligence Agency and Pentagon relied on missions flown by both manned spy 
planes – like the high-altitude U-2 and earlier aircraft like the RB-29 – and unmanned drones to 
peer behind the iron and bamboo curtains. Some missions monitored rivals from international 
airspace, while others involved provocative penetrations into Chinese and Soviet airspace. 
 Planning these missions often involved senior officials including the Secretary of Defense, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, and in many cases, the 
                                                        
125 For more on the role of aerial reconnaissance see, Burrows, By Any Means Necessary; Tart and Keefe, The Price 
of Vigilance; John Thomas Farquhar, A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 
1945-1953 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2004); Dino A. Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky: 
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 179 
President himself. As the nested case studies in this chapter illustrate, these policymakers 
frequently debated the risks and benefits of using manned or unmanned reconnaissance platforms 
to gather information in places like China, North Korea, the Soviet Union and Cuba. In line with 
technology-enabled escalation control, these decisionmakers often preferred to employ drones in 
lieu of manned assets on high risk missions where the downing of a manned aircraft could cause 
significant political and military incidents. To be sure, however, drones were not always deployed 
in place of manned aircraft. In many cases, officials worried that drones would be less effective at 
collecting intelligence than manned assets, would be shot down at higher rates than manned 
platforms, or could reveal sensitive capabilities to adversaries. When manned planes were lost to 
communist fighter jets or surface to air missiles, decisionmakers were more likely to contemplate 
armed retaliation. Indeed, shootdown incidents often escalated, even if armed retaliation did not 
occur. Tension between states generally climbed to higher rungs on the escalation ladder than 
incidents where drones were lost to hostile action – providing empirical support for technology-
enabled escalation control.  
 To test whether technology-enabled escalation control plays out outside of the 
experimental settings described in chapters 4 and 5, I draw from thousands of pages of archival 
materials to examine Cold War reconnaissance operations. I map the development of the United 
States drone program and then turn to three cases of peacetime and crisis reconnaissance operations 
during the Cold War: Cuba, North Korea, and China.126 In each of these cases, the United States 
military and intelligence community used or considered using a mix of manned and unmanned 
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aircraft, and faced several shootdowns of reconnaissance aircraft. Recently declassified materials 
shed light on the decisions surrounding the selection of manned or unmanned assets and the logic 
surrounding the divergent responses to attacks on manned and unmanned aircraft across multiple 
theaters of operations and presidential administrations. Beyond providing empirical tests of the 
hypotheses associated with technology-enabled escalation control, the case studies in this chapter 
may be of interest to Cold War and airpower scholars. The archival materials, including several 
documents declassified specifically for this project, offer unique insight from the tactical to White 
House levels, shedding light on national security policymaking and crisis decision-making.127  
U.S. DRONE DEVELOPMENT 
 Most scholarly and policy work on drones focuses on their use in the post-9/11 era. 
Remotely piloted aircraft, however, have played a role in military operations dating back to World 
War I. These early drone programs shed light on the motivations for drone development and allow 
me to explore how the reasons for using drones have evolved over time. Although drone 
technology has changed significantly, the U.S. military has long viewed drones as a means of 
carrying out operations with less risk to friendly aircrews. 
The U.S. military’s first drones surfaced during World War I in the form of primitive 
guided missiles. These “flying bombs” were aimed toward a target, launched, and eventually dove 
to the ground after flying a predetermined distance.128 Although U.S. Army officials considered 
ordering up to 100,000 of these unmanned weapons, the lack of navigation technology limited 
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their accuracy and only twenty were built.129 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, engineers in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Germany continued to research aircraft that could be operated 
by pilots via remote control. Few progressed beyond the testing stage, and those that did were 
generally used as targets for fighter pilots and anti-aircraft gunners.130 
 The use of drones for operational military purposes reappeared during World War II. The 
Army Air Forces and Navy developed drones for use as missiles against hardened targets in Europe 
and Japan that had withstood earlier conventional bombing operations. The Army Air Forces 
Aphrodite Project, for instance, attempted to use B-17s bombers converted into drones to destroy 
industrial facilities “in large German cities as far inland as practicable” and V-1 and V-2 rocket 
launch sites.131 The B-17 drones were packed with 20,000 pounds of explosives and flown toward 
targets by a pilot onboard the aircraft. The pilot would bail out before reaching enemy territory, at 
which point the drone was flown to its target using remote control.132 An Air Force assessment 
found that “the six missions flown were not satisfactory as far as damage to enemy installations is 
concerned.”133 Although the missions were unsuccessful and resulted in the deaths of several 
American crewmembers – including Joseph Kennedy Jr. – due to crashes and premature  
explosives detonations, these World War II projects highlighted the U.S. military’s early rationale 
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for developing drones.134 The military looked to drones as a means of precisely delivering large 
amounts of ordnance against a target. Given the heavy wartime losses of American bomber crews, 
the military’s intent seemed more focused on developing an effective combat capability than on 
removing American aircrew from harm’s way. Indeed, archival documents make no reference to 
mitigating risk to friendly personnel.  
 In the years after World War II, drones were used to support the development of America’s 
nuclear arsenal. Initially, surplus bombers were converted into drones that monitored atomic bomb 
tests. As part of Operation Sandstone, B-17 drones were flown through atomic clouds to collect 
samples of radioactive material and to photograph bomb blasts, eliminating the need to expose 
American pilots to radiation.135 In addition to supporting bomb tests, the development of a 
remotely piloted long-range bomber was also a high priority for the Air Force, which had become 
an independent service in 1947.136 Remotely piloted bombers would enable the United States to 
deliver munitions without exposing crews to enemy air defenses. The World War II-era Boeing B-
29 Superfortress – the same type of aircraft that dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki – was  “successfully droned” in October 1948, although the drone bomber never saw 
operational service.137  
As jets replaced propeller-driven aircraft, the Air Force refocused its drone development 
efforts to designing remotely operated jet bombers. The highly classified BRASS RING project, 
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for instance, called for a remotely piloted jet to deliver hydrogen bombs to targets in the Soviet 
Union. Researchers predicted that hydrogen bombs “would produce a lethal area so great that, 
were it released in a normal manner, the [manned carrier aircraft] would not survive the explosion 
effects.”138 To avoid losing American aircrews, the Air Force’s Air Materiel Command began 
work in 1949 on a project to convert B-47 bombers into drones capable of “deliver[ing] a 10,000-
pound package over a distance of 4,000 nautical miles with an accuracy of at least two miles from 
the center of the target.”139 Development continued for several years and advanced to test flights, 
but the BRASS RING drone was deemed “operationally undesirable, undependable, and 
unproven” and the project was cancelled in 1953.140 Two factors contributed to the project’s 
cancellation. First, navigation and remote-control systems of the era were not yet sufficiently 
advanced to produce an operational drone bomber that met the Air Force’s requirements. Second, 
Air Force studies demonstrated that manned bombers could deliver a hydrogen bomb and escape 
from the blast area, eliminating the need for a remotely-piloted bomber.141 While BRASS RING 
drones never entered operational service, the program demonstrated the emerging desire for 
remotely operated systems explicitly because they would allow the military to initiate operations 
with reduced risk to friendly aircrew.142 
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The growth of the Air Force’s jet bomber fleet and the development of the remaining two 
legs of the nuclear triad - intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic 
missiles – decreased the need for remotely operated bombers. As the Cold War progressed, 
however, the requirement for intelligence on the military capabilities of communist rivals 
increased significantly.143 In the early years of the Cold War, the United States routinely flew 
manned reconnaissance aircraft around and through the airspace of Communist Bloc states to 
collect imagery and signals intelligence. Most of these missions were carried out using modified 
World War II-era transport aircraft or bombers outfitted with cameras and other sensors.144 These 
relatively slow and low-flying aircraft typically flew without fighter escorts, and were increasingly 
vulnerable to intercept by the Soviet Union’s new jet-powered MiG fighters and shootdown by 
surface-to-air missiles like the SA-2. By the early 1960s, even the Air Force’s newer, high-altitude 
reconnaissance jets like the U-2, RB-47, and RB-57 were susceptible to an increasingly capable 
network of Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles.145 Indeed, between 1950 and 1960, the air defense 
forces of Communist Bloc states intercepted over 30 western aircraft and shot down at least seven 
U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, resulting in the loss of 76 American service members.146  
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In line with the expectation for a more escalatory response to attacks on manned platforms, 
many of these downings heightened diplomatic and military tension between the United States and 
its rivals. For example, the United States initiated proceedings against the Soviet Union at the 
International Court of Justice after Soviet fighters attacked B-29s off the Hokkaido Islands in 1952 
and 1954.147 More widely known, the May 1960 shootdown of a U-2 reconnaissance plane over 
the Soviet Union and the capture of its pilot, Gary Powers, led to a diplomatic standoff between 
President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Khrushchev and the cancellation of a summit between 
the two leaders.148 To be sure, not all incidents led to escalatory diplomatic or military responses. 
Taking action could publicly highlight that American reconnaissance aircraft had penetrated Soviet 
or Chinese airspace, a violation of international law.149 In other cases, the United States lacked 
intelligence confirmation that Communist Bloc states had actually attacked missing aircraft.150 
Finally, even when senior military and civilian leaders believed military reprisals were justified, 
they often tempered their responses for fear of triggering larger conflicts. Even though shootdowns 
of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft did not always result in military responses, policymakers frequently 
considered armed reprisals. Indeed, they often explicitly discussed the rationalist and emotional 
drivers outlined in chapter 2 that underpin escalatory responses. 
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The risk to U.S. aerial reconnaissance operations increased as the Soviet Union developed 
more capable surface-to-air missile systems and interceptor jets able to fly at higher altitudes. As 
an alternative to manned reconnaissance aircraft, the Air Force and intelligence community began 
considering the use of drones as intelligence collection platforms. A 1954 Air Force report, for 
instance, described the need for a “drone type aircraft capable of producing inexpensive, high 
speed and accurate battlefield intelligence.”151  The following year, San Diego-based Ryan 
Aeronautics, which produced jet-powered target drones for the military, issued a press release that 
advertised a reconnaissance drone: “For tactical reconnaissance, a Firebee [target drone] could be 
equipped with aerial cameras, radar, reconofax and television installations to transmit intelligence 
information to operational headquarters.”152 Ryan Aeronautics representatives eventually 
presented their drone plans to Air Force leadership at the Pentagon in April 1960, one month prior 
to the Gary Powers U-2 shootdown. Ryan argued, “The use of U-2 manned vehicles for overflights 
of the territory of nations unfriendly to the United States creates…risks which are unnecessary to 
take. We feel there is a solution to this in the logical evolution of the unmanned Firebee drone 
system.”153 This early reconnaissance drone development effort provides support for the casualty 
aversion that underlies elements of technology-enabled escalation control theory: removing 
friendly aviators from harm’s way was viewed as enabling the Air Force to carry out operations 
over hostile nations with less risk that a mission gone awry would trigger a diplomatic or military 
crisis. 
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The Air Force initially showed little interest in obtaining remotely piloted aircraft, in part 
because it had already invested heavily in the development of the high altitude and high speed SR-
71, a reconnaissance aircraft specifically designed to penetrate hostile airspace and remain out of 
reach of enemy air defenses.154 Additionally, some senior Air Force leaders were resistant to 
Ryan’s proposal as they initially viewed a “pilotless” plane as infringing on the traditional role of 
pilots who made up the service’s elite. Acquiring unmanned aircraft could shift the Air Force’s 
dominant missions and capabilities away from its then dominant mission of delivering nuclear 
weapons, and degrade what former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and bureaucratic 
politics theorist Morton Halperin described as the Air Force’s “organizational essence.”155 
This initially lukewarm reception changed after the Powers shootdown, and the Air Force 
explicitly began searching for ways to reduce the human – and associated political – risk associated 
with reconnaissance overflights. Ryan Aeronautics moved forward with its development of a 
reconnaissance drone and in February 1962 signed a contract with the Air Force to produce the 
Firebee Special Purpose Aircraft (SPA), which the service codenamed “Lightning Bug.”156 The 
drone was launched from a specially modified cargo aircraft and flew a preprogrammed route 
collecting imagery intelligence from high altitudes. Upon completion of its mission, the drone was 
recovered in mid-air using a helicopter or descended to the ground in friendly territory using a 
parachute. Film was then offloaded, developed, and analyzed by intelligence personnel.157  This 
process was manpower intensive and involved dozens of personnel to launch and recover the drone 
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and to analyze the data it collected.158 Despite the significant personnel requirements, these crews 
could be stationed in friendly territory, enabling Lightning Bug to collect intelligence in areas that 
might be too dangerous or politically sensitive for manned aircraft.  
Support for drones as reconnaissance platforms grew throughout the 1960s. One top secret 
Strategic Air Command document from 1964 highlighted the need for drones to carry out missions 
that might otherwise not be possible using manned aircraft: “with the improved defense posture of 
Communist countries the risk of performing operational reconnaissance has greatly 
increased…The development of a more economical method of penetrating the improved enemy 
defenses would (1) reduce the risk involved, and (2) allow a greater flexibility of reconnaissance 
operations. The primary objective of the Lighting Bug Program is to develop just such a 
method.”159 Indeed, the Lightning Bug allowed the Air Force to operate in high-risk areas with no 
threat to a pilot and the associated military and political challenges associated with losing a pilot 
to hostile fire.160 Another assessment suggested that “the relative expendability of SPA made it 
ideal for penetrations into high-risk areas with no threat to the life of a pilot.”161 These assessments 
suggest decisionmakers viewed drones as a tool to carry out missions they might not otherwise be 
willing to launch – providing support for the increased initiation logic.  
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Although drones significantly lowered the human and political risk of aerial reconnaissance 
missions, some senior officials were not convinced they eliminated risk altogether. In a top secret 
memo to the Director of Central Intelligence, Edward Purcell, a radar expert who chaired the 
Reconnaissance Panel, noted that drones still involved political risks, “even with the pilot 
absent.”162 This political risk, however, was lower than that associated with losing American 
reconnaissance crewmembers to hostile action.  
The decreased risk to friendly personnel was not the sole factor motivating the development 
and use of drones. Some military planners viewed drones as offering a lower cost means of 
conducting reconnaissance operations. A Strategic Air Command assessment from the 1960s noted 
the “cost of SPA in relation to the cost of other options made it relatively expendable.…Any other 
vehicle which could satisfy the same high-risk requirement would far exceed the cost of the SPA 
(in both lives and materiel) thereby making it the most expendable of any options.”163 Similarly, a 
classified history of Tactical Air Command drone operations explained, “Since World War II, the 
cost of tactical aircraft had gone from tens of thousands to millions of dollars each.…Better defense 
systems meant more of these necessarily expensive and sophisticated aircraft would be needed 
even as the attrition rate increased. It was in this setting that the aerospace press rediscovered and 
praised the drone/remotely piloted vehicle as the answer to increased costs and aircrew losses.”164  
These decreased risks and costs led to the first operational Lightning Bug deployment in 
August 1964. Over the next decade, the Lightning Bug and more advanced derivatives flew 
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thousands of missions in Southeast Asia collecting intelligence on targets in South and North 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the People’s Republic of China. These missions allowed American 
forces to conduct battle damage assessment after bombing raids, helped identify targets for the 
Rolling Thunder bombing campaigns, and monitored the flow of supplies and troops into 
communist controlled regions.165 Later variants of the Lightning Bug conducted other missions 
over high risk areas in Southeast Asia including collecting signals intelligence on North Vietnam’s 
air defense systems and dropping leaflets behind enemy lines.166 Dozens of these assets were lost 
or severely damaged during missions, but these losses rarely generated significant concern among 
military decisionmakers. As one former Lightning Bug crew member explained, “there was a 
relatively laissez-faire attitude surrounding losses, we didn’t think much about them.”167  In part 
because of the Lightning Bug’s operational success in Southeast Asia, the military and intelligence 
community developed other drone programs and – as the case studies that follow illustrate – 
considered drone use in a variety of crisis settings throughout the Cold War.  
Despite the lower human and financial costs that drones offered, they were not always 
deployed in lieu of manned assets during the Cold War. Indeed, senior policymakers sometimes 
chose to deploy manned reconnaissance aircraft into areas well-defended by adversary fighter jets 
and missiles. At the surface this might appear to challenge the increased initiation logic underlying 
technology-enabled escalation control. Yet in many cases, manned reconnaissance aircraft like the 
supersonic, high altitude SR-71 Blackbird were assessed to be relatively invulnerable to Soviet-
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produced air defense systems of the era.168 As a result, certain manned systems were viewed as 
offering a higher likelihood of successful intelligence collection with a lower risk of being attacked 
or shot down than drone aircraft. This aligns with the experimental findings from chapter 4 which 
demonstrate greater support for the deployment of manned assets when they had a higher 
likelihood of accomplishing the mission than remotely piloted assets. Drones, however, were 
frequently considered as an alternative to manned aircraft and deployed in a variety of operational 
contexts during the Cold War. 
The remainder of this chapter explores specific instances where manned or unmanned 
reconnaissance aircraft were deployed in three different theaters: Cuba, North Korea, and China. 
In each of these cases, the behavior of senior military and civilian policymakers was largely 
consistent with the expectations of technology-enabled escalation control. Drones were either 
considered or deployed on high risk missions to avoid political incidents that could lead to 
escalation. Indeed, as one Tactical Air Command report suggests, drones could be deployed into 
sensitive area “with a reduced probability of precipitating open hostilities.”169 When drones were 
lost to enemy fire, the United States generally took no military response, in contrast to the shows 
of force, military mobilizations, and diplomatic demarches that often accompanied the downing of 
manned aircraft.  
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CUBA: RECONNAISSANCE DURING THE MISSILE CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 Just 100 miles of the coast of Florida, Cuba was a hub of Cold War activity. Shortly after 
Fidel Castro established his communist government on the island, the United States initiated plans 
to undermine the Castro regime. Members of the U.S. foreign policy and security establishments 
feared Cuba would export communist revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere and were 
concerned that Cuba could be used as launching point for attacks on the United States. These fears 
became particularly salient in fall 1962 when the Soviet Union began to ship bomber aircraft and 
medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles to Cuba, ostensibly as a response to the botched, 
CIA-supported Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961 and the deployment of American ballistic 
missiles in Italy and Turkey.170 The presence of offensive military assets just dozens of miles from 
Florida posed a significant threat to the American homeland.171 
 The delivery of Soviet offensive weapons to Cuba increased demand for intelligence 
collection operations over the island. A series of incidents involving reconnaissance aircraft in the 
Soviet Union and China in the summer of 1962, however, had decreased the frequency of 
reconnaissance missions over Cuba. In August 1962, an Air Force U-2 accidentally flew over 
Sakhalin Island, leading the Soviets to lodge a diplomatic complaint, and in September, China shot 
down a U-2 operated by the Republic of China Air Force. As a result, Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy severely limited U-2 overflights of Cuba, 
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resulting in intelligence gaps about the status of the weapons buildup.172 By fall, decisionmakers 
were pressing for additional intelligence collection. A top secret October 5, 1962 memorandum 
from the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) to the United States Intelligence 
Board argued that there was “a pressing and continuing need for up-to-date intelligence on the 
progress of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba. The very highest levels of the government are 
dependent upon this intelligence to assist in making policy decisions of immediate and vital 
concern to the nation.”173  
As with many other Cold War targets, aerial and satellite reconnaissance offered a means 
of gathering information on areas that were otherwise off limits to American personnel. The 
COMOR noted that satellite missions over Cuba could provide some intelligence, but that they 
were “not timely enough nor of sufficient resolution” to monitor the weapons deliveries and 
missile site construction.174 The primary alternatives to satellites were manned reconnaissance 
aircraft, which fell into two categories: high-altitude strategic reconnaissance aircraft and tactical 
reconnaissance aircraft. High-altitude strategic reconnaissance assets were less vulnerable to the 
threat posed by the SA-2 surface-to-air missiles and MiG-21 fighter jets deployed in Cuba. Their 
high altitude also meant they could collect imagery of large swaths of the island without making 
repeated passes, decreasing the shootdown risk. Tactical reconnaissance aircraft like the RF-101 
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and F8U-1P flew at lower altitude, making them more exposed to anti-aircraft artillery and 
allowing them to capture only narrow bands of imagery. The imagery these aircraft collected could 
therefore “provide detailed photography for technical intelligence purposes, but not the repeated, 
wide area coverage necessary to cover the present objectives.”175 These limitations meant that 
tactical reconnaissance aircraft could serve as a supplement to the high-altitude U-2, but not as a 
substitute.  
 Concerned that the White House would not authorize the deployment of manned aircraft 
in light of the Soviet and Chinese incidents, senior intelligence and defense policymakers also 
considered the use of drones as a lower risk means of collecting intelligence over Cuba. The Ryan 
Aeronautics reconnaissance drones that the Air Force had ordered in early 1962 were undergoing 
flight tests in Florida when the Cuban Missile Crisis began. Just weeks earlier, CIA’s Deputy 
Director of Research, Herbert Scoville, Jr., assessed the drones – then codenamed Fire Fly – as not 
ready for operations over the Soviet Union due to uncertainty surrounding the drone’s survivability 
against Soviet air defenses. Scoville did, however, urge the United States Intelligence Board to 
“consider its potential applications in other areas of the world such as Cuba.”176 During an October 
5th meeting, the Secretary and Undersecretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and 
the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office agreed that the Fire Fly drone should “go ahead 
for potential use in Cuba.”177 As the crisis unfolded, Joseph Charyk, Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office, directed that plans be drawn up “for the Fire Fly vehicles to be employed 
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against Cuba under the operational responsibility of the Department of Defense….under the NRO 
supervision and with CIA assistance.”178 
Although the Fire Fly drones could have easily been deployed from their base in Florida, 
they were not deployed during the Cuban crisis. The decision not to deploy the drones highlights 
two conditions under which a state might not employ drones even when doing so would reduce 
risk to friendly aircrew and the associated risk of escalation. First, the COMOR believed the Fire 
Fly would be “highly useful in covering specific objectives of limited scope. But the small area 
coverage obtainable by Fire Fly makes it less desirable than the U-2.”179 The greater perceived 
effectiveness of a manned platform in this case outweighed the reduced risk to friendly personnel 
and the political risks of a shootdown. Second, senior Air Force leaders were concerned that 
deploying the Fire Fly to Cuba would reveal a new and highly sensitive capability to the Soviet 
Union. The loss of a drone over Cuba could compromise a classified asset and sensitive technology 
that might be used in a future conflict against the Soviet Union.180 Air Force Chief of Staff General 
Curtis LeMay was also reportedly concerned that the downing of even a single drone would 
represent a loss of a significant portion of the Air Force’s then-nascent drone fleet. 181  
 The White House reauthorized U-2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba in early October. 
These missions collected imagery of new ballistic missile launch sites in western Cuba, triggering 
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concern across the intelligence community.182 Intelligence collection operations were 
subsequently increased, using a mix of manned high-altitude and tactical reconnaissance aircraft. 
In addition to concerns about the status of missile launchers in Cuba, decisionmakers were also 
worried about the flareup that could result from the downing of one of the manned reconnaissance 
aircraft. At the height of the crisis on October 23rd, the Joint Chiefs and the Executive Committee 
separately discussed how to react to an attack on a U-2 overflying Cuba. The Joint Chiefs initially 
adopted a graduated response plan. They agreed that if a U-2 was downed, one or two flights 
should continue until another U-2 loss occurred. At that point, they would decide “whether the 
projected attrition rate was acceptable.” If it was, they would continue the flights. If not, they 
would attack all surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba and then resume flights. Mid-way through 
their meeting, Joint Chiefs received updated guidance from the Executive Committee.183 
 In contrast to the graduated retaliation proposed by the Joint Chiefs, President Kennedy 
approved a more escalatory plan to respond to the downing of a U-2. The President approved 
immediate retaliation “upon the most likely surface-to-air site involved in this action.”184 In the 
language of Thomas Schelling, this represented a response in the “same currency” as the initial 
transgression.185 In other words, this tit-for-tat response was intended to deter additional attacks. 
If, however, the limited retaliation did not stop the hostile actions, the Executive Committee 
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expected the U.S. military to take actions to “eliminate the effectiveness of surface-to-air 
missiles.”186 Although the plan developed by civilian policymakers at the Executive Committee 
called for more rapid escalation than the Joint Chiefs’ plan, both called for military responses to 
the downing of manned reconnaissance aircraft. These plans demonstrated that attacks on manned 
aircraft had significant potential for escalation, and also support arguments that civilian 
decisionmakers often hold more hawkish positions than their military leaders.187 
 Four days later, these plans were tested when a U-2 piloted by U.S. Air Force Major 
Rudolph Anderson was shot down while on a mission over Cuba. At 2pm on October 27th, the 
Joint Reconnaissance Center – the focal point for U.S. reconnaissance operations – reported that a 
U-2 flying over Cuba was overdue. Intelligence reports soon confirmed the Cubans had discovered 
the U-2 wreckage and Major Anderson’s body. Later that afternoon, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor informed the Executive Committee of the U-2 shootdown. In 
line with the plans developed on the 23rd, Taylor announced that he believed the United States 
should retaliate with an airstrike on the missile site responsible for downing the U-2.188 The 
Executive Committee made no decision about airstrikes, but cancelled the evening’s remaining 
aerial reconnaissance missions.189 At around the same time, other senior military officers readied 
themselves for impending airstrikes. Vice Admiral Charles D. Griffin, the Deputy Chief of Naval 
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Operations, for instance, began reviewing Contingency Plan 312, which included retaliation plans 
for an attack on reconnaissance aircraft.190 Each of these actions suggested the loss of an American 
aircrew triggered the desire to punish the adversary for their actions.  
 After the Executive Committee Meeting, General Taylor called together his Joint Chiefs. 
He asked the senior officers of each service, “Should we take out a SAM site?” Air Force General 
Curtis LeMay responded, “No, we would open ourselves to retaliation. We have little to gain and 
a lot to lose.”191 Army Chief of Staff General Earle Wheeler agreed, commenting, “I feel the same 
way. Khrushchev may loose one of his missiles on us.” Taylor pushed his service chiefs, arguing, 
“If this was wise on the 23rd, it should be just as wise on the 27th.”192 Wheeler responded by saying 
that intelligence that showed concrete launch pads for nuclear missiles had changed his thoughts 
on the use of force. The threat of a nuclear response seemingly tempered the retaliatory demands 
that had earlier been associated with the loss of a manned aircraft. Roughly three hours later at the 
final Executive Committee meeting of the day, President Kennedy said that if American 
reconnaissance planes were fired on the following day, “we should take out the SAM sites in Cuba 
by air action.”193   
The retaliatory strikes, however, were never carried out. After the final Executive 
Committee meeting on evening of the 27th, Attorney General Robert Kennedy visited Soviet 
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ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to continue negotiating an agreement in which the Soviets would 
withdraw their missiles from Cuba if the United States removed its own missiles from Turkey and 
Italy and pledged not to invade Cuba.194 According to Dobrynin’s transcript of the meeting, Robert 
Kennedy described the demand for retaliation for the downing of the U-2 and death of its pilot.  
Because of the plane that was shot down, there is now strong pressure on 
the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon when 
American reconnaissance planes are flying over Cuba. The USA can't stop 
these flights, because this is the only way we can quickly get information 
about the state of construction of the missile bases in Cuba, which we 
believe pose a very serious threat to our national security. But if we start 
to fire in response – a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very 
hard to stop.195  
 
The following day, President Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to the terms of the missile 
withdrawal deal, averting further escalation. Indeed, the shootdown greatly increased 
Khrushchev’s fear of escalation, contributing to his willingness to withdraw the missiles. The 
potential for an armed reprisal after the U-2 downing highlights the escalation risks associated 
with deploying manned aircraft during crises.  
 Although the crisis was resolved, the United States looked for ways to ensure Soviet 
offensive weapons were not reintroduced in Cuba and to monitor Cuban military activity. The 
same sort of debates on aerial reconnaissance that took place in the lead up to the missile crisis 
played out again in the months and years after it.  As in earlier discussions, senior policymakers 
weighed the tradeoffs of different collection assets including satellites, manned aircraft, and 
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drones. By mid-1963, the United States was operating two U-2 missions a day over Cuba because 
the Cuban government had refused to authorize on-the-ground inspections to safeguard against the 
reintroduction of offensive weapons. Although alternative methods of intelligence collection 
including satellites and drones were available, officials including Deputy Undersecretary of State 
for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs Paul Nitze believed “the quantity of data that could be obtained by these 
alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2 and would not meet the stated 
requirement.”196 As a result, the U-2s continued flying missions over Cuba.  
 By May 1964, Castro’s continuing refusal to allow on-the-ground inspections combined 
with new reports of offensive missiles in Cuba reaffirmed the need for intelligence overflights. 
During two National Security Council meetings that month, senior decisionmakers considered 
deploying drones in place of manned U-2s. At the May 2nd NSC meeting, Director of Central 
Intelligence John McCone suggested that drones could be considered for use as an intelligence 
collection asset. He explained that “the shootdown of a drone would not create an incident exactly 
paralleling the shootdown of a U-2.”197 McCone’s assessment provides strong evidence for 
technology-enabled escalation control. A drone loss would be characterized as fundamentally 
different from the loss of a manned aircraft, leading to a different – and likely less intense – set of 
political and military responses in line with the restrained retaliation logic.  
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The discussion of drones continued at a follow-on meeting three days later. Despite 
McCone’s belief that drones would avoid the type of incident surrounding a U-2 shootdown, both 
he and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara offered limited support to drone operations. 
McNamara believed the military had “never operated drones to this extent” and that there were 
“numerous operational problems limiting the capability of drones.”198 Similarly, McCone feared 
that drones were more vulnerable to enemy air defenses and less capable than their manned 
counterparts. They flew at lower altitudes than the U-2 and could photograph a smaller swath of 
ground than the U-2. Because of the latter limitation, far more drone missions would need to be 
flown, pushing the cost of drone operations higher than those of U-2 operations.199  
 In addition to concerns about drone capability, policymakers also believed Cuban forces 
would be more likely to target drones than manned aircraft. In statements consistent with the 
amplified aggression hypothesis, cabinet level decisionmakers expressed their concerns. 
Undersecretary of State George Ball argued that “if it became known to the Cubans that we were 
flying drones, Castro would undoubtedly attack them.” McGeorge Bundy agreed, saying that the 
“Cubans would act much more promptly against a drone than against piloted planes.”200 
Underlying these assessments was the belief that drones signaled a lower degree of resolve than 
manned assets, and an attack on a drone would be unlikely to trigger an immediate armed reprisal. 
McNamara, for instance, noted that “if word gets around that we are using drones, the Cubans 
would say we are weakening our position.”201 McNamara suggested that the United States could 
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carry on drone operations for several weeks even with enemy action, demonstrating – in line with 
the restrained retaliation logic – that a drone downing would not trigger the same sort of reaction 
as an attack on a manned U-2.202 McNamara believed, however, that multiple drone downings 
could cause a political problem and that “if the Cubans knocked out drone after drone, we would 
have to make some response.”203 Yet, the precise response was not discussed.  The meeting ended 
with Secretary McNamara agreeing to look into drone use and electronic counter measures that 
could enhance the survivability of manned reconnaissance assets.204  
Later that year, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
and the National Security Advisor continued to assess how to best gather intelligence on Cuba. 
Their conversation focused on identifying the means to most effectively collect imagery with 
minimal financial costs and risk of conflict. In one exchange, Secretary of Defense McNamara 
suggested that satellites like the KH-4 and KH-7 could provide both intelligence coverage of 
targets of interest. Ray Cline, head of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, commented that the 
cost of each satellite mission was a major consideration, to which McNamara responded, “it was 
much less costly than a war which might be brought on by a shoot down.”205 Another option 
considered was the deployment of manned aircraft like the U-2. Although McNamara thought the 
shootdown of a manned aircraft could lead to war, he believed there was a relatively low risk that 
the Cubans would attempt to shoot down a U-2.206 The National Security Advisor, McGeorge 
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Bundy, agreed with McNamara’s assessment, commenting that “the Cubans are not likely to shoot 
down a U-2 at this time.”207 In contrast, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson – in a statement in line 
with the amplified aggression logic – believed that use of unmanned aircraft such as drones or 
balloons in lieu of manned aircraft “would invite a shoot down.”208  
Throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis and its aftermath, senior policymakers including the 
President and Secretary of Defense routinely made decisions about drones and escalation that were 
consistent with several of the logics underpinning technology-enabled escalation control. Prior to 
the crisis, intelligence community leaders considered deploying drones as a means of carrying out 
military operations without the political risks associated with flying – and potentially losing – a 
manned reconnaissance aircraft over denied territory. Drones likely would have been deployed in 
lieu of manned assets as a way of avoiding escalation after a shootdown, but drones of the era were 
considered too vulnerable and too operationally inefficient. Decisionmakers during and after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis also provided support for the restrained retaliation hypothesis by expressing 
a willingness to respond to the downing of a manned U-2 with a far more escalatory military 
reprisal than the loss of a drone, which policymakers generally viewed as more expendable.   
NORTH KOREA: AIRCRAFT SHOOTDOWN, ESCALATION, AND DRONE ALERTS 
 After the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula continued to run high. To defend South Korea from potential North Korean aggression, 
the United States maintained tens of thousands of troops along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
separating North and South Korea and at bases throughout the southern half of the peninsula. In 
order to provide American, United Nations, and South Korean forces with warning of impending 
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North Korean attacks or provocation, the United States conducted significant intelligence 
collection operations in and around the Korean Peninsula using ships, ground observers, and 
airborne reconnaissance assets. The latter were particularly well-suited for collecting electronic 
and signals intelligence, such as emissions from air defense radars and communications between 
military units.209 As a result, the United States Air Force and Navy conducted dozens of airborne 
intelligence gathering operations throughout Northeast Asia each month as part of the Department 
of Defense’s Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO).210  
 The importance of these missions in providing indications and warning intelligence 
increased during the mid-1960s. Beginning in 1966, North Korea mounted a series of armed 
attacks against American and South Korean troops stationed along the DMZ. This represented a 
marked shift from earlier North Korean activities, which had focused primarily on intelligence 
collection. In mid-October 1966, North Korean infiltration teams began ambushing American 
patrols, sabotaging trains, and even attacked the barracks of the U.S. Army’s Second Infantry 
Division.211 Between 1966 and 1968, North Korean troops launched 259 attacks, killing 40 
American and 280 South Korean troops.212 In response, the United States-led United Nations 
Command launched artillery strikes, while South Korea unilaterally conducted a series of raids 
across the DMZ attacking North Korean People’s Army installations.213 
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 North Korean provocations peaked in 1968 when Pyongyang initiated a series of high-
profile operations again South Korean and American targets. In January 1968, North Korean 
commandos attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee. Thirty-one 
members of an elite North Korean People’s Army unit infiltrated across the DMZ into South Korea 
to attack the Blue House presidential residence. The commandos were detected by South Korean 
civilians, setting off a nine-day manhunt. The mission was unsuccessful, but resulted in the deaths 
of 26 South Koreans, four Americans, and all but two of the North Korean intruders.214 At the 
height of the search for Blue House intruders, North Korean forces captured the USS Pueblo, a 
U.S. Navy spy ship, on January 23, 1968. The Pueblo was operating off the coast Wonsan, North 
Korea collecting electronic intelligence when it came under attack by North Korean naval vessels. 
After the Pueblo’s commanding officer surrendered, North Korea impounded the ship and 
imprisoned its crew for eleven months.215 Attacks continued for the remainder of the year. In 
September, a battalion of North Korean troops infiltrated south of the DMZ, and in October and 
November, another 120 commandos landed in South Korea hoping to recruit members for the 
Korean Worker’s Party. The infiltrations set off nearly two months of counter-insurgency style 
operations aimed at killing the North Korean commandos.216 
 In light of the crisis surrounding the North Korean provocations – particularly the Pueblo 
incident – the United States stepped up its aerial reconnaissance operations in the Korean 
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theater.217 Between January and April 1969, for instance, the Air Force and Navy flew 190 
missions over the Sea of Japan to monitor North Korean military activity.218 Military planners 
recognized these missions involved significant risk as they “operated well outside the capability 
of friendly radar for a large portion of their missions and well within the North Korean air defense 
environment.”219 Indeed, one Pacific Command intelligence report suggested the reconnaissance 
flights were “vulnerable to communist reaction” by North Korean MiGs and that “North Korea 
still has the political initiative and the military capability to selectively react at any time.”220 
Despite these risks, the National Security Council deemed these missions “essential if we are to 
maintain adequate cognizance of military capabilities and postures of communist countries” and 
that patrols over the Sea of Japan “contribute to the totality of our appreciation of the military 
strength and activities of North Korea.”221  Throughout most of the crisis, these missions were 
conducted without incident. 
 This changed on April 15, 1969 when two North Korean MiG-21 fighter jets downed a 
U.S. Navy EC-121M Warning Star reconnaissance aircraft flying a mission over the Sea of Japan. 
The attack killed all 31 American crewmembers, representing the largest single loss of U.S. 
aircrew during the Cold War. The propeller-driven aircraft – equipped with long-range radars and 
other sensors designed to collect adversary radar signals and electronic emissions – took off from 
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Naval Air Facility Atsugi, southeast of Tokyo, in the early morning hours of April 15th and flew 
west toward the Korean Peninsula, where it began flying a circular orbit 50 nautical miles east of 
the North Korean coastline – clearly within international airspace.222 As the EC-121M neared the 
end of its mission, the crew received a radio warning of an impending intercept by North Korean 
jets. Six minutes later, the North Korean MiGs shot down the naval reconnaissance plane.   
Planning a Response  
The shootdown triggered immediate military action by forces in the Pacific theater. Within 
twenty minutes of the plane’s downing, the Air Force scrambled two F-102 fighter jets to the 
eastern end of the DMZ where they were directed to await further directions. Three hours later, 
Fifth Air Force – the command responsible for Air Force operations in Northeast Asia – ordered 
all Korea-based tactical air forces to assume maximum readiness as it remained unclear whether 
the shootdown was an isolated incident or the start of a broader North Korean attack.223 In addition 
to increasing its readiness posture, the military also initiated a large search and rescue mission, 
placing additional American assets in range of North Korean forces. Air Force and Navy aircraft 
assisted by ships from the Soviet Navy searched the Sea of Japan for survivors and wreckage in 
an operation that planners believed could be a target of North Korean attack.224 Indeed, U.S. 
military aircraft were fired on during the search and rescue mission, but were unable to identify 
the source of the surface-to-air fire.225 
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Planners at Pacific Command, the Pentagon, the State Department, and National Security 
Council also began developing military and diplomatic response options. Consistent with the 
predictions of the restrained retaliation logic, initial plans reflected a desire to significantly punish 
North Korea for an attack that had claimed the lives of American personnel. The day after the 
shootdown, the National Security Council outlined several key objectives for any U.S. response. 
Any response should maintain the right to use international airspace, deter similar hostile actions 
by North Korea or other countries, exact redress by retaliation or compensation, maximize 
international criticism of North Korea and minimize criticism of U.S. actions, and maintain 
domestic support for overseas security commitments.226 These objectives informed the 
formulation of several potential diplomatic and military actions. 
The least escalatory responses were those that were purely diplomatic in nature.  The NSC 
considered several goals for options that did not involve the use of force: conveying an explicit 
warning that the next incident would lead to a military response, demanding compensation for the 
EC-121 and aircrew, maximizing international criticism against North Korea, or reducing tension 
by “treating the matter in relatively calm form.”227 These objectives shaped the potential 
“diplomacy only” options, which involved talks with the North Koreas at Panmunjom in the DMZ, 
calling a United Nations Security Council meeting or presenting a letter to the Security Council, 
or, using third country channels like the Soviets to convey warning to North Korea.228 These 
diplomatic approaches, however, were generally viewed as being either unfeasible or unlikely to 
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meet the diplomatic objectives if not coupled with military actions. When used in support of 
military action, diplomatic efforts were intended to establish the legal basis for U.S. actions and to 
seek support for military operations, while minimizing criticism and censure from the international 
community.229 
 The National Security Council also considered several military actions “not involving 
combat courses of action” such as repeat EC-121 reconnaissance missions with combat escort or 
a “show of force using air and naval forces in proximity to but outside of North Korea.”230 These 
actions were considered to pose little risk of escalation to full hostilities, but were viewed as 
generating little deterrent effect and imposing no costs on North Korea. Indeed the NSC believed 
these shows of force “would be viewed by North Koreans as unconvincing” and “allows their 
unlawful acts to go unpunished.”231 Consistent with the theoretical expectations outlined in chapter 
2, the NSC assessment of the plans highlight how the non-combat reactions were viewed as 
providing insufficient punishment and deterrent value following an attack that cost the lives of 
American servicemembers. In other words, they were viewed as falling in a different “currency” 
than the North Korean attack or not being a sufficiently tit-for-tat response. 
More escalatory “military combat options” were seen as having the advantage of providing 
“a greater opportunity to accomplish the possible objectives of deterrence, redress, and 
maintenance of our rights to use international airspace.”232 The proposals were “single, selected 
military combat actions” including destroying a North Korean aircraft off the coast of North Korea, 
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striking a selected North Korean airfield, carrying out shore bombardments of military targets on 
the east or west coasts of North Korea, ground raids across the DMZ, submarine attacks on North 
Korean naval vessels, blockades of North Korean ports, mining North Korean waters, or seizing 
North Korean assets – like fishing ships – on the high seas.233 These options were viewed as 
positive acts of retaliation that would help exact redress and deter future action. In the case where 
ships or aircraft were targeted, the retaliation would be directly relatable to North Korea’s violation 
of the right to the free use of international waters and airspace – highlighting a tit-for-tat response 
logic.  NSC Staff believed these military options increased the risk of retaliatory action by North 
Korea, but posed little risk to drawing China or the Soviet Union into conflict.234 Significant 
planning for many of these responses was carried out in the days after the attack. For instance, the 
Headquarters Pacific Air Forces developed a plan in which 24 U.S. Air Force F-4 fighter-bombers 
would launch from bases in Korea and Japan to strike Wonsan or Sondong Ni Airfields and destroy 
hardened facilities and aircraft.235 Similarly, Strategic Air Command offered a plan to use B-52s 
based at Guam to attack Wonsan and Sondak Airfields.236  
 Several senior officers and policymakers initially leaned toward a response that would both 
punish North Korea and deter future actions against the United States. Admiral John McCain, the 
Commander in Chief of Pacific Command, for instance, argued for a strong reaction rather than a 
display of force.  In a classified memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the day after the attack, he 
explained, “If we operate again in the Sea of Japan only as a show of force, and without positive 
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action, I believe that we continue to provide justification to their judgement of us as ‘Paper tigers’. 
The end result might well be the opposite of our intended purpose and encourage rather than 
discourage further belligerence.”237  A top secret Central Intelligence Agency assessment 
published two days after the shootdown came to a similar conclusion. CIA analysts noted, “The 
North Koreans probably would view actions such as demonstrative air and naval maneuvers in 
proximity to North Korea essentially as a repetition of the US response to the Pueblo seizure. They 
would be inclined to interpret such demonstrations as indicating US unwillingness to resort to any 
direct application of force that might carry high risks of a resumption of major hostilities.”238  
Those within the NSC also initially preferred escalatory responses. Alexander Haig, then 
serving as the military assistant to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger sent Kissinger a 
note strongly advocating for a military reprisal. Haig noted that unlike the Pueblo seizure in which 
crewmembers were imprisoned in North Korea, the death of the EC-121 aircrew meant that 
“similar inhibitions are not available in explaining a ‘no action’ stand.” As a result, “all factors 
considered, a military retaliatory strike of some type is called for.” Haig noted that even if the 
president was unwilling to launch an overt attack on a North Korean airfield, he should pursue a 
more covert military reprisal such as a “submarine ambush” against North Korean targets.239  
President Nixon himself also believed a response of some sort was required. In a call to 
Kissinger the evening of the shootdown, Nixon explained, “there has to be some reaction here. I 
                                                        
237 Message, CINCPAC, subj: Mission of TF-71, 16 April 1969 (Top Secret) cited in Project Checo: The EC-121 
Incident (Top Secret), 15-16. 
238 Intelligence Memorandum: Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions (Top Secret), Central Intelligence Agency, 
17 April 1969, 3.  
239 Memorandum Al Haig to Kissinger (Top Secret); 16 April 1969; General Materials EC-121 Shoot down (1 of 2); 
Box 436; National Security Council Files: Korea EC-121 Shoot down; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum Yorba Linda, California. 
 212 
have a feeling they’re testing us.”240 Kissinger agreed, explaining the potential reputational 
consequences of inaction: “to let this one go again will be taken very seriously. There was an 
intelligence report of Nasser’s conversation with Hussein to the effect, ‘After all, it isn’t so risky 
to defy the United States – look at North Korea and the Pueblo.’”241 Throughout the crisis, Nixon 
continued to view options below the threshold of an armed reprisal as an inadequate response to 
the North Korean attack. On April 18th, for instance, he told Kissinger that the resumption of 
reconnaissance flights around Korea was “too much of a piddily thing to announce…It’s not all 
that significant” and continued to express his desire to launch military strikes.242 As a set of first – 
and more visible - steps, Nixon deployed a naval task force toward the Korean Peninsula and 
issued a demarche to North Korea. 
In addition to reputational concerns on the international stage, Nixon also had domestic 
political motivations for considering a military reprisal – suggesting that public opinion plays a 
role in shaping decisions on military escalation. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon 
had condemned the Johnson administration’s lack of a military response following the Pueblo 
seizure.243 Failing to act after the EC-121 shootdown could have led to criticism about a similarly 
weak response in a case where more Americans were killed. In a phone call with Kissinger two 
days after the shootdown, Nixon weighed the risks of the adverse public reaction for taking no 
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action with the risks of being criticized for heightening the risk of a second war in Asia by 
retaliating against North Korea.244 Although there was no widespread consensus among the public 
on how to respond to the attack, some elected officials had called for immediate retaliation, 
including the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. South Carolina Congressman Lucius Mendel 
Rivers, for instance, announced “There can only be one answer for America – Retaliation – 
Retaliation – Retaliation.” He explained. “I don’t think nuclear weapons would be needed to bring 
this crowd to its knees, but if it requires that, let ’em have it.”245  
A Surprisingly Restrained Response 
These initial reactions suggest policymakers believe that escalatory armed reprisals are 
justified following an attack on manned military assets that result in the death of American 
personnel. Indeed, senior decisionmakers appeared driven in part by emotional factors to avenge 
the deaths of American personnel and instrumental factors to deter future aggression. In the days 
following the shootdown, airstrikes against North Korea were the preferred option amon g several 
key decisionmakers. Indeed, just three days after the EC-121 attack, Nixon’s staff prepared the 
speech he would deliver from the West Wing announcing military action in response to the 
“deliberate and well-planned attack.” Had Nixon ordered the airstrikes, he planned to justify his 
reasoning to the American public and international community: 
For if we fail to act today to defend ourselves against unprovoked attack, we 
only invite a more serious challenge tomorrow….With these considerations in 
mind, and after the most painstaking examining of all the courses open to us, 
I have today ordered a carrier strike force in the Sea of Japan to launch an air 
attack against a North Korean air base. This is a single military action. It 
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involves no larger commitment, and represents a challenge to no other 
nation.246 
 
The retaliatory airstrikes, of course, never came to fruition. Instead, Nixon ordered the 
resumption of reconnaissance flights around the Korean Peninsula and directed the Seventh Fleet 
to surge a massive flotilla comprised of four aircraft carriers, 19 destroyers and cruisers and more 
than 350 aircraft to the Sea of Japan.247 Between April 19th and 26th, this flotilla – referred to as 
Task Force 71 – conducted air and surface maneuvers off the coast of North Korea in a show of 
force intended to deter further provocations. In public statements, Nixon made clear that he 
reserved the right to take additional action on top of these initial deployments.248 The Task Force, 
however was withdrawn to its pre-surge posture on April 26th with ships returning to bases and 
operating areas in Japan and Southeast Asia without further escalation.249 
  Although some military leaders and some of Nixon’s civilian advisors initially sought an 
armed reprisal to punish and deter North Korea, the response was tempered out of fear that even a 
limited set of airstrikes could trigger a war that could undermine Washington’s efforts in Vietnam. 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, for instance, desired retaliation but realized initiating military 
action in Korea could jeopardize operations in Vietnam. In a phone called to Henry Kissinger, 
Laird described his thinking, “if there was some way we could hit one of their aircraft or ships, I 
would do it in a minute…But I have got concerns over what this might mean from the standpoint 
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of our force commitments in that area, and we must bear in mind that we can’t put ourselves in a 
position where we are forced to pull back, as far as Vietnam is concerned.”250  Secretary of State 
William Rogers, CIA Director Richard Helms, and U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William 
Porter were similarly opposed to a military reprisal.251 Rogers was concerned of the potentially 
adverse effect that launching military operations could have on public opinion, while Helms shared 
a combination of the concerns voiced by Laird and Rogers.252  
 Perceptions among some senior military officers on the ground were similar. General 
Charles Bonesteel III, Commander United States Forces Korea and Commander in Chief UN 
Command Korea reasoned that, “Much as all of us here would like to take a crack at N.K. there 
are certain general considerations bearing on contingency plans that a deeper responsibility to U.S. 
position world-wide, and more particularly to our avowed mission ‘to defend the Republic of 
Korea against Communist aggression’ requires us to set forth.”253 Bonesteel was particularly 
concerned that any military response could trigger a North Korean reaction that could draw 
American forces into a bloody conflict on the Korean Peninsula and damage the South Korean 
economy.254 Indeed, a Joint Chiefs of Staff study forwarded to the White House on April 17th 
suggested that American forces in Korea had significant shortfalls in equipment and could only 
support 28 days of ground combat and 45 days of air operations. To resupply these forces, 
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equipment would need to be drawn from the logistics pipeline supporting operations in Southeast 
Asia, potentially weakening U.S. war efforts in Vietnam.255  
While some senior policymakers – particularly Henry Kissinger – believed that an armed 
retaliation that exacted redress for the shootdown of a manned aircraft was the most appropriate 
response, competing military requirements in Southeast Asia forced the implementation of a more 
tempered plan. As Kissinger later explained, finding a military option that balanced the desire for 
tit-for-tat retaliation with minimizing the risk of becoming entrenched in a second Asian War was 
difficult: “those [military options] that seemed safe were inadequate to the provocation, those that 
seemed equal to the challenge appeared too risky in terms of the fear of a two-front war.”256 Had 
the United States not been as deeply engaged in Vietnam, it is probable that Nixon would have 
ordered military strikes. Indeed, Kissinger described the decision surrounding the response to the 
EC-121 downing as “a close call, which probably should have gone the other way.”257 Even 
without actual strikes, however, the deployment of Task Force 71 and the demarche delivered at 
Panmunjom represented a far greater military and diplomatic escalation than that which would 
have followed the loss of a drone.  
Lessons Learned: Future Retaliation and Drone Operations Plans 
 Policymakers and national security practitioners drew several lessons about the risks of 
manned reconnaissance operations from the EC-121 shootdown. First, Nixon and his National 
Security Council recognized they had insufficient plans for dealing with attacks on manned assets 
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and other provocations. In the months following the EC-121 incident, the national security 
establishment began developing contingency plans in the event North Korea carried out further 
attacks on American personnel and manned assets. Many of these plans called for armed reprisal, 
highlighting that responses were generally less restrained and more escalatory when manned assets 
or personnel were attacked. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s FRACTURE PINE plan, 
for example, offered a “measured” option for U.S. retaliation to North Korean provocations. Under 
the plan, U.S. naval ships would fire long-range Talos surface-to-air missiles at North Korean jets 
operating from or between Wonsan and Sondong-Ni airfields.258 The plan featured broad 
authorities that allowed for the targeting of North Korean aircraft even if they did not demonstrate 
hostile intent toward U.S. forces.259  
Plans similar to FRACTURE PINE were discussed by the Washington Special Actions 
Group (WSAG), a group that Kissinger established in July 1969 to plan and coordinate government 
responses to crises. The group considered over two-dozen contingency plans that were designed 
to provide the president with a broad menu of options to quickly respond to future North Korean 
provocation. The potential response plans ranged from relatively non-escalatory actions such as 
non-combatant evacuations to the “selective use of tactical weapons against North Korea” in a 
punitive attack against military targets.260 The most limited of these nuclear options involved using 
tactical fighter jets, carrier-based attack aircraft, or surface-to-surface missiles to strike up to  
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twelve military targets with nuclear weapons with a yield of .2 to 10 kilotons.261 While WSAG 
considered several options, Kissinger noted that in the event of a future contingency, the president 
would likely respond by doing nothing or select a response on the “extreme end of the range of 
possibilities” in order to prevent any North Korean countermeasures.262 Even though the risk of 
massive escalation could restrain retaliation, the WSAG’s contingency planning efforts 
demonstrate that decisionmakers believe far more escalatory responses are justified to punish or 
deter a rival after attacks on manned platforms and personnel.    
The EC-121 downing also led to a second lesson consistent with the tenets of technology-
enabled escalation control: using drones in place of manned reconnaissance aircraft could greatly 
reduce the political and military consequences associated with shootdowns. In the months 
following the EC-121 attack, a Pacific Command group tasked with analyzing the incident 
recommended the deployment of unmanned reconnaissance platforms. Air Force Major General 
John Morrison of the National Security Agency (NSA) took this recommendation and directed 
NSA personnel to investigate the use of drones to collect signals intelligence in the Korean theater. 
NSA discovered the Air Force had already started development of a drone that could substitute for 
manned aircraft on electronic intelligence gathering missions. After the EC-121 attack, the Air 
Force presented their drone plan at the Pentagon, and received approval for the program from 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance in May, just one month after the shootdown. The Ryan 
Aeronautics Model TE drone made its first test flight in November 1969 and its first operational 
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mission in February 1970.263 Simultaneously, the Air Force took steps to “mini-man” its manned 
reconnaissance operations by moving intelligence analysts from aircraft to ground stations, where 
they analyzed data downlinked from reconnaissance aircraft operated by just a cockpit crew.264 
The Air Force continues to conduct operations using this “mini-man” approach both in Korea and 
in other regions today, highlighting the desire of senior policymakers to avoid the consequences 
of losing friendly intelligence aircrew.265  
In the years after the EC-121 shootdown, drones were built into contingency and 
intelligence collection plans for the Korean theater. A report prepared by the interagency working 
group that assessed potential responses to North Korean provocations included drone 
reconnaissance in several of their plans.266 In addition to contingency operations, drones like the 
Model TE – codenamed COMBAT DAWN – continued to play a role in peacetime intelligence 
collection in the Korean theater. By late 1972 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had doubled the collection 
mission for the COMBAT DAWN high-altitude signals intelligence drone from 30 to 60 hours 
each month.267 Just a year later, however, the Air Force planned to phase out COMBAT DAWN 
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operations in Korea because it “could no longer justify the expense of COMBAT DAWN in the 
current austere fiscal environment.”268 Although the COMBAT DAWN drones were phased out 
of service in Korea by 1975, the Air Force maintained a drone contingency force based in the 
United States that could be deployed worldwide in the event of crises.269  
The following year, the Pentagon ordered the Air Force to prepare to deploy these U.S.-
based drones for a high-risk reconnaissance operation following a crisis in the DMZ. On August 
18, 1976, North Korean troops killed two U.S. Army officers in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of 
the DMZ. Captain Arthur Bonifas and Lieutenant Mark Barrett were leading a team of South 
Korean and American personnel in the JSA to trim a tree that blocked the line of sight between 
two United Nations Command guard posts. The obstructed view made troops stationed at the guard 
posts vulnerable to North Korean harassment. Shortly after the work party began trimming the 
tree, a Korean People’s Army officer ordered the group to halt. When the American officers 
refused, North Korean troops brutally clubbed and axed them to death.270 
The day after the Axe Murder incident, the 432nd Tactical Drone Group was placed into 
alert status for a possible deployment to Northeast Asia. Four AQM-34M drones along with two 
DC-130E mother ships and two CH-3 drone recovery helicopters were prepared to launch within 
two and half hours of receiving a deployment order.271 If deployed, the drones would collect 
imagery of North Korean military positions within the DMZ. The secret cable from Tactical Air 
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Command headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia to the 432nd Tactical Drone Group at 
Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona explained that “current and forecast weather 
conditions in Korea precludes use of high altitude, stand-off, photo reconnaissance of DMZ and 
adjacent North Korean Landmass. Use of RF-4 aircraft flying under the overcast, in or near DMZ, 
not considered prudent due [to] high risk factor.”272 In other words, low cloud cover precluded the 
use of manned high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that flew beyond the reach of North Korean 
air defenses and the use of manned RF-4 tactical reconnaissance aircraft was too risky. Because 
they could collect imagery with lower operational risk, drones were seen as more easily deployable 
in this context than manned assets.  
The reconnaissance flights would support a joint U.S. and South Korean show of force 
operation, codenamed Paul Bunyan, in which forces would enter the JSA to cut down the tree. 
Ultimately, the drones of the 432nd Tactical Drone Group were not deployed before Operation Paul 
Bunyan was launched on the morning of August 21. Over 100 United Nations Command personnel 
including combat engineers and special forces troops entered the JSA supported by attack 
helicopters, 20 utility helicopters carrying a U.S. infantry unit, and U.S. fighter jets and B-52s 
flying south of the DMZ.273 The personnel cut down the tree without interference from North 
Korean forces. The next day, Tactical Air Command relaxed the two-and-a-half-hour alert for the 
432nd to 24 hours, and removed the Drone Group from alert status on August 25.274 Even though 
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the drones were not deployed, Tactical Air Command’s planning reveals that senior military 
leaders considered drones to be a less risky and more easily deployable option than manned assets 
– providing support for the logic underlying the increased initiation hypothesis.  
CHINA: DRONES BEHIND THE BAMBOO CURTAIN 
 The People’s Republic of China was another critical intelligence target for the United 
States during the Cold War. In the years following the establishment of the People’s Republic in 
October 1949, China engaged in a series of actions that challenged the United States and its allies 
in Asia. In fall 1950, China dispatched nearly a quarter million “volunteers” to fight against 
American and United Nations forces in Korea. By the time hostilities ended in 1953, more than 
three million Chinese personnel had served in Korea, including both ground and air forces.275 
During the same period, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out military operations 
against America’s ally, the Nationalist Republic of China, whose Kuomintang (KMT) government 
had fled to Taiwan after their military defeat in the Chinese Civil War. From 1950 to 1958, the 
PLA launched a series of operations aimed at capturing islands off the coast of mainland China 
that were under KMT control. These operations dragged the United States into crises in 1954-1955 
and 1958, when the People’s Republic of China threatened to seize the islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu.276 In response, the United States bolstered its military support and deployed forces into the 
region to support the Republic of China’s claims. China also helped arm and advise communist 
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forces fighting American troops in Vietnam.277 To monitor Chinese activity, the United States 
dedicated significant attention to collecting intelligence on China’s capabilities and intentions.278  
 As in other regions of the world, airborne reconnaissance operations played a significant 
role helping to collect sensitive information in mainland China. Most early intelligence gathering 
missions were flown using slow moving aircraft like modified World War II-era B-29 bombers 
that flew along the periphery or over Chinese territory.279 Early flights often penetrated deep into 
Chinese airspace, collecting information on military and industrial facilities.280 As the PLA Air 
Force strengthened its air defense capability by acquiring new fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft 
artillery, and surface-to-air missile systems, U.S. military aircraft operating in and around China 
faced an increasing threat. Indeed, between 1949 and 1969, Chinese forces attacked at least 11 
American military aircraft, including several reconnaissance aircraft.281 
 To avoid exposing American personnel to China's air defenses, the military and 
intelligence community turned to new means of intelligence collection. Some of these risk 
reducing measures involved new technologies. In the late 1950s, the United States began to deploy 
the high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which operated at an altitude of approximately 
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70,000 feet, out of reach of most of China’s fighters and air defenses.282 Under Operation SOFT 
TOUCH, for example, the United States flew two U-2 missions over mainland China in 1958.283 
While these aircraft were less vulnerable than the slow-moving World War II era planes that were 
previously used for intelligence collection, they had their limitations. The May 1960 shootdown 
of Gary Powers in his U-2 highlighted the vulnerability of even high-altitude aircraft to Soviet-
built surface-to-air missiles, leading President Eisenhower to bar reconnaissance flights over the 
Soviet Union. These restrictions, however, did not apply to China even though the PLA operated 
Soviet MiG fighter jets and the same SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile that had downed Gary 
Powers. Indeed, in July 1960, the CIA recommended U-2 overflights of China as a means of filling 
an “urgent and high priority requirement for additional photographic reconnaissance of 
Communist China.”284 The intelligence community also increasingly relied on its nascent array of 
reconnaissance satellites to collect imagery deep within Chinese territory.285 But satellites of the 
era had difficulty penetrating cloud cover, could not easily be moved to collect on other targets, 
and often required long timelines between collection of imagery and delivery to intelligence 
consumers.286 
 In addition to technical solutions, the intelligence community sought to reduce risk to 
American personnel – and the associated risk of getting tangled up in a diplomatic or military crisis 
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with China – by outsourcing airborne reconnaissance missions to foreign crews. After the 1958 
Taiwan Straits Crisis, the United States began transferring reconnaissance aircraft to the Republic 
of China and coordinating intelligence collection operations. Under one of these agreements, the 
United States Air Force transferred RB-57 reconnaissance jets to the Nationalist Chinese and 
coordinated targets to photograph. Nationalist pilots flew these missions – which sometimes 
included deep penetrations over mainland China – and provided duplicate copies of the imagery 
they collected to the United States.287 In January 1959, this partnership expanded when the Central 
Intelligence Agency launched a program to train pilots from the Republic of China Air Force to 
fly the U-2. Planners hoped that replacing American pilots with Nationalist Chinese pilots would 
reduce the likelihood of an international incident involving the United States if a U-2 was shot 
down over mainland China.288 The Republic of China’s Black Cat Squadron began U-2 overflights 
of mainland China in 1962, collecting much of the information on China’s nuclear and missile 
development programs and its conventional military capabilities.289  
The PLA’s air defenses, however, soon posed a significant threat to U-2 operations. PLA 
forces downed four Nationalist-operated U-2s between 1962 and 1965. In a classified note to 
President Johnson, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy noted that the outsourcing the 
flights to China allowed the United States “to keep out of this entirely, and the Chinese Nationalists 
have always been very good about taking the responsibility and avoiding chatter. In that way we 
have so far kept these episodes from having the political impact of the U-2 lost over the Soviet 
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Union[.]”290 In other words, the United States had no need to escalate diplomatically or militarily 
because no American airmen were captured or killed.291 Still, the high risk to operations and the 
potential political risk associated with losing manned aircraft over mainland China led the United 
States military and intelligence community to look toward unmanned options for intelligence 
collection of targets within China. 
Increased Initiation  
Drone operations over China began in 1964 when the United States deployed Firebee 
drones to Southeast Asia under the code name Operation BLUE SPRINGS. While BLUE 
SPRINGS missions focused primarily on North Vietnamese targets, they were soon flying into 
China to monitor PLA readiness and to detect Chinese support to communist forces in Vietnam.292 
One top secret document outlining the United States Intelligence Board’s (USIB) requirements 
from March 1965 identified 20 targets in South China “requiring frequent coverage with high 
resolution stereo photography…to be achieved either by U-2 or BLUE SPRINGS (drone).”293 The 
USIB demonstrated its desire to reduce risk to American aircrew by directing the intelligence 
community “to get BLUE SPRINGS coverage before sending the U-2.”294 To be sure, their 
                                                        
290 Memorandum for the President from McGeorge Bundy (Top Secret); 10 January 1965; McGeorge Bundy 1/1-
2/28/65 Vol 8 (2 of 2); Box 2; National Security Files: Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol 5-8; Lyndon 
B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. 
290 Ibid.  
291 This logic aligns with Austin Carson’s argument that covert action can help control escalation. See, Carson, 
Secret Wars. 
292 One BLUE SPRINGS mission report from December 1964 indicates that Firebee drones were collecting imagery 
of Chinese airfields hundreds of miles inside China. See Nan-Ning Airfield South China, Blue Springs; 19 December 
1964; CIA-RDP80T01471R000200050012-3.  
293 South China USIB Requirement (Top Secret); 22 March 1965; CIA-RDP68R00530A000100080042-3.  
294 Ibid.  
 227 
guidance did not proscribe U-2 deployments, but still indicated a greater willingness to deploy 
drones than manned aircraft on high risk missions, providing support for the increased initiation 
hypothesis.  
In addition to Firebee operations along the Vietnam-China border, the intelligence 
community looked to drones as a means of gathering intelligence in China’s nuclear capabilities. 
Many of the facilities associated with China’s nuclear weapons program, such as the Lop Nur test 
site, were located in western China far from borders where they could be monitored by aircraft 
flying outside of Chinese airspace, and were far beyond the Firebee’s traditional operating areas. 
Flying manned aircraft deep within China was too risky due to an increasingly robust Chinese air 
defense network. America’s expanding constellation of surveillance satellites provided one 
alternative that avoided violations of national airspace and eliminated the need to place aircrew in 
harm’s way. A CIA report from 1967, however, noted that “satellite reconnaissance cannot be 
assured due to cloud cover” and “in rapidly changing tactical or crisis situations satellite 
reconnaissance can not provide a high enough rate coverage and data return to meet the need.”295  
As a complement to existing intelligence collection platforms, the CIA proposed a high-
altitude, high-speed drone codenamed TAGBOARD. The CIA drone was launched from specially 
configured B-52 bomber and used a ramjet engine to operate at cruise speeds greater than Mach 3. 
After flying its preprogrammed route of up to 3000 nautical miles, TAGBOARD would eject its 
intelligence payload, which would be retrieved in mid-air by a modified C-130 cargo aircraft. The 
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drone itself would then self-destruct.296 The CIA viewed TAGBOARD as a tool that could greatly 
decrease the human and political risks associated with intelligence overflights. Once CIA 
assessment of TAGBOARD utilization scenarios explained, “there are many situations and denied 
areas of the world in which there may be a substantial diminution in the political liability incurred 
by the United States by the use of drones rather than manned aircraft for overflight.”297. Using the 
language introduced in chapter 2, the CIA believed the TAGBOARD could increase the menu of 
options for policy makers, allow the United States to initiate missions it would be unable to conduct 
using manned assets, and reduce the risks of diplomatic or military tensions in the wake of a 
shootdown.  
Although the CIA touted the potential benefits of TAGBOARD operations, not all 
decisionmakers believed the CIA drone was a more desirable collection asset than manned 
platforms like the U-2 and SR-71. Specifically, some decisionmakers believed TAGBOARD 
would be more vulnerable to shootdown by surface-to-air missiles than manned aircraft like the 
SR-71 that were equipped with electronic counter-measures to defend them from air defensives.298 
Drone skeptics feared this would hinder TAGBOARD’s ability to collect intelligence, creating a 
“very expensive program of doubtful value.”299 Thus, while drones expanded the menu of military 
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options, they were not necessarily the tool of choice. If manned aircraft were perceived to be more 
effective than drones at achieving intelligence collection or military objectives, they would be used 
even if they put friendly personnel over hostile territory – a logic that also appeared in the surveys 
in chapter 4.  
In spite of the tepid support, President Nixon authorized four operational TAGBOARD 
missions through Chinese airspace. One mission was designed to gather information about a 
shipment of military goods from the Soviet Union and China to North Vietnam. The drone would 
fly over North Korean and Chinese rail lines and over Shanghai. None of the four missions was 
successful. Drones either disappeared or flew their programmed routes but their intelligence 
payloads were never recovered.300 Despite the failure of TAGBOARD operations, they provide 
support for the increase initiation logic: President Nixon launched drones on an operation that 
would likely not have occurred had drones been unavailable.    
Amplified Aggression and Restrained Retaliation 
The drones operating in China were frequent targets for PLA air defenses, but the loss of 
these unmanned aircraft never triggered an escalatory American response. In November 1964, the 
Chinese government announced it had shot down a “pilotless high-altitude reconnaissance military 
plane of U.S. imperialism,” in an attack that Chinese Minister of National Defense Lin Biao praised 
as a “major victory.”301 By the end of April 1965, China claimed to have downed five American 
Firebees. The downed drones were placed on display in Beijing and were reportedly visited by 
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more than 30,000 Chinese citizens.302 The shootdowns continued over the next several years, with 
the Chinese government using each incident for propaganda purposes. In January 1968, for 
instance, a Chinese state owned newspaper published an article announcing, “The Air Force of the 
heroic Chinese People’s Liberation Army, which is boundlessly loyal to Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s 
thought and Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line, shot down a U.S. imperialist high 
altitude military reconnaissance plane when it intruded into China’s airspace over southwest China 
for reconnaissance and provocation.”303 The PLA crew was subsequently awarded medals for 
successfully downing the Firebee.304 China’s repeated attacks on American drones and the 
propagandization of shootdowns offers support for the amplified aggression hypothesis. The 
shootdowns enabled China to demonstrate its air defense capabilities to domestic audiences 
without jeopardizing the lives of American personnel, thereby reducing the likelihood of American 
retaliation. In short, the lack of captured or killed crewmembers made drone downings easy for 
Americans policymakers to publicly ignore. 
Despite the repeated drone shootdowns, the United States demonstrated restrained 
retaliation. The United States government refused to acknowledge drone operations over China 
even in the face of significant Chinese propaganda efforts. In response to Chinese media 
announcing the November 1964 shootdown, White House Press Secretary George Reedy 
commented, “I know nothing about it. This is the first I’ve heard about it.”305 The State Department 
similarly claimed they had “no information to support the Chinese claim” and the Defense 
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Department offered no comment.306 Indeed, this lack of response was intentional and pre-planned. 
Colonel Lloyd Ryan, Deputy Chief of the Reconnaissance Division at U.S. Air Force Headquarters 
during the launch of BLUE SPRINGS operations described the policy: “If they shoot one down 
and announce it publicly, don’t deny it; but don’t acknowledge it. Just reply, ‘no comment’ and 
sweat it out.”307 To further reduce the likelihood of political incidents and escalation following 
drone shootdowns over China, plans were made to either eliminate all identification markings from 
the drones or to design self-destruct mechanisms for the drones. These plans, however, were 
abandoned in favor of simply ignoring drone losses.308 As one former Ryan Aeronautics employee 
explained, “A name plate doesn’t receive the same public attention as an American pilot in 
prison.”309 
This restrained retaliation following drone shootdowns stood in contrast to the military and 
diplomatic action that sometimes accompanied the loss of American aircraft to China’s air 
defenses. To be sure, the United States did not retaliate militarily to China’s downing of manned 
aircraft that had penetrated into Chinese airspace, but it did launch search and rescue operations 
close to or in Chinese territorial airspace to recover downed crews. These efforts could lead to 
additional violations of Chinese sovereignty and created what Thomas Schelling referred to as “a 
threat that leaves something to chance,” an action that increases the potential for escalation through 
accidents, miscommunication, or additional shootdowns.310 In February 1968, for example, two 
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unarmed US Navy aircraft on a ferry flight from the Philippines to an aircraft carrier in the Gulf 
of Tonkin experienced navigational difficulties and inadvertently strayed in airspace off the coast 
of the Chinese controlled Hainan Islands in the South China Sea. Chinese MiG fighters shot down 
one of the American aircraft, prompting an emergency meeting of President Johnson and his 
foreign policy advisors to discuss how to respond. Since the aircraft had violated Chinese airspace, 
discussions focused not on military retaliation, but whether and how to rescue the downed pilot. 
The Navy’s Seventh Fleet proposed a helicopter rescue operation that would include a combat air 
patrol of Navy fighters to protect the rescue helicopter against further MiG attacks. The plan 
elicited tepid support from Johnson’s senior advisors who feared the operation could trigger 
additional Chinese attacks. Secretary of State Dean Rusk believed the risks to the helicopter crew 
were too high, asking, “Do you want to risk 3 or 4 men for 1?”311 Secretary of Defense McNamara 
voiced similar reservations: “I hate to say this Mr. President, because this pilot is one of my men. 
But I recommend against this action…There is a very high chance of losing 3 or 4 men in an effort 
to save 1. The chances are better than 50-50, perhaps 60 to 40 that this would involve us in a 
conflict with the Chinese.”312 Despite the risks, the President ordered the deployment of a 
reconnaissance aircraft that flew just outside Chinese airspace to continue the search for the 
downed crew.313 Even this move was viewed risky as it heightened the chance of inadvertent 
violations of Chinese airspace that could trigger Chinese response.314 Although the reconnaissance 
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aircraft never entered Chinese airspace, planning efforts and search operation illustrate how 
decisionmakers are willing to launch risky operations following the loss of manned aircraft – just 
as the participants did in the wargames in Chapter 5.  
The End of Overflights 
 As President Nixon’s national security staff worked to reestablish ties between Washington 
and Beijing, they began to question the value of drone missions in Chinese airspace. There was 
concern that an incident involving a reconnaissance aircraft over China could scuttle 
rapprochement efforts, much as the May 1960 U-2 incident led to the cancellation of the Paris 
Summit between President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Khrushchev.315 To be sure, President 
Nixon had approved the resumption of aerial reconnaissance missions over South China, which 
had been suspended in March 1968.316 His March 1969 authorization, however, limited overflights 
to drones and required the 303 Committee – which oversaw covert operations – to approve each 
mission.317 Despite the authorization, no missions were flown between March and October 1969 
for a variety of reasons including the EC-121 shootdown, President Nixon’s trip to Southeast Asia, 
and the easing of trade and travel restrictions between the United States and China.318   
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By October 1969, the 303 Committee began debating the need for reconnaissance 
overflights of South China to meet intelligence requirements. Despite the need for intelligence on 
Chinese support to North Vietnam, Nixon’s senior advisors remained cognizant that an incident 
could strain relations between Washington and Beijing. Indeed, the State Department opposed to 
any overflights as it was “not persuaded that the intelligence requirements and prospects of 
successful collection override the political considerations.”319 In a memo, Kissinger requested 
Nixon’s approval to conduct these missions, specifically asking the president to select between the 
Firebee drone, the new TAGBOARD drone, the manned U-2, or SR-71 spy planes. Kissinger noted 
“the risk of shoot down of an SR-71 or TAGBOARD drone is virtually zero. The U-2R has an 
average survivability factor ranging from 92.5% during each single SAM site engagement if it flies 
directly overhead to 99.6% if attacked by MiGs….The 147T [Firebee] drones have approximately 
the same survivability factors as the U-2 to attack by either SAMs or MiGs.”320 On the “action” 
section of the memo where the president could select his options, only the drones are selected.321 
This provides support for the increased initiation hypothesis. It also suggests senior 
decisionmakers view drones as presenting fundamentally lower political and operational risks than 
manned assets. As relations between China and the United States improved, Nixon ordered the 
halt of all reconnaissance flights – manned and unmanned – over China in September 1971. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Each of the three cases in this chapter – aerial reconnaissance in Cuba, North Korea, and 
China – provide opportunities to test the theory of technology-enabled escalation control. Despite 
variation in the operational setting, presidential administrations, and senior military and civilian 
advisors, decisions on the deployment of drones and on crisis escalation often played out in a 
manner consistent with the logics that underpin technology-enabled escalation control. On one 
hand, policymakers generally viewed drones as a means of carrying out military operations with a 
lower risk of political incidents and escalation relative to deployments of manned assets. As a 
result, decisionmakers used drones to launch missions – such as the deep penetrations of 
TAGBOARD drones into China – that they otherwise would not have, providing support for the 
increased initiation hypothesis. At the same time, some senior policymakers expressed concerns 
that adversaries would take aggressive moves against drones and have fewer reservations shooting 
down drones than manned aircraft. Yet, in line with the restrained retaliation logic, policymakers 
did not consider taking the same type of military reprisals to drone shootdowns that they did after 
attacks on manned platforms.  
 To be sure, decisionmakers did not always behave in a way that technology-enabled 
escalation control might expect. Policymakers did not always respond with escalatory military 
retaliation in response to attacks on manned aircraft.  After the downing of the U-2 over Cuba and 
North Korea’s attack on the EC-121, senior civilian and military leaders contemplated launching 
military reprisals, but because of broader political and strategic considerations, tempered their 
responses. In both cases, however, decisionmakers planned for retaliatory action and came close 
to launching these military reprisals. In the Cuban case, airstrikes were never launched because 
the threat of escalation encouraged Khrushchev to negotiate a settlement that ended the missile 
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crisis. And in the North Korean case, Nixon almost certainly refrained from launching retaliatory 
strikes because of the circumstances surrounding the quagmire in Vietnam. Even without military 
action, incidents involving manned assets generally heightened crisis escalation – often in the form 
of military mobilizations or intrusive search and rescue operations – more than incidents involving 
drones, which garnered little, if any public attention.  
In other cases, policymaker behavior deviated from the expectations of technology-enabled 
escalation control by opting to employ manned assets even when drones were available. Indeed, 
drones were used far less frequently than manned reconnaissance aircraft during the Cold War.322 
While this seemingly runs counter to the increased initiation hypothesis, military and civilian 
decisionmakers typically weighed the tradeoffs of drones and inhabited platforms. President 
Kennedy’s and Johnson’s advisors, for instance, chose to deploy manned assets over Cuba because 
they believed manned assets were less vulnerable to shootdown than drones, more effective at 
collecting intelligence than drones, and because they did not want to reveal a new and sensitive 
capability to rivals. As drones have developed and become increasingly capable, these tradeoffs 
between risk and capability have become less apparent. Drone capabilities have improved 
significantly, and in some areas – such as endurance and maneuverability – have exceeded the 
capabilities of many manned assets. These increased capabilities, however, have also pushed the 
costs of acquiring and operating drones closer to those of manned assets. This introduces a new 
set of calculations for decisionmakers to contend with. Despite these higher costs, the lower risk 
of friendly casualties and the corresponding reduction in political risks associated with drone 
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operations, means that remotely operated systems will likely remain an attractive tool with which 
to initiate military operations.  
 Beyond offering evidence for and highlighting the limits of technology-enabled escalation 
control, the case studies in this chapter demonstrate that senior civilian and military policymakers 
often hold beliefs that generally align with those of the general public and more junior military 
personnel. Indeed, the logic, assumptions, and preferences of policymakers at the highest level of 
American government during the Cold War were often similar to those of the survey respondents 
and wargame participants in chapters 4 and 5. Their calls for aggressive and escalatory responses 
to the loss of manned aircraft, however, did not always translate into military action because of 
broader geopolitical realities that are not fully captured in wargames and survey experiments. This 
highlights the value of a multimethod approach in gathering a more complete understanding of 
both the logics that drive decision-making and the actual policymaking process. While this chapter 
finds broad support for technology-enabled escalation control in the United States, the next chapter 
examines whether the theory holds in a different political, military, and threat environment: Israel. 
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Chapter 7  
 




 The previous chapter assesses technology-enabled escalation control in the context of the 
United States’ drone use during the Cold War. While the three nested cases in that chapter feature 
variation across presidential administrations, senior policy advisors, and operating environments, 
they focus on the use of drones purely for reconnaissance missions and during operations against 
Communist rivals. To examine whether drones contribute to technology-enabled escalation control 
in other states and operational environments, this chapter investigates Israel’s development and 
use of drones. Israel represents an ideal test for technology-enabled escalation control for two key 
reasons. First, Israel is one of the world’s largest drone producers and was the first state to employ 
armed drones operationally. This extended operational history, which includes periods of relative 
peace and conventional combat, allows me to examine how the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and 
Israel’s intelligence community employ drones across a range of operating contexts and missions 
– including both reconnaissance and armed strike. Second, the threat environment Israel faces is 
vastly different than that of the United States. Unlike the United States, which deployed its drones 
thousands of miles from home shores, Israel frequently uses drones in its near abroad against 
threats perceived as more existentially threatening.  
 Drawing from analysis of published sources and interviews with senior Israeli officials, 
including former national security advisors and IDF generals, this chapter provides support for 
elements of technology-enabled escalation control.1 Like the United States, Israel developed 
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drones as a means of carrying out operations in denied or contested areas with reduced risk to 
friendly personnel. The decreased political risks associated with captured or killed personnel led 
to the increased use of drones to support both peacetime and combat military operations from the 
1960s through today. Indeed, many senior officials commented that drones enabled Israel to extend 
the length of the “campaigns between wars” – periods of low intensity conflict between large scale 
force-on-force confrontations.2 In other words, drones allowed Israel to temper and tailor targeting 
in a way that Israeli policymakers believed helped control escalation. Specifically, by enabling 
tailored airstrikes on high value targets, drones allowed Israel to counter potential threats before  
large scale military operations were needed. At the same time, the cases examined in this chapter 
provide support for the other logics associated with technology-enabled escalation control. Israeli 
national security practitioners, for instance, discussed their greater willingness to deploy drones 
than manned assets on high-risk missions, providing support for the increased initiation 
hypothesis. Israel has also restrained retaliation following the loss of drones – often opting to 
ignore losses over adversary territory. This chapter begins by tracing the history of Israeli drone 
development and then explores how drone operations extend the “campaign between wars” by 
examining Israel’s reported use of drones to carry out missions in Lebanon and Sudan. 
ISRAEL’S DRONE DEVELOPMENT 
 Surrounded by potential rivals, Israel has long needed to monitor the military capabilities 
and intentions of its neighbors. In the first two decades of its existence, Israel engaged in a series 
of wars with its neighbors, who sought to eliminate the new state. Both during these wars and the 
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periods between them, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and its predecessors flew reconnaissance 
missions to track the forces of Israel’s adversaries, helping to target them during wartime and 
minimize the likelihood of surprise attacks in the periods between large wars. Indeed, one of the 
nascent Israeli Air Force’s first missions was conducting reconnaissance flights that peered into 
the territory of potential rivals.3 These early missions often relied on civilian aircraft that were 
vulnerable to enemy fire, although these outmoded utility and transport planes were soon 
supplanted by tactical reconnaissance aircraft that were more survivable in the face of adversary 
air defenses.4 
 The proliferation of Soviet produced air defense systems throughout the Middle East – 
including the same surface-to-air missiles that had downed U-2s in China, Cuba, and the Soviet 
Union – soon increased the threat to IAF operations.5 Despite the increased risks, Israel’s military 
and intelligence services still needed a means of gathering intelligence on the state’s increasingly 
threatening neighbors. This need increased significantly after Israel’s victory in the Six Day War 
in June 1967, when it gained control of territory in the Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, and Golan 
Heights. In each of these areas, Israeli forces needed the ability to see beyond their new borders to 
protect themselves from adversary activity.  
Intelligence collection was a particularly challenging task along the Suez Canal. Although 
the Six Day War led to Israeli control of the Sinai Peninsula up to the east bank of the canal, Israeli 
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troops could not simply look across the waterway to monitor the status of Egyptian forces. To 
hinder Israel’s intelligence collection efforts and to complicate any Israeli assault across the canal, 
Egypt had constructed 30-foot high sand barriers along the western side of the canal. The IDF 
initially built observation posts to allow troops to look over the barriers, but Egyptian snipers soon 
started taking shots at Israeli observers.6 Israel could also not easily mount aerial reconnaissance 
missions due to Egypt’s deployment of surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery batteries to 
the region. Aircraft flying at low altitudes were at risk of being shot down, while aircraft operating 
at higher altitudes could not collect imagery of sufficiently high resolution to meet IDF and 
intelligence requirements.7 As a result, Israel relied primarily on complex human intelligence 
operations to gather information on Egyptian military activity just across the canal. Israeli 
intelligence agents posing as Egyptians would travel to the Suez Canal via Europe, take photos, 
then take the same circuitous European route back to Israel. Such an approach was both risky and 
time consuming – and in the minds of some IDF intelligence officers, illogical. Indeed, IDF 
intelligence Major Shabtai Brill asked, “We need to launch such an operation to get a single photo 
of what is happening just over the canal?”8 
Brill and his colleagues set off to develop a less risky and more expedient means of 
gathering intelligence on Egyptian forces using small, remote controlled hobby aircraft. After 
securing initial approval from his superiors, Brill devised a plan for the IDF’s first drone fleet: 
three remote controlled airplanes equipped with 35-millimeter cameras with timers programmed 
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to capture a photo every 10 seconds.9 Despite the low risk and low cost of the IDF’s first drones, 
some senior officers were concerned that Egyptian air defenses could easily down the planes. After 
demonstrating the aircraft were too small a target, the IDF approved the small drones for their first 
mission in July 1969. The drones flew over a town along the Suez Canal, gathering high resolution 
imagery that revealed the location of Egyptian trenches, equipment, and communications cables, 
critical information for Israeli military planners.10 The mission was deemed a success and the 
drones were soon deployed on missions over Jordanian positions along Israel’s eastern border. The 
operational effectiveness of these missions led Major General Aharon Yariv, head of IDF military 
intelligence, to establish a team to design a sturdier drone that could be integrated into IDF 
operations.11 Although the program was cancelled after a series of crashes, the cancellation did not 
mark the end of Israeli drone development and operations efforts.  
During the War of Attrition (1967-1970) that followed the Six Day War, Egypt, Jordan, 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization carried out artillery attacks, commando raids, and aerial 
and naval operations against Israeli forces and territory.12 These actions posed a threat to Israel 
that demanded additional intelligence collection, while simultaneously making aerial 
reconnaissance operations more difficult. The greatest threats to Israel’s air operations were 
Egypt’s deployment of MiG fighter jets – including some piloted by Soviet personnel – and 
recently acquired Soviet-built SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems close to the canal 
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zone. The losses these systems inflicted on IAF aircraft led Israeli policymakers to consider 
acquiring new reconnaissance platforms that would reduce the risk to Israel’s pilots. Candidates 
included the French-produced Mirage IV and a variety of remotely piloted drones. The Mirage IV 
was deemed too susceptible to Egyptian air defenses, leaving remotely piloted aircraft as the best 
alternative.13  Despite resistance from senior air force officials who believed drones challenged the 
prestige of fighter pilots, the IDF began the search for a reconnaissance drone.14 The continuing 
losses of Israeli aircraft over the canal, including at least two RF-4 tactical reconnaissance jets, 
reinforced the IAF’s need for unmanned reconnaissance assets.15 
The IAF soon turned its attention to acquiring drones from Ryan Aeronautics, the same 
company that produced the Lightning Bug drones that the United States had deployed in Southeast 
Asia and China. The IAF hosted a Ryan Aeronautics delegation in March 1970 and began custom 
designing a reconnaissance drone that could be used for operations over the Suez.16 The export of 
a military drone, however, required U.S. government approval. The acquisition of drones was such 
a priority for the Israeli government that Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, 
specifically requested drones in a 1970 letter to President Nixon and raised the issue again during 
a meeting with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in July 1970.17 Rabin lamented that Israel faced 
a significant threat from Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles and could not allow the Soviets and 
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Egyptians to gain air superiority over the Suez Canal. To enable Israel to target these air defense 
sites more precisely, Rabin explained that the IAF first needed to be able to locate them. To do 
this, Rabin asked for 24 Ryan Aeronautics drones in addition to manned tactical reconnaissance 
jets, fighter bombers, and munitions.18 
The State Department granted approval for the transfer of Ryan drones, dubbed the Model 
124I and the first demonstration flight took place in the Sinai desert in August 1971. Just one 
month later, the IAF began flying the 124Is on operational flights through Egyptian airspace. The 
first of these missions flew over Egyptian SAM sites, while subsequent missions collected imagery 
of gun and missile emplacements west of the Suez Canal.19 Although Israel reportedly lost at least 
two 124Is during operations over Egypt, the IAF did not publicly release information on these 
losses in line with the restrained retaliation logic. Missions flown using 124I drones contributed 
to the stream of information informing Israel’s military and intelligence services, but the 
intelligence was not enough to help Israeli analysts anticipate the multi-front surprise attack 
launched by Israel’s Arab neighbors in October 1973.20 
Drones continued to play a role during the Yom Kippur War, serving as both decoys to 
draw anti-aircraft fire and as a reconnaissance platform collecting intelligence over targets in 
Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, where they helped cue Israeli airstrikes.21 Although the escalation to 
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war had already occurred, deploying drones in lieu of manned assets prevented unnecessarily 
endangering Israeli airmen. Indeed, Colonel Eliezer Cohen, who commanded an IAF airbase 
during the war noted, “All the aircraft that Syria prided herself on having shot down after the war 
were pilotless.”22 The drones demonstrated their utility during the Yom Kippur War, but suffered 
from an important limitation. Because intelligence from the 124I drones could only be analyzed 
once the film was off-loaded after a mission, there was a considerable delay between when the 
intelligence was collected and when it might be incorporated into the planning of military 
operations. As a result, many airstrikes were launched on empty sites where air defense forces had 
previously positioned mobile surface-to-air missile launchers.23 This led IDF leaders to call for the 
development of more advanced drones that could transmit intelligence to commanders and analysts 
in near-real time.24 These systems could further reduce the need to deploy manned aircraft and 
ground observers into hostile territory, and could allow the IDF to tailor targeting against 
adversaries.  
The task of managing development of the new drone fell to Brigadier General Uzi Eilam, 
then head of the IDF’s Military Research and Development Unit. The initial drones Eilam hoped 
to acquire would provide commanders with tactical and operational intelligence, while avoiding 
the type of manned aircraft losses Israel had suffered during the Yom Kippur War.25 The result of 
the drone development efforts were the Scout and Mestiff unmanned aerial vehicles, relatively 
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small aircraft that could stream video footage to commanders in real time.26  Although the drones 
were ready for operational use by the mid-to-late 1970s, many senior IDF officers felt they should 
be preserved for the next major war to avoid revealing sensitive capabilities to rivals. Their views 
mirrored those of American commanders like General Curtis LeMay who had blocked drone 
flights over Cuba in the 1960s for fear that Soviets would learn about the Air Force’s new 
unmanned aircraft. IDF General Headquarters, however, ordered that the systems be used in “daily 
wars,” enabling the IDF to refine its drone tactics and technology.27  
Over the next two decades, the IDF built an increasingly capable drone fleet and gained 
considerable operational expertise deploying drones in both combat and non-combat scenarios. 
Drones played a critical role helping to pinpoint Syrian missile sites during Israel’s 1982 air 
campaign in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley and were later used to monitor Israel’s security zone in 
southern Lebanon.28 By the early 1990s, Israel had equipped some of its reconnaissance drones 
with laser designators that allowed the remotely piloted aircraft to locate targets for airstrikes 
carried out using manned platforms such as fighter jets and attack helicopters.29 By the 2000s, 
Israel had armed several of its drones, employing them during operations in Lebanon and Gaza.30 
By arming drones, the IDF could more rapidly conduct precision airstrikes on targets as the drones 
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could carry out strikes without waiting for a manned aircraft. For the IDF drones were essential 
for tailored targeting missions, often in areas considered too risky for Israeli ground or air forces.  
EXTENDING THE CAMPAIGN BETWEEN WARS 
 Having experienced conflicts with both state and non-state actors, Israel adopted a national 
security strategy aimed at prolonging the length of time between conventional conflicts. These 
periods, referred to as “campaigns between wars,” are free of large-scale force on force 
confrontations, but still feature significant, albeit smaller-scale, military activity.31 During these 
campaigns between wars, Israel continues to wage aggressive counter-terrorism operations, carry 
out covert action against state rivals – like its 2007 raid on a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor, and 
face terrorist attacks.32 Israeli national security decisionmakers believe these limited operations 
deter rivals and degrade their warfighting capability, thereby preventing escalation to larger, and 
more destabilizing, conflicts.33 Policymakers fear a large-scale war would involve the mobilization 
of Israel’s reserve forces and involve attacks on the Israeli population, triggering downturns in 
tourism and the economy – events Israel’s political leaders seek to avoid.34 Instead of operations 
aimed at achieving decisive victory or gaining control of territory, campaigns between wars focus 
on more limited objectives such as targeting individual actors or critical resources and installations. 
As one former Israeli deputy national security advisor explained, “Israel can destroy if we are 
forced to destroy, but we can avoid this by using options that are lower on the policy menu – 
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‘starters before the main course.’”35 The principle of extending the campaigns between wars was 
formalized in August 2015, when Israel’s Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Gadi 
Eizenkot, incorporated it into Israel’s national defense doctrine.36 
Yaakov Amidror, Israel’s National Security Advisor between 2011 and 2013, described 
drones as an ideal tool with which to implement the policy of extending the length of campaigns 
between wars, explaining that “drones allow states to do many little things instead of going to 
war.”37 In other words, military technology that allowed Israel to carry out precise strikes against 
its rivals with little risk to friendly forces, provided an alternative to initiating large-scale military 
operations. Another former senior policy advisor argued that “the range of choices is much more 
sophisticated” when drones are available, allowing Israel to avoid “massive and decisive action” 
against its adversaries.38  
For senior Israeli decisionmakers, drones feature several characteristics that make them 
well suited for carrying out operations that extend the campaigns between wars. First, the lack of 
friendly personnel onboard makes drones easier to deploy on high risk missions than manned 
assets. As a former Director of the IDF’s Strategic Planning Division explained, “Drones make the 
use of force easier. They cancel the possibility that you will lose a solider – either killed or as a 
prisoner of war.”39 Senior Israeli military officers feared that losing personnel could lead drag the 
IDF into drawn out, dangerous, and manpower intensive search and rescue operations behind 
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enemy lines, and result in domestic political pressure for additional military action. These risks are 
particularly great in cases involving captured IDF personnel. As one retired IDF general explained, 
“The POW situation is more difficult. When someone is killed there is a funeral, but then people 
move on. When someone falls into the hands of the other side, you hear about them all the time in 
the media. This has a much deeper impact…and becomes a long saga with a very deep impact on 
society.”40 
Second, Israeli decisionmakers view drones as offering a set of military and intelligence 
collection capabilities that are particularly useful for waging campaigns between wars.41 
Specifically, many of the IDF’s drones have long endurance and range. This allows Israel’s 
military and intelligence community to track small, mobile targets – like terrorist leaders or arms 
shipments – for extended periods of time. In other words, drones can generally linger over a target 
for far longer than a manned aircraft can, gathering information that builds “pattern of life” – 
information about the daily routines associated with a target. Analysts can use this information to 
verify the identity of a target and identify the best time to strike, to avoid civilian casualties.42 
These more precise and accurate strikes allows Israel to tailor targeting to individual actors or 
facilities in an effort to avoid civilian casualties or collateral damage that often trigger blowback 
and more intense retaliation by Israel’s adversaries. For Israel, avoiding collateral damage and 
civilian casualties is critical not only to abide by the law of armed conflict, but also for public 
relations purposes. The precise targeting that drones enable helps Israel avoid the propagandization 
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of civilian deaths by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.43 The long range of many IDF drones also 
allows Israel to conduct operations far beyond its borders without the need for complex refueling 
operations. Additionally, the IDF’s armed drones are able to complete all multiple phases of the 
targeting cycle: finding a target, fixing the target’s location, tracking the target, targeting it, 
engaging the target with missiles, and then assessing the effectiveness of the airstrike.44 This 
enables the IDF to carry out operations with fewer assets than required prior the advent of drones, 
when multiple reconnaissance missions and separate aircraft for intelligence collection and strike 
operations were needed.  
 The sections that follow examine two types of operations where Israel has employed 
drones: targeted killings – or assassinations – of Israel’s rivals and precision airstrikes on military 
equipment being transported to Israel’s adversaries. The cases demonstrate that Israel’s use of 
drones appears to align with several tenets of technology-enabled escalation control. Israeli 
decisionmakers appear more willing to launch high risk operations when drones are available, 
providing evidence for the increased initiation logic. Drones have also allowed Israeli 
commanders to launch strikes that involve more tailored targeting than large-scale airstrikes or 
conventional ground operations. In the minds of Israeli decisionmakers, these tailored strikes help 
prevent Israel’s adversaries from launching larger and more destabilizing attacks. Finally, relative 
to attacks on manned assets, Israel has exercised more restrained retaliation following the loss of 
its unmanned drones than the loss of manned assets during the campaign between wars.  
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Targeted Killings  
 In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States waged a drone campaign to 
eliminate suspected terrorists in places like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.45 Although the United 
States’ targeted killing program attracted the attention of policymakers and the international 
community, Israel pioneered the practice of “selective targeting” using drones to target a state’s 
rivals in the early 1990s. Using drones to support or carry out targeted killings represented an 
evolution in Israel’s long record of assassinating its rivals. Even before the advent of drones, 
Israel’s intelligence and military services relied on a range of tactics – including teams of assassins 
and the conventional bombing of rival’s headquarters – to eliminate adversaries of the state.46 
Drones, however, offered a new means of carrying out selective targeting that involved relatively 
low risk to Israeli personnel and provided the ability to tailor targeting to minimize the risks of 
civilian casualties or collateral damage.   
Targeting leadership and technical experts in a terrorist organization can degrade the 
group’s ability to operate.47 Eliminating senior leaders can weaken command and control, create 
power struggles as members seek to fill leadership vacuums, and cause senior leaders to alter their 
behavior for fear of becoming targets themselves.48 Similarly, targeting technical experts, like 
bomb makers, can degrade a group’s operational capacity. Using drones to carry out these 
operations can reduce the need for missions such as ground force raids that expose friendly 
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personnel to greater risk. Israel’s special operations forces, for instance, have suffered casualties 
when carrying out operations in the Gaza Strip, making drones a more attractive alternative.49  
They also offer an alternative to operations like large ground incursions or shelling that pose higher 
levels of risk to civilians or infrastructure surrounding the intended target. Reducing the risk of 
friendly and civilian casualties may subsequently mitigate the likelihood of escalation that could 
be triggered by reprisals for the loss of friendly personnel or local civilians.  
Israel’s first known use of drones to support a selective targeting operation occurred in 
February 1992, when drones enabled the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary General Abbas al 
Moussawi. Israeli intelligence suspected that al Moussawi would attend a memorial service in the 
city of Jibchit in southern Lebanon. The IDF decided to track al Moussawi’s motorcade using an 
IAF drone and collect intelligence that could be used to plan a future operation in which al 
Moussawi would be abducted and exchanged for Israelis held by Hezbollah. On the day of the 
memorial ceremony, IAF drone pilots searched for al Moussawi’s motorcade using intelligence 
gleaned from human sources. Once al Moussawi’s motorcade was located, drones tracked the 
vehicles as they moved from the memorial ceremony to a compound where al Moussawi was 
meeting with other Hezbollah leaders. Intelligence analysts assessed with high certainty that al 
Moussawi was traveling in the motorcade, and critically, that there was little chance that Iranian 
or Lebanese government officials were traveling with him.50 
Although the initial plan called only for an intelligence collection mission, IDF Chief of 
General Staff Ehud Barak advocated for more aggressive action. On the day of the mission, Barak 
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received Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s authorization to assassinate al Moussawi – in part 
because of the high-quality intelligence gathered by the drone tracking al Moussawi’s motorcade. 
Barak ordered the IAF to scramble armed Apache attack helicopters to the motorcade’s location, 
which drone operators relayed to the Apache pilots. After receiving the target location, the attack 
helicopters launched a series of airstrikes, killing al Moussawi, his wife and son, and four members 
of al Moussawi’s entourage.51 This drone-enabled targeted killing represents a case where Israel 
carried out an operation that would likely not have occurred had drones not been available as a 
low risk means of collecting intelligence on al Moussawi’s location, providing support for the 
increased initiation hypothesis.  
In the years after al Moussawi’s assassination, targeted killings involving drones became a 
standard practice for Israel’s military and intelligence services. In some cases, armed drones would 
both locate a target and then carry out a strike. In others, drones were used in coordination with 
intelligence and special operations forces or manned assets.52 Other high-profile leaders that Israel 
selectively targeted using drones included the Hamas military chief, Ahmed Jabari in 2012 and a 
senior Hezbollah field commander in Syria in 2015.53 Israeli national security policymakers 
viewed these tailored targeting efforts as a means to eliminate threats to Israel and extend the 
length of periods between wars by degrading an organization’s ability to carry out attacks against 
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Israel.54 To be sure, killing senior leaders can trigger escalation.55 Hezbollah retaliated for al 
Moussawi’s assassination by shelling Israel, bombing a synagogue in Turkey, and attacking the 
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.56 Similarly, Hamas launched a volley of rockets into Israel after 
Jabari was killed and launched suicide attacks on Israeli targets after attacks on other senior 
leaders.57 While these acts represent escalations in the use of force, some analysts suggest these 
retaliatory acts are relatively limited in nature. They are also likely to generate fewer casualties 
than those that would result if the groups were left to operate unchecked.58 In turn, smaller numbers 
of casualties might allow Israel to take less significant reprisals, helping prevent the outbreak of 
larger and more intense military confrontations.  
Interdicting Advanced Weapons 
 A second approach that Israel has used to extend the periods between wars is destroying 
weapon shipments en route to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. In many instances, these strikes 
are carried out far from Israel’s borders, before the weapons can threaten Israeli territory and 
citizens. The attacks are intended to degrade a rival’s capabilities, deter their activity, and 
ultimately prevent adversaries from taking actions that could lead to larger escalation.59 To be sure, 
Israel carried out targeted strikes on targets considered to pose an existential threat even without 
the use of drones. For example, the IAF destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and 
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attacked a Syrian reactor in 2007.60  The expansion of Israel’s drone fleet, however, increased the 
state’s ability to conduct tailored targeting operations against an expanded set of targets. 
 Drones are an ideal asset for monitoring and striking targets outside of Israel, particularly 
those that are highly mobile – like arms shipments. The lack of personnel onboard a drone provides 
Israel with plausible deniability in the event of shootdowns or crashes, decreasing the political risk 
associated with operations. Drones also provide useful tactical benefits that can increase the 
effectiveness of precision strike missions against both mobile and stationary targets. Their long 
endurance enables them to monitor targets, a more difficult task for manned reconnaissance assets 
with shorter dwell times. Armed drones also allow Israel to track moving targets and then execute 
a strike, without the need for other assets.  
 In January 2009, Israel employed this approach when it used drones to destroy a 
consignment of weapons being smuggled from Iran to Gaza through Egypt and Sudan. Israeli 
intelligence identified a shipment of advanced weaponry – including Fajr-3 rockets – that had been 
off-loaded from a ship in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The shipment was being prepared for 
overland transport. Rockets like the Fajr-3 were perceived as a significant threat to Israel’s 
security; their 43-kilometer range allowed them to reach several Israeli cities when launched from 
the Gaza Strip.61 These attacks often triggered escalatory Israeli retaliatory airstrikes and raids. To 
prevent the rockets from being used against Israel and the associated escalation, the Israeli 
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government decided to destroy the arms shipment. The Israeli military, however, had a narrow 
window in which to act. Attacking or capturing the weapons in Egypt was unlikely because of the 
delicate diplomatic relationship between Israel and Egypt. Waiting until the shipment reached 
Gaza was not practical either because Hamas would quickly stash the equipment in its network of 
tunnels and safehouses. Once hidden, Israel’s intelligence services and military would have 
difficulty locating the rockets. Even if the rockets were found, launching special forces raids or 
airstrikes to destroy them would be challenging because of the Hamas-controlled operating 
environment and the threat of civilian casualties and collateral damage when carrying out airstrikes 
in urban areas.62 
 These political and operational challenges led Israeli decisionmakers to develop plans to 
strike the arms convoy as it traveled through Sudan. Israel could more easily track the convoy as 
it drove along dessert roads. Further, launching airstrikes at trucks on these isolated roads carried 
relatively low risk of civilian casualties or collateral damage. Drones were viewed as the ideal 
asset to support the strike operation. As an Israeli security source explained, “with a moving target 
with no definite time for the move, UAVs are best as they can hover extremely high and remain 
unseen until the target is on the move.”63 Upon receiving political authorization from civilian 
leaders, an IAF Heron TP reconnaissance drone was launched to track the rocket-transporting as 
it moved through the Sudanese desert.64 Once the reconnaissance drone pinpointed the location of 
                                                        
62 Katz and Bohbot, The Weapon Wizards, 72–75. 
63 Quoted in Uzi Mahnaimi, “Israeli Drones Destroy Rocket Smuggling Convoys in Sudan,” The Sunday Times, March 
29, 2009, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/israeli-drones-destroy-rocket-smuggling-convoys-in-sudan-
rp5sgvbp5jt. 
64 Interviews with a former Deputy National Security Advisor, a military aide to the Israeli Prime Minister, and a 
former head of IDF Strategic Planning all indicate that the use of drones outside of Israel’s borders generally requires 
approval from the office of the Prime Minister.  
 257 
the arms shipment, armed Hermes 450 drones were dispatched to strike the convoy with air-to-
ground missiles, destroying 23 trucks and killing 43 smugglers.65  
Although some media reports suggested that the strikes were conducted by F-16 and F-15 
fighter-bombers in addition to the Hermes 450 drones, the airstrikes would likely not have occured 
had drones not offered a low-risk means of tracking a moving convoy thousands of miles from 
Israel.66 Without drones, Israeli intelligence could have opted to deploy special operations forces 
to Sudan, launched manned aircraft into Sudan’s airspace, or relied on satellite imagery to track 
the shipment. Dispatching ground forces to Sudan and operating manned aircraft for extended 
periods in Sudan’s airspace to track the convoy would have exposed IDF personnel to significant 
risk of attack or capture. And satellites might not have been able to provide the type and rate of 
data needed to track mobile targets.67 In other words, without drones, Israel may have been unable 
to track and subsequently target the rocket shipment, potentially allowing the rockets to enter Gaza. 
From there, the rockets could be used against Israel, triggering a military reprisal. Drones, 
therefore, likely enabled Israel to carry out a mission it might not otherwise have launched, 
providing support for the increased initiation hypothesis. 
 The January raid was deemed a success. In a veiled statement shortly after the strike, then 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert commented, “We operate in many places near and far and 
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carry out strikes in a manner that strengthens our deterrence.”68 In the years that followed, Israel 
conducted a series of additional strikes on weapons shipments transiting through Sudan. A strike 
in February 2009, for instance, reportedly killed an additional 40 smugglers and destroyed 12 more 
containers of Iranian weapons bound for Gaza.69 Then in 2011, Israel reportedly launched an 
airstrike on a car occupied by Hamas arms smugglers in Port Sudan.70 The following year, Sudan’s 
government accused Israel of attacking an arms factory in Khartoum.71 Although the Israeli 
officials made no public comment about these attacks, analysts noted that armed IAF drones could 
have carried out the operations.72 In each of these cases, drones provided a lower risk means of 
carrying out operations – either intelligence collection or armed strikes – intended to prevent 
Israel’s adversaries from receiving the arms needed to launch larger and more escalatory 
operations. Indeed, as a former Israeli National Security Advisor explained, “Drones open the 
space for decisionmakers to maneuver short of war.”73 
 While no Israeli personnel were reported lost during these operations in Sudan, Israel 
reportedly lost a drone over Sudan in 2015. In May 2015, Sudan’s military announced it had 
“toppled an Israeli drone that infiltrated its airspace.”74 Israel’s response to the reported shootdown 
                                                        
68 “How Israel Foiled an Arms Convoy Bound for Hamas.” 
69 Katz and Bohbot, The Weapon Wizards, 76. 
70 Avi Issacharoff, Amos Harel, and Yossi Melman, “Air Strike on Car in Port Sudan Kills Two,” Haaretz, April 6, 
2011, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5147572; Ian Black, “‘Israeli Attack’ on Sudanese Arms Factory Offers Glimpse of 
Secret War,” The Guardian, October 25, 2012, sec. World news, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/25/israeli-sudanese-factory-secret-war. 
71 Black, “‘Israeli Attack’ on Sudanese Arms Factory Offers Glimpse of Secret War.” 
72 Black. 
73 Interview with IDF Major General (Retired) Yaakov Amidror. 
74 Jack Khoury, “Sudan Army Says It Toppled Israeli Drone That Infiltrated Its Air Space,” Haaretz, May 6, 2015, 
https://www.haaretz.com/sudan-army-says-it-toppled-israeli-drone-1.5358963; Ari Yashar, “Sudan Claims It Shot 
Down Israeli Drone,” Arutz Sheva, May 6, 2015, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/195049; Some 
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aligned with the expectations of the restrained retaliation logic. Official Israeli spokespersons 
offered no comment, while one Israeli defense source informed reporters that no Israeli drone had 
been shot down over Sudan.75 Israel initiated no observable retaliatory action for the downing. 
This lack of a response makes sense. Many Israeli officers viewed that the loss of a drone as falling 
below the threshold of action that necessitates a military response. One IDF intelligence officer 
commented that “nobody cares when a drone is lost.”76 Another retired IAF brigadier general 
explained that the use of “unmanned [aircraft] gives decisionmakers freedom. There is no need to 
respond if you don’t want to after a drone is shot down.”77 In other words, decisionmakers could 
easily deescalate after the loss of a drone to hostile fire. 
The absence of response to drone downings was vastly different from Israel’s actions 
following the loss of manned IAF assets during campaigns between wars. For instance, Israel 
launched a massive, multi-decade search for IAF navigator Ron Arad after he was captured in 
Lebanon in 1986. The operation involved numerous military, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts 
including commando raids that led to additional Israeli casualties, an offer of financial aid to Iran 
in exchange for information on Arad, and the capture of Hezbollah members for interrogation.78 
More recently, Syria’s shootdown of an Israeli F-16 fighter jet in February 2018 led Israel to launch 
                                                        
reports noted that Sudanese officials did not identify the drone as Israeli, “Sudan Unsure Where Downed Drone Came 
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75 “Sudan Unsure Where Downed Drone Came From.” 
76 Interview with IDF Intelligence Officer (Reserve).  
77 Interview with IAF Brigadier General (Retired), Former UAV Base Commander, 28 August 2016, Herzliya, Israel.   
78 Ronen Bergman, “Israel Offered Iran Billions for Arad,” YNet News, December 22, 2005, 
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a massive series of airstrikes that reportedly destroyed more than half of Syria’s air defenses.79 
Even though the Israeli pilot survived the shootdown, Israel targeted radar and missile sites 
throughout Syria in retaliation for the jet’s downing. As in the findings in the survey experiments 
and wargames fielded on U.S. military personnel, Israeli decisionmakers seem more apt to take 
escalatory retaliatory after the loss of manned platforms than remotely piloted ones. 
CONCLUSION 
 Israel’s use of drones to target Hezbollah and Hamas leaders and to interdict shipments of 
advanced weapons provides support for technology-enabled escalation control. Despite having a 
threat environment, domestic political context, and leadership structure that differs from the United 
States, Israeli national security policymakers shared several of assumptions and decision-making 
logics with their American counterparts described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. For instance, Israeli 
decisionmakers launched missions that perhaps would not have been carried out had drones not 
been available as a low risk means of collecting intelligence or carrying out airstrikes. They also 
demonstrated greater restraint in responding to the loss of drones over enemy territory. At the same 
time, the cases analyzed in this chapter illustrate how Israel has used drones in efforts to carry out 
tailored targeting of its rivals’ leadership and material resources, something not tested in the 
preceding chapters.80 The findings of these case studies suggest technology-enabled escalation 
control is generalizable beyond the U.S. case.  
 Drones appear to have played an important role in implementing Israel’s military doctrine 
of increasing the length of campaigns between wars. Indeed, senior Israeli policymakers believe 
                                                        
79 Harel, “Israel Believes Syria Strikes Took out Nearly Half of Assad’s Air Defenses.” 
80 Kinetic targeting was not examined in the U.S. case studies in Chapter 6 because the United States did not use 
drones to support targeting operations outside of combat zones during the Cold War.  
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that using drones to carry out or support military operations with limited objectives can help 
control escalation to broader and more destabilizing large-scale conflicts. Specifically, drones have 
allowed Israel to increase initiation of operations that would have been too dangerous or unfeasible 
had remotely operated aircraft not been in Israel’s arsenal. Drones enabled Israel to carry out 
precision strikes in areas thousands of miles from Israeli territory and to collect detailed 
intelligence on small and mobile targets closer to home, allowing the IDF to carry out tailored 
targeting missions with lower risks of both friendly and inadvertent civilian casualties.  
After missions are launched, Israel’s responses to the loss of drones during the campaigns 
between wars aligns with the expectations of the restrained retaliation hypothesis. The reported 
loss of an Israeli drone over Sudan in 2015, for instance, triggered no response from the IDF.81 
Israel has adopted similar responses to other drone losses such as Iran’s reported shootdown of an 
IDF drone in 2014 and the loss of an Israeli drone over Lebanon in 2015.82 These muted responses 
stand in stark contrast to cases where Israel has launched massive military reprisals or search 
operations following the loss of manned aircraft. 
 Israel’s use of drones to conduct operations to extend the length of the campaigns between 
wars will likely persist given Israel’s less than hospitable neighborhood. Indeed, Israel’s strategic 
environment became even more challenging in the years following the Arab Spring. While Israel 
continued to face challenges from groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, other actors – including Iran 
and Russia – became increasingly active in Israel’s backyard during the Syrian Civil War. The 
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presence of these militarily capable actors has bolstered the capabilities of Israel’s regional rivals 
through arms transfers and increases Israel’s intelligence requirements.83 For senior Israeli national 
security officials, drones provide a means of providing for Israel’s security while mitigating the 
risks of escalation. As the commander of an IAF drone squadron explained in 2016, “The Russians 
are now in the Mediterranean, challenging our presence. How do we continue to guard our borders 
and assets without approaching the wrong vessel, being shot down, and dragging the country into 
a diplomatic adventure?”84  
Because of this changing security environment, the IAF expanded its drone fleet 
throughout the 2000s and 2010s, replacing several manned platforms with remotely piloted ones. 
For instance, the IAF replaced the manned King Air intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
aircraft used to monitor the Israeli coastline with Israeli-produced drones. Israeli defense analysts 
noted that the move “decreases risk to personnel…and is efficient from a budgetary standpoint 
[because] it costs less to maintain drones.”85 This trend will likely continue. Indeed, the growing 
reliance on drone aircraft has increased the number of drone flight hours significantly. By 2016, 
drones had the highest number of flying hours of any type of aircraft in the IAF fleet.86 The 
increased demand for drones suggests they will play an expanding role in Israel’s military 
operations – allowing Israel to continue extending the length of the campaigns between wars and 
avoid destabilizing escalation.  
                                                        
83 Interview with Israeli Defense Expert/Defense Correspondent, 4 March 2018, Rehovot, Israel.  
84 Draft manuscript provided to author by Defense Correspondent, 4 March 2018. 
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 This dissertation examines how a rapidly proliferating class of weapons affects crisis 
dynamics and escalation. As the project’s empirical findings demonstrate, remote warfighting 
technologies – like drones – can enable decisionmakers to initiate the use of force more frequently, 
but limit the potential for escalation during crises. This theory, which I refer to as technology-
enabled escalation control suggests that technologies that remove friendly personnel from harm’s 
way make military operations more likely by lowering the political barriers for using force, but 
also reduce the likelihood that these deployments will lead to escalation. This is in part because 
drones and other remote warfighting technologies can gather intelligence that helps overcome 
information asymmetries that often lead to interstate conflicts, can help tailor targeting to make 
kinetic action more precise, and can remove incentives for escalatory acts of retaliation following 
attacks by rivals.  
 To test this theory of technology-enabled escalation control, the project leverages a mixed-
methods research design that combines survey experiments, experiments embedded in military 
wargames, and case studies informed by archival materials and interviews with senior national 
security decisionmakers in the United States and Israel. Each component of the research design 
examines how perceptions of different actors within a state – the public, military officers, and 
senior civilian leaders shape escalation. The empirical findings provide strong support for the 
theory, but also suggest several areas where the theory can be applied beyond the state use of 
drones and present avenues for future research. 
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 This chapter begins by reviewing the central tenets of technology-enabled escalation 
control and summarizing the empirical findings from the overall research design. The chapter then 
explains the project’s contributions to scholarly studies of armed conflict and its implications for 
national security and interstate relations. Next, I assess the generalizability of the theory by 
examining two cases beyond the state use of drones: U.S. use of cyber operations against North 
Korea and Hezbollah’s use of remotely piloted aircraft. These cases allow me to probe whether 
technology-enabled escalation control dynamics are also evident in relation to technologies other 
than drones, and whether and how the underlying logics apply to non-state actors. The chapter 
concludes by identifying several potential avenues for future research.  
SUMMARY OF THEORY AND FINDINGS 
 Technology-enabled escalation control posits that military technologies like drones 
increase the frequency with which states initiate military operations, but limit the potential for 
escalation during crises relative to the use of inhabited assets. By removing friendly personnel 
from harm’s way, drones lower the risk of friendly casualties and the associated political barriers, 
making their operational deployment more likely. This can increase initiation of various types of 
military operations. For instance, by lowering barriers to deployments, decisionmakers may more 
easily launch these systems on intelligence collection missions that help to gather information that 
overcomes information asymmetries. More complete information about a rival’s capabilities and 
intentions might help temper targeting if a rival is found to lack hostile intent or capability. Or, it 
could restrain targeting if the adversary is viewed as more capable than initially thought, invoking 
principles of deterrence by denial. Additional information can also help tailor targeting and allow 
military decisionmakers to carry out more precise operations against a rival. Precision targeting 
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may enable a state to eliminate a threat without a larger and more escalatory operation or to 
eliminate a target before it poses a more significant threat.  
 The removal of friendly forces from harm’s way can also reduce the likelihood of 
escalatory acts of retaliation during crises. In contrast to attacks on manned assets in which the 
lives of friendly personnel are lost, the loss of a machine does not generally trigger the same type 
of instrumental or emotional reactions that can lead to escalatory military reprisals. This restrained 
retaliation can prevent crises from escalating and can offer decisionmakers with off-ramps with 
which to de-escalate tense situations. Knowledge that an adversary might choose not to retaliate 
after an attack on a drone, however, might lead actors to amplify aggression and attack remotely 
operated assets with a higher frequency than inhabited ones. Although these actions may lead to 
more losses of equipment, they are unlikely to present the same potential for escalation as attacks 
on manned platforms. In short, remotely operated systems can actually contribute to escalation 
control and interstate stability, a notion that runs counter to much of the public discourse 
surrounding drone use and academic theories linking technology and armed conflict.   
 Each element of my multi-method research design tests different aspects of technology-
enabled escalation control theory. The results of these tests support the core of the theory, and also 
suggest additional avenues for future research. Chapters 4 and 5 use experiments embedded in 
surveys and wargames played by national security practitioners to test the hypotheses associated 
with the theory. The survey experiments present U.S. civilian and military respondents with 
realistic, though hypothetical, crisis scenarios that vary whether inhabited assets or remotely 
piloted ones are involved. Respondents are then asked for their preferences toward the initiation 
and escalation of military force. The results of the survey experiments suggest that drones 
influence the preferences of members of the public and mid-grade military officers in similar ways, 
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and often for similar reasons. Respondents are, on average, more prone to support the deployment 
of remotely piloted assets than manned ones on potentially dangerous missions. If drones are lost 
to a rival’s actions, both military and civilian respondents call for more restrained retaliatory 
measures than to the loss of manned platforms. Indeed, many respondents considered a rival’s 
downing of a U.S. military drone as being insufficiently significant of an act to warrant an armed 
reprisal. At the same time, both military and civilian respondents were more willing to take 
aggressive action against an intruding drone than against an intruding manned aircraft, believing 
that doing so would generate little response from the rival.  
 The results of the experiments embedded in wargames played by national security 
practitioners yield more support for the theory. The wargames, moreover, arguably provide far 
richer insights on the decision-making process of military officers than the survey experiments, 
which collect only limited qualitative data on the logics underlying respondent preferences. These 
in-person interactive scenarios also more closely model the dynamics of actual crisis response 
situations than internet-based surveys completed in isolation. Qualitative data gathered from 
discussions between wargame participants demonstrate that military officers’ decisions involving 
drone use and responses to adversary drones are driven by both instrumental factors – aimed at 
protecting assets – and emotional ones driven by a deeply held American military conviction of 
defending one’s comrades in arms and avenging their deaths.  
 In Chapter 6, I test the theory in a real-world context by probing U.S. reconnaissance 
operations during Cold War crises. Drawing from thousands of pages of recently declassified 
archival materials from the White House, Pentagon, State Department, and Intelligence 
Community, I find that technology-enabled escalation control largely explains the behavior of U.S. 
decisionmakers responsible for military and intelligence operations in North Korea, China, and 
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Cuba. The military and intelligence agencies developed drones as a means of reducing the 
exposure of friendly forces to adversary threats – and the political risk associated with losses – 
during intelligence gathering operations. Although early drones often lacked the capability of 
manned assets, they were frequently deployed or considered for deployment in lieu of inhabited 
platforms. Many decisionmakers of the era understood these assets were more likely to be fired 
upon than manned ones – in line with the amplified aggression logic – but were willing to accept 
this risk to collect intelligence without exposing personnel to shootdown situations that had the 
potential to create political and military standoffs.  
 A study of Israel’s drone program, which is based on interviews with senior Israeli national 
security sector officials, also provides support for my theory of technology-enabled escalation 
control. Israel, which has long used drones both for reconnaissance and strike operations, employs 
its remotely piloted aircraft as part of a national escalation control strategy. Drones enable the 
Israeli Defense Forces and Israel’s intelligence services to collect intelligence and carry out 
precision strike missions that target key adversaries and individuals during periods of relative 
calm, helping to extend the length of time between conventional conflicts involving larger-scale 
uses of armed force. In other words, drones enable tempered targeting that Israel uses to prevent 
smaller issues from escalating into larger, conventional conflicts.  
To be clear, there are limits to the theory and the empirical tests presented in this 
dissertation. First, the theory does not apply to all warfighting technology. Instead, it applies only 
to technologies that remove friendly personnel from the front lines. This is a necessary condition 
since each of the logics underlying the theory assume limited or no risk to friendly forces. Second, 
the theory focuses primarily on the decision to deploy forces and escalate during interstate crises.  
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The project’s research design focused specifically on capturing the effects of manipulating 
the type of asset – inhabited or remotely operated – on decisions surrounding the use of force and 
escalation. While the surveys and wargames, yielded valuable insights on these effects, extensions 
of the project might consider three additional manipulations. First, additional experiments might 
manipulate the stakes of a conflict in which drones are being considered or used. The current set 
of experiments holds constant the missions, yet decisionmakers may be willing to accept different 
degrees of risk depending on the mission at hand. For instance, civilian and military policymakers 
may be more willing to expose friendly forces to risk for missions aimed at countering an 
existential threat than for a lower stakes mission. Second, and relatedly, future research might more 
deliberately vary whether drones are being used for reconnaissance or attack missions. While the 
existing experiments include both types of missions, they generally appear in separate 
experiments, rather than being varied in a single experiment. As described in chapter 2, 
decisionmakers might be more prone to take hostile action against an armed drone than a 
reconnaissance drone, potentially leading to different escalation pathways depending on whether 
the drone is armed or unarmed. To be sure, however, the armed-unarmed distinction will likely 
become less apparent and important since modern drones are increasingly multi-purpose platforms 
capable of carrying out both types of missions. Finally, the additional studies might focus greater 
attention on the financial cost of drones. For instance, would decisionmakers prefer to deploy a 
remotely piloted drone that costs more than a manned aircraft on a risky mission? 
Further research might more deeply explore how the preferences of each of the three groups 
assessed in this study – the public, military decisionmakers, and senior civilian decisionmakers – 
interact and shape the implementation of actions and policies surrounding crisis escalation. On one 
hand, the case studies provide some insight into these interactions. For example, analysis of the 
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EC-121 shootdown highlights how the response was shaped by a combination of concerns about 
potential domestic political consequences among civilian decisionmakers and fears of military 
risks among senior uniformed officers and civilian defense officials. On the other hand, future 
experiments might attempt to better simulate real world dynamics. For instance, the survey and 
wargame experiments fielded on military samples helped identify the preferences of national 
security practitioners that might one day advise senior leaders or make operational level decisions 
about the use of force. However, during actual crises, most deliberate decisions on escalation 
would be directed by decisionmakers at much higher echelons, such as the National Security 
Council. Future experimental work might therefore attempt to recruit current or former NSC staff 
or other civilian officials to participate in surveys or wargames. Or, it might expose military and 
civilian decisionmakers with treatments that vary levels of public support for escalation. These 
extensions would enhance the project’s external validity and potentially yield valuable insights 
that build upon the growing body of work that examines the role that perceptions of the public, 
advisors, and leaders play in crisis decision-making and decisions on the use of force.1 
Extensions of the project might also more deeply probe whether technology-enabled 
escalation control theory generalizes to other states. Although the two states profiled in this 
dissertation vary along several dimensions such as threat environment, national leadership, and 
military organizations, both states are democratic with highly professionalized militaries that are 
subordinate to civilian control. Despite these similarities, however, there were differences in the 
behavior of Israeli and American decisionmakers. For instance, as Chapter 7 describes, Israel 
launched a massively escalatory retaliation after Syria downed an IAF F-16 fighter jet in 2018, 
                                                        
1 Saunders, “Leaders, Advisers, and the Political Origins of Elite Support for War”; Horowitz and Fuhrmann, 
“Studying Leaders and Military Conflict”; Busby et al., “Multilateralism and the Use of Force.” 
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even though the pilot survived. In contrast, American decisionmakers have escalated through the 
mobilization of forces and through diplomatic means after attacks on manned assets outside of 
combat zones, but has generally not launched significant military retaliation.2 This suggests that 
state-level factors influence escalation dynamics, something that should not come as a surprise 
given the context-dependent nature of escalation.  
One important factor that might have influenced the different degrees of retaliatory 
escalation in the U.S. and Israeli cases is the number and type of competing military priorities that 
a state faces. For Israel, the primary security threats are located in its immediate vicinity. Israeli 
forces can, in nearly all cases, strike key targets using assets operating from bases in Israel – 
without the need for forward bases or overseas deployments. Indeed, IAF aircraft equipped with 
long-range air-to-ground missiles can reportedly strike a large number of adversary targets without 
leaving Israel’s airspace.3 Because of the geographically limited scope of Israel’s threat 
environment, Israeli decisionmakers can face fewer concerns that a limited retaliatory strike will 
inhibit its ability to carry out operations elsewhere. Further, Israeli decisionmakers consider the 
degree to which a rival might further escalate after an Israeli retaliation.  In cases where Israel 
maintains escalation dominance, it may retaliate. When it does not, Israel may opt to not launch 
military action.4 In contrast, the global scale of U.S. military operations may mean that the United 
States needs to withdraw forces from, one region of the world in order to launch retaliatory actions 
                                                        
2 One recent exception is the Pentagon’s tit-for-tat launch of strikes against Houthi radar sites in Yemen after Houthi 
fighters launched missiles at the USS Mason in 2016. See  Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Strikes Yemen after Missile 
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3 Interview with Brigadier General, Former Director of IDF Strategic Planning Division, Tel Aviv, Israel. 31 August 
2016. 
4 Interview with IDF Intelligence Colonel (Retired), Former Deputy Head of IDF Combat Intelligence, January 
2017. 
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in another. If shifting forces, even temporarily, would detract from a more important national 
security objective, the United States may refrain from retaliating – as they did following North 
Korea’s downing of the EC-121 reconnaissance plane during the Vietnam War.   
Another question worth exploring is whether technology-enabled escalation control 
operates differently in states of varying regime types.5 For instance, might autocratic leaders view 
human life differently and consequently be more prone to deploy or attack inhabited assets? 
Existing literature suggests that non-democratic leaders can be casualty averse and face political 
consequences for launching unpopular military operations. Exploring how these autocrats use 
remote warfighting technology would yield important theoretical and policy insights on their 
propensity to use force.  
BROADER APPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED ESCALATION CONTROL 
 
Thus far the project has tested technology-enabled escalation control on one type of 
increasingly common weapon system used by state actors. But does technology-enabled escalation 
control apply to other military technologies and to the use of these systems by non-state actors? 
To explore the generalizability of the theory, I examine two cases additional cases: cyber 
operations by the United States and the use of drones by non-state actors. If the theory is broadly 
generalizable, the logics of increased initiation, tailored targeting, and restrained retaliation should 
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Like drones, cyber warfare capabilities have proliferated widely to both state and non-state 
actors. Dozens of states now maintain institutions tasked with conducting defensive or offensive 
cyber operations, and non-state actors have increasingly leveraged cyber operations against their 
rivals.6  Beyond their rapid proliferation in recent years, cyberwarfare operations share several 
other parallels with operations conducted using remotely operated systems. First, both drones and 
cyber operations remove friendly personnel from the physical frontlines, allowing states to conduct 
operations without putting troops in harm’s way. This reduced risk to friendly troops may, if the 
increased initiation logic applies to the cyber domain, lead states to more easily initiate cyber 
actions than conventional operations. Second, drone and cyber operation can either gather 
information on rivals (computer network exploitation) or launch attacks aimed at degrading a 
rival’s capabilities (computer network attack).7 Third, both types of technologies can enable 
precision targeting. Just as a drone can loiter over a target for extended periods of time waiting for 
the prime opportunity to attack, so too can cyber operatives. Offensive cyber operators can 
penetrate into adversary networks and attempt to strike a specific node or actor without generating 
significant collateral damage.8  
                                                        
6 For example, Max Smeets, “Integrating Offensive Cyber Capabilities: Meaning, Dilemmas, and Assessment,” 
Defence Studies 18, no. 4 (October 2018): 395–410; Melissa K. Griffith, “A Comprehensive Security Approach: 
Bolstering Finnish Cybersecurity Capacity,” Journal of Cyber Policy 3, no. 3 (September 2018): 407–29; Nadiya 
Kostyuk and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 63, no. 2 (February 2019): 317–47. 
7 Chris Inglis, “Illuminating a New Domain: The Role and Nature of Military Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance in Cyberspace,” in Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber 
Operations, ed. Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 19–44. 
8 For more on cyber targeting, see Austin Long, “A Cyber SIOP? Operational Considerations for Strategic Offensive 
Cyber Planning,” Journal of Cybersecurity 3, no. 1 (February 18, 2017): 19–28. 
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Despite these similarities, there is a fundamental difference between drone and cyber 
operations. While drone operations send a physical asset into or near a rival’s territory, there is no 
such physical equivalent in cyber operations. This can make attribution difficult, sometimes 
leaving states unable to point a finger at the party responsible for an attack. The lack of a physical 
intruder in rival territory also changes how actors might defend against cyber attacks. While a state 
can shoot down an intruding drone, defensive actions in the cyber domain might, for instance, 
entail degrading the capability of servers in a rival’s homeland or elsewhere. Despite these 
differences, several studies suggest that cyber operations do not result in the same degree of 
escalation as similar operations carried out using more traditional means.9 Much like drones, cyber 
operations appear to fall at a lower threshold than operations by inhabited assets, potentially 
helping to control escalation.  
To explore whether and how the logics associated with technology-enabled escalation 
control play out in the cyber domain, I look to the U.S. intelligence community’s attempt to 
degrade North Korea’s missile capabilities using cyber operations. During the early years of the 
Obama administration, North Korea increased the pace of its nuclear weapons and missile 
programs and adopted a more aggressive posture toward its South Korean neighbors. Just months 
after Obama took office, North Korea – then under the leadership of Kim Jong Il – conducted a 
missile test under the guise of a satellite launch. North Korea also took several provocative actions 
against South Korean forces. In March 2010, North Korea launched a torpedo against a South 
Korean warship, killing 46 sailors. Just five months later, North Korean forces attacked 
                                                        
9 Sarah Kreps and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: 
Moving Beyond Effects-Based Logics,” 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3104014. 
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Yeongpyeong Island in South Korea, killing four and wounding 22.10 The North Korean threat 
continued to grow over the course of the Obama administration, and diplomatic efforts had little 
effect in countering Pyongyang’s increasing hostility. 
Among the most significant North Korean threat was the rapid development of its medium 
and long-range missiles, which could be used to deliver nuclear warheads. As early as 2011, North 
Korea was developing missiles like the KN-08, which had the range to strike the United States. 
U.S. Navy Admiral James Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced 
in March 2013 that “the KN-08 probably does have the range to reach the United States.”11 North 
Korea conducted several additional missile tests, and in 2015, claimed it had developed a 
submarine launched ballistic missile capability.12 The risk that these missiles could reach the 
United States and its allies worried American policymakers. Indeed, a U.S. Department of Defense 
report assessed that North Korea’s missile and nuclear program “goes beyond minimal deterrence 
to one that could provide greater freedom action for North Korean aggression or coercion against 
its neighbors.”13  
The Obama administration considered several strategies to counter the North Korean 
missile threat. One option was a diplomatic approach that involved asking the People’s Republic 
                                                        
10 Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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of China to cut support to North Korea. This plan was rejected, however, because China often fell 
through on enforcing agreements with North Korea. A second option was launching military 
strikes on North Korean leadership and missile sites. Indeed, President Obama reportedly 
announced that he would have targeted North Korean leadership and weapons sites, but realized 
that pinpointing the location of these targets was nearly impossible. Obama worried that a failed 
strike would then trigger retaliation and risk war on the Korean Peninsula.14 At the same time, 
senior defense leaders were concerned that ballistic missile defenses might be incapable of 
stopping an inbound barrage of North Korean missiles. Indeed, the Missile Defense Agency found 
that ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California failed 56-percent of the time under near-
perfect conditions.15 
Because of these concerns, the Obama administration reportedly turned to a “left-of-
launch” strategy aimed at halting the development of missiles before they could be operationally 
employed. The approach involved manipulating the production of missile components or guidance 
systems, often through the use of computer network operations, and since the early 2010s had been 
considered a pillar of the Department of Defense Integrated Air and Missile Defense plans.16 In 
2013, for instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff described joint air and missile defense as a program 
“where all capabilities…cyber warfare, directed energy and electronic attack…are melded into a 
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comprehensive joint and combined force capable of preventing an adversary from effectively 
employing an of its offensive air and missile weapons.”17A year later, the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Army Chief of Staff urged the Secretary of Defense to develop a missile 
defense strategy “incorporating ‘left of launch’ and other non-kinetic means of defense.”18 
Although specific details of the left of the launch program remain classified, the operations 
appear to have had an effect on North Korea’s missile program. The failure rate of missile tests 
climbed to 88-percent, leading Kim Jong Un to reportedly investigate and execute officials 
associated with missile testing.19 The availability of cyber warfare tools allowed the United States 
to initiate operations against North Korea that President Obama had considered too risky to 
conduct using conventional forces. The approach also allowed the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence 
community to tailor targeting to the missile program and, like the Israeli strategy of extending the 
campaigns between wars, to delay North Korea’s ability to threaten conventional operations 
against the United States.20 
The U.S. use of cyber operations against North Korea provides strong support that the core 
logics of technology-enabled escalation control operate in this domain. To be sure, there are key 
differences between cyber and drone operations, the most critical of which in the North Korean 
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case were the covert nature of the operations and the lack of a physical U.S. asset that North Korea 
could attack in self-defense. Escalation control could therefore be attributable to the covert nature 
of the operation, rather than the technology employed. However, senior U.S. officials spoke openly 
about left of launch operations, seemingly claiming responsibility for the failures of North Korean 
missile tests.21 Further, the two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Cyber warfare is not only 
more covert, but can also enable states to carry out operations with less risk to friendly personnel 
and to execute highly tailored targeting. Obama seemingly opted to use cyber-enabled left of 
launch operations to precisely and accurately target North Korean military infrastructure, 
something that would have been difficult and far more escalatory using traditional kinetic 
operations. These findings align with a growing body of research that suggests that operations 
carried out using cyber warfare capabilities often result in less escalatory responses than similar 
operations carried out in the physical domain.22  
Drone Use by Violent Non-State Actors 
 As a second assessment of the theory’s generalizability, I loosen the dissertation’s scope 
condition about the use of force by actors with nearly symmetric military capabilities and examine 
whether technology-enabled escalation control applies to the use of drones by violent non-state 
actors. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic State (ISIS) have used a variety of drones 
– ranging from modified hobbyist quadcopters to large remotely-piloted, military-grade aircraft – 
to carry out both reconnaissance and strike missions against both state and non-state actors.23 To 
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be sure, there is significant variation across violent non-state actors. Their differing goals, 
ideologies, and organizational structures can make it difficult to test the theory across all group 
types. 
 Violent non-state actors, however, typically share several characteristics that differentiate 
them from democratic state actors in ways that may not align with the logics that underpin 
technology-enabled escalation control. First, not all violent non-state actors are casualty averse. 
Indeed, many rely on suicide attacks and extol the virtues of martyrdom.24  Second, these groups 
are often at a power disadvantage compared to their rivals. As such, the tactics and technologies 
they employ may simply be the best or only way of carrying out an operation, rather than as a 
means of limiting the risk of casualties or escalation. These organizations may also not seek to 
temper or tailor their targeting, and instead seek to generate large numbers of casualties with little 
regard to the laws of armed conflict. Finally, many violent non-state actors may not seek to control 
escalation. Instead, a common terrorist strategy is to provoke a rival to launch an overwhelming 
response to attacks.25 Terrorist groups can then cite these disproportionate government responses 
in their efforts to gain recruits and supporters.  
As an empirical probe of this extension, I examine Hezbollah’s use of remotely piloted 
aircraft against Israel and during the Syrian Civil War. To be sure, Hezbollah arguably has more 
state-like characteristics and greater military capability than many other violent non-state actors. 
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This, however, still serves as a useful hoop test, or plausibility probe, of technology-enabled 
escalation control’s applicability to non-state actors.26  Passing the hoop test affirms the 
plausibility of the theory’s applicability. If, however, evidence does not indicate that the theory 
applies, the theory is eliminated from subsequent consideration. Several observable indicators 
would provide support for the theory’s applicability to non-state actors. Hezbollah should use 
drones to carry out missions they would not otherwise initiate (increased initiation); drones should 
allow Hezbollah to carry more precise operations (tempered/tailored targeting); and Hezbollah 
should take less escalatory reprisals to the loss of drones than to the loss of personnel (restrained 
retaliation). 
Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shia militant organization, has been a key actor in the Iran-
Israel proxy conflict since the early 1980s.27 The group has used a variety of tactics to attack and 
harass Israeli forces and supported Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian Civil War. Although the 
group has traditionally relied on ground forces, guerrilla warfare, rockets, and terrorist attacks, 
Hezbollah entered the drone scene in the early 2000s. In 2004, Hezbollah flew an Iranian-built 
remotely piloted aircraft over Israel for nearly 20 minutes before the Israeli Air Force intercepted 
it. The overflight caused no damage to Israel, but did signal Hezbollah’s capability to penetrate 
Israeli airspace and triggered fears that Hezbollah could use drones to attack Israel.28 These 
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concerns led Israel’s Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to investigate the incident.29 
Fears of Hezbollah using drones to carry out an attack were not unfounded. Shortly after the 2004 
drone incident, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah told a rally that future drone missions could 
reach “deep, deep” into Israel and “be laden with a quantity of explosives, forty to fifty kilograms, 
and hit any target, be it water or power plant, a military base or airport.”30  
These fears came to fruition in 2006 when Hezbollah launched a series of drones laden 
with explosives to strike targets in Israel. In July 2006, a small drone attacked an Israeli warship 
off the coast of Beirut, leaving four Israeli sailors missing.31 The following month, Hezbollah 
launched Iranian-built Ababil drones armed with explosive charges at Israel. One of these drones 
made it to the outskirts of the Israeli city of Haifa before it was intercepted and downed.32 Several 
years later in 2012, Hezbollah flew an Iranian-built Shahed drone from a facility in southern 
Lebanon and penetrated dozens of miles into Israeli airspace. The drone approached Israeli nuclear 
facilities in Dimona before it was shot down by Israeli fighter jets, raising concerns that the drone 
may have collected intelligence of highly sensitive Israeli facilities.33 More significantly, the 
breach of restricted airspace demonstrated the ability of Hezbollah – and its Iranian patron – to 
reach some of Israel’s most critical infrastructure. Hezbollah did not retaliate for the shootdown 
of its drone. Instead, Hassan Nasrallah turned the drone mission into a propaganda victory, 
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announcing, “we are uncovering a small part of our capabilities…It is our natural right to send 
other reconnaissance flights inside occupied Palestine…This is not the first time and will not be 
the last.”34 Senior Iranian officials also praised the mission, claiming that the mission demonstrated 
“strategic deterrence” by being able to reach airspace near Israel’s nuclear reactor.35 
In addition to carrying out drone operations against Israel, Hezbollah has also used drones 
to support the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War. These missions were often carried out 
alongside Iranian, Syrian, and Russian forces, and involved a mix of military grade and modified 
commercial off-the-shelf drones. In 2014, Hezbollah launched a successful drone strike against a 
headquarters of the al-Nusra Front, a Salafist jihadist organization, near the Lebanon-Syrian 
border.36 By 2016, Hezbollah had shifted to using smaller and cheaper modified commercial 
drones to strike ISIS targets in Syria.37 These micro drones carried small cluster bombs that were 
used to precisely target Syrian rebels.38 Although these systems allowed Hezbollah to tailor 
targeting, it is unlikely Hezbollah did this as a means of escalation control. Given Hezbollah’s 
history of indiscriminate targeting of civilian populations, Hezbollah likely viewed the drones 
                                                        
34 “Hezbollah Drone Proves Tehran’s Capabilities, Says Iranian Defense Minister,” The Times of Israel, October 14, 
2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-drone-proves-tehrans-capabilities-says-iranian-defense-minister/. 
35 “Hezbollah Drone Proves Tehran’s Capabilities, Says Iranian Defense Minister.” 
36 Gili Cohen, “Hezbollah Strikes Nusra Front Positions near Syria Border, Iran Says,” Haaretz, September 22, 2014, 
https://www.haaretz.com/hezbollah-attacks-nusra-front-near-syria-1.5304809. 
37 Abbas Al-Sabbagh, “Hezbollah Expands Its Arsenal,” An-Nahar, August 10, 2018, 
https://en.annahar.com/article/842769-hezbollah-expands-arsenal. 
38 Kyle Mizokami, “Terrorist Group Hezbollah Is Reportedly Using Drone Bombers,” Popular Mechanics, August 16, 
2016, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a22366/hezbollah-drone-bombers/. 
 282 
primarily as a low cost and effective means of hitting targets that they might otherwise not have 
been able to strike.39  
Hezbollah’s use of drones provides tentative limited support for technology-enabled 
escalation control in cases beyond those involving state actors with roughly symmetrical 
capabilities. First, drones enabled Hezbollah to carry out operations it might not otherwise have 
been to conduct, providing support for the increased initiation logic. However, Hezbollah’s 
willingness to initiate missions using drones was likely not because remote warfighting 
technologies reduced the risk to Hezbollah personnel. Instead, drones provided a capability to 
reach targets that Hezbollah would otherwise be unable to easily target. In other words, principles 
of escalation control and casualty aversion appeared less important to Hezbollah’s decision logic 
than that of states. Further, the publicity that Hezbollah leaders attached to these drone missions 
suggests one aim was to demonstrate that it possessed advanced military capabilities that could 
threaten targets in Israel. The mechanisms underlying the increased initiation logic in this case 
appears to be different than those of the state actors examined in Chapters 4 through 7, whether 
due to their status, or the relative asymmetry in capabilities.   
The operation of the restrained retaliation logic in the Hezbollah case appears similar to its 
operation with state actors. Hezbollah did not take significant retaliatory actions after the loss of 
its drones to Israeli air defenses. In contrast, Hezbollah generally threatens retaliation for Israeli 
strikes against its personnel.40 Finally, although drones also helped Hezbollah tailor its targeting 
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during operations against Israel and in the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah likely considered this 
precision targeting as a means of gaining tactical advantage rather than controlling escalation. 
Indeed, violent non-state actors that tailor targeting may actually generate more casualties or more 
precisely strike critical targets, triggering more significant retaliation from an adversary. This 
could result in greater escalation rather than escalation control, undercutting the technology-
enabled escalation control. 
The two cases briefly examined above suggest that elements of technology-enabled 
escalation control are generalizable across different types of remote warfighting technology and 
different types of actors. Additional testing, however, will help to more fully explore the limits of 
the theory’s generalizability and will help provide data that can help inform policymaking as 
remote warfighting technologies become increasingly common in modern conflicts. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP AND POLICY 
 The theory of technology enabled escalation control builds upon scholarly theories that 
link technology and armed conflict and contributes to scholarly understanding of escalation 
dynamics. First, unlike many theories that examine technology and conflict, technology-enabled 
escalation control highlights the effect of technology on escalation after the initial decision to use 
force. Many existing logics argue that technology can influence decisions on initiating the use of 
force, but understanding escalation dynamics also requires looking what happens after force is first 
used. Second, the project’s theory and findings suggest that certain types of technology can have 
a stabilizing effect on escalation dynamics, even if those technologies reduce the costs and risks 
of military operations. This raises questions about the scope conditions of several dominant 
international theories that argue that technologies which make warfighting less risky and less 
costly increase the likelihood of conflict and make the world less stable. While these technologies 
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can increase the likelihood of conflict onset, this project’s empirical findings demonstrate that 
remote warfighting technologies can also lower the risks of destabilizing escalation precisely 
because they lower the risks and costs of military action. At the same time, many theories suggest 
that technologies that are massively destructive – such as nuclear weapons – can promote stability 
by deterring the use of military force. The findings presented in Chapters 4 through 7 demonstrate 
that technologies need not threaten complete destruction to promote stability. In short, the project 
perhaps offers a variant of the stability-instability paradox, in which a class of technologies makes 
military action during crises more likely but less intense than those that might occur if remote 
warfighting technologies were not available. Understanding how crises unfold is particularly 
important in an era where the nature of conflict has shifted from large scale wars aimed at gaining 
and holding control of territory to conflicts with more limited objectives.41  
 The project also contributes to the resurgence of scholarly attention toward escalation and 
escalation dynamics. Although much of the foundational work on escalation took place during the 
Cold War, recent research has returned to the study of escalation in a variety of operational 
contexts. Scholars have examined the risks of inadvertent escalation,42 the use of covert action as 
a means of escalation control,43 and the dangers of escalation between the United States and its 
near-peer competitors.44 Many of these studies note that technologies can play a role in shaping 
escalation dynamics, a topic that this dissertation examines in depth. This project’s findings, for 
instance, suggest that the concept of escalation thresholds that are common in academic studies 
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require more nuance. For instance, rather than classifying actions as the deployment of limited 
military force, scholars may need to consider whether assets dispatched on these limited 
deployments are inhabited or remotely piloted. This distinction, as the experiments and case 
studies highlight, is important to policymakers and the public, and may result in different degrees 
of escalation. 
 Beyond questions dealing purely with the use of force and escalation, the project raises 
broader theoretical questions about crisis signaling and domestic politics. The use of remote 
warfighting technologies that take friendly personnel out of harm’s way may lead scholars to 
reconsider existing theories of crisis signaling. Most logics suggest that the most credible signals 
during crises are those that tie an actor’s hands or force it to sink costs. These sorts of actions are 
considered credible because they put skin in the game and require actors either to pay ex ante costs 
by deploying personnel or ex post costs for reneging on agreements.45 For instance, the U.S. 
Army’s Berlin Brigade lacked the capability to defeat East German and Soviet forces in the event 
of war. Instead, the brigade was designed as a signal to reassure allies of Washington’s 
commitment to the defense of Berlin and to deter communist aggression by “[dying] heroically, 
dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”46  
 What happens to crisis signaling when technologies like drones allow states to carry out 
military operations without putting skin the game is an important and increasingly salient 
theoretical and policy question. The empirical findings in this project suggest that drones are a 
weaker signal than manned assets since decisionmakers seem more willing to take actions against 
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remotely piloted aircraft than inhabited ones. Yet, some studies suggest drones still signal resolve 
to rivals. According to these studies, drones represent a credible signal of a state’s commitment to 
continuing military operations since leaders may be less prone to halt operations even after 
multiple drone losses.47 As such, drones may represent a new “currency” for coercive diplomacy.48 
Drone deployments and actions against drones may allow states to signal capacity and resolve 
prior to and during crises without necessarily endangering friendly or rival personnel. Shooting 
down a drone, for instance, can allow states to signal displeasure with a rival’s surveillance 
activities without the risk of escalation that might be associated with downing a manned aircraft. 
Similarly, selecting not to shoot down a rival’s drone can also convey a message to a potential 
rival. In short, the emergence of new technologies that enable states to project military power 
without demonstrating skin in the game suggests that scholars and policymakers may need to 
rethink the determinants of credible signals. To be sure, significant demonstrations of hand tying 
or sunk costs are still likely to convey the most credible signals to both rivals and allies, but remote 
warfighting technologies provide decisionmakers with a new set of tools with which to signal and 
bargain with other states and non-state actors.    
 Technologies that take friendly warfighters off the battlefield not only influence dynamics 
on the international stage, but might also shape matters of domestic politics and accountability. As 
the survey experiments in Chapter 4 demonstrate, the public is more supportive of military 
deployments involving drones than those involving manned assets. In the minds of the domestic 
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public, remotely operated systems largely eliminate the risk to friendly forces, reducing concerns 
about the consequences of armed conflict. Deploying machines instead of men and women into 
harm’s way might not only increase public support for conflict, but in some cases, might make it 
difficult for the public to even know when their leaders are carrying out military operations 
overseas. Without the deployment of friends, family members, and neighbors – and the associated 
publicity surrounding troop mobilizations, the public may have less knowledge about their nation’s 
military operations. As a result, decisionmakers may have greater freedom to carry out military 
action without the degree of oversight and scrutiny often attached to more traditional operations.  
 The decreased risk to friendly forces that drones provide may also make it easier for 
policymakers to avoid the political consequences – or audience costs – associated with backing 
down from threats. Many scholars argue that leaders avoid backing down after making foreign 
policy threats for fear that their constituents will punish them for doing so.49 Drones and other 
remote warfighting technologies, however, increase the policy menu for decisionmakers and may 
provide a tool for carrying out some action after making an initial threat instead of being forced to 
renege entirely. For instance, a leader might threaten to carry out a large military operation against 
a rival state, but then realize that doing so is impractical and risky. Rather than backing down 
entirely and taking no action, a leader might opt to launch drone strikes, helping mitigate the 
audience costs she faces.50  
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 In short, technology-enabled escalation control highlights how certain types of military 
technologies that remove friendly personnel from harm’s way necessitate rethinking the contours 
of existing theories on conflict and crisis. Many of our existing theories were developed to help 
explain the large conventional battles that defined many of the wars of the 20th centuries and do 
not fully account for the ways in which new technologies have reshaped the conduct of modern 
conflict. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Richard Betts cautions that the “Military, budgetary, diplomatic, and political implications 
of technological advances…are seldom understood and often are not clear until long after new 
weapons have been deployed. Ensuring that…inadvertent negative consequences [of new military 
systems] do not outweigh their benefits has become progressively more important.” 51 To that end, 
the theory and findings presented in this dissertation have several implications for national security 
practitioners and foreign policymakers. Drones and other warfighting technologies that remove 
friendly personnel from harm’s way are rapidly proliferating, allowing both state and non-state 
actors to incorporate these capabilities into their operations. Indeed, Pakistan and Indian have 
reportedly used drones to collect intelligence on each other, violent non-state actors like the Islamic 
State have used rudimentary drones to carry out attacks on government forces, and Russia has 
flown drones over separatist controlled regions of Ukraine.52 An understanding of how drones 
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shape escalation dynamics can help inform force employment and contingency planning, doctrine, 
and the development of norms surrounding their use. 
 As more states and non-state actors acquire drones, the likelihood these systems will be 
operationally deployed should increase, in line with the increased initiation logic. States might use 
these systems to carry out aggressive probes into a rival’s territory, recognizing that there is little 
risk of escalation relative to the deployment of manned assets on similar missions. Decisionmakers 
might also be prone to carry out more strikes against targets overseas, as evidenced by 
Washington’s use of drones on counterterrorism missions in places like Pakistan and Yemen.53 
This increased rate of drone deployments could lead to greater incidences of confrontation between 
state militaries, potentially necessitating the need for more deliberate planning and policies on how 
states should react during these situations.  
Another consideration for policymakers is whether increased drone use will heighten the 
risk of drone-triggered inadvertent escalation and, what Thomas Schelling described as threats that 
leave something to chance – an action that deliberately exploits the risks and uncertainties of 
seemingly low-level military activity.54 If, for instance, drones allow states to more easily launch 
strikes against a rival’s infrastructure and personnel, a state might inadvertently strike targets that 
are considered critically important to a rival. For example, a state might use a drone to launch 
strikes on what it believes to be a tactical military command post, but could in fact be a key nuclear 
command and control node.55 Or, a state on the receiving end of drone attacks might shoot down 
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what it thinks is a drone, but is actually a manned aircraft. Either of these actions could lead to 
military responses that are more significant than what decisionmakers might have wanted. In short, 
the risk of confrontations and inadvertent escalation is, in part, a game of odds – a larger number 
of missions means a greater number of potential missions to go awry.  
Policymakers will need to assess whether the increased frequencies of military encounters 
and heightened risk of inadvertent escalation is more or less escalatory and destabilizing than 
operations that would occur if drones were unavailable. The case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 show 
that policymakers have historically considered the tradeoffs between using manned and remotely 
piloted assets. For instance, members of the Kennedy and Johnson National Security Councils 
debated the balance of intelligence gathering capabilities and operational risks associated with 
launching drones over Cuba.56 In more recent years, however, growing casualty aversion among 
the population and decisionmakers in many states has led drones to be viewed as a cure all solution 
to a range of foreign policy challenges.57 As drones become more ubiquitous, military and civilian 
decisionmakers may benefit from more deliberate guidance and planning surrounding their use 
during crises and conflicts.  
Currently, much doctrine is “platform agnostic,” making no references to specific types of 
military assets. In other words, current doctrine typically does not differentiate between remotely 
piloted and inhabited assets. The lack of clear doctrine can subsequently contribute to confusion 
on issues surrounding tactics and force employment. Indeed, some combat aviators described not 
having guidance on whether to carry out intercepts against manned and remotely piloted aircraft 
                                                        
56 See Chapter 6. 
57 Schulman, Weird Birds: Working Paper on Policymaker Perspectives on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Their 
Impact on National Security Decision-Making. 
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differently.58 More broadly, existing airspace regulations have only limited guidance for remotely 
piloted aircraft operations.59 Yet, the findings from the experiments in Chapters 4 and 5 highlight 
how military decisionmakers take different action depending on whether operations entail 
inhabited or remotely operated assets. More refined guidance might better posture military 
decisionmakers for future conflicts in which remote warfighting technologies are more common, 
potentially helping to avoid unwanted escalation. 
One specific area where doctrinal clarity is critically needed is the definition of what 
constitutes a remote warfighting system. While the remotely piloted aircraft (or ground or maritime 
vehicle) itself is the most apparent component, remote warfighting systems are systems of 
systems.60 These typically include a large support infrastructure that includes ground control 
stations, communication satellites, and ground-based intelligence processing facilities.61 Under 
international law, each of these components could be considered be a lawful target during military 
operations since they all enable the operation of a combat system. Many of these sites, however, 
remain far outside of combat zones, meaning that strikes on these sites could lead to horizontal 
escalation. Military planners and policymakers will need to consider how strikes on these systems 
might influence escalation dynamics during crises and armed conflicts. 
                                                        
58 Interview with U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (Reconnaissance Pilot/Combat Operations Planner), 1 June 
2016, Ramstein Air Base, Germany; Interview with U.S. Air Force Major (Remotely Piloted Reconnaissance 
Aircraft Pilot), 1 June 2016, Ramstein Air Base, Germany; 
59 Interview with U.S. Air Force airspace planner, 2 2 June 2016, Ramstein Air Base, Germany; Interview with U.S. 
Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (Reconnaissance Pilot/Combat Operations Planner). 
60 Gilli and Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?,” January 2016, 71–80. 
61 For descriptions of these control stations and intelligence sites, see “Air Force DCGS Fact Sheet”; “MQ-9 Fact 
Sheet.” 
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 As the operational deployments of drones increase, there is also value in considering the 
norms and international laws that govern their use. Under existing international agreements, there 
is generally no distinction between inhabited and remotely operated assets. The Law of Armed 
Conflict, for instance, does not establish separate guidelines for the military use of manned and 
unmanned platforms, and instead focuses on regulating the effects that weapons of any type can 
have on the battlefield. Similarly, agreements such as the Chicago Convention of 1944 and the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea which govern access and use of airspace and the maritime 
domain treat inhabited and remotely piloted craft as equals. Despite the equivalence of inhabited 
and remotely piloted assets under these agreements, the findings presented in this dissertation and 
recent state practice highlights that militaries often use and react differently to inhabited and 
remotely piloted platforms.  
This divergent behavior suggests emerging international norms surrounding RPA use that 
map on to deeply embedded features of the law of armed conflict. There appears to be a greater 
tacit agreement among states that the downing of a remotely operated asset will not trigger an 
aggressive military or diplomatic response. Indeed, the experimental findings, case studies, and 
contemporary events all demonstrate that states are often willing to ignore the loss of a drone to 
hostile activity, or react with less than a tit-for-tat response. While this appears to be an emerging 
norm, states may find benefit in formalizing agreements or guidelines to help inform the future use 
and interactions of these systems. Formal regulations may become even more important as 
remotely operated systems are augmented with artificial intelligence that increases their 
autonomy.62 These guidelines or regulations, which could be similar to those that governed the 
development and use of earlier generations of weapons, might offer procedures for de-escalation 
                                                        
62 Paul Scharre, “Killer Apps: The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3 (June 5, 2019): 144. 
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in the event of incidents or limit proliferation of remote warfighting technologies in a way that 
prevents arms racing.63  
Drones will almost certainly continue to be a feature of modern warfare into the foreseeable 
future. Their ability to lower the risks and costs associated with deploying forces coupled with the 
growing number of drone producers will likely contribute to the continuing proliferation of 
increasingly advanced drones to state and non-state actors. The understanding that drones can help 
control escalation – and the limits to this claim – should help inform policymaking and military 
decision-making in a way that reduces the risk of crisis escalation. 
FINAL THOUGHTS AND PATHWAYS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
This project proposes and tests a theory of technology-enabled escalation control, focusing 
primarily on the use of drones by democratic state actors. While this concluding chapter assessed 
the theory’s applicability to cases beyond state drone use and introduced broader theoretical and 
policy considerations, there are several avenues for further research. Future work might probe the 
generalizability of the theory across various types of actors and technologies, assess the theory’s 
durability in a world of increasingly proliferated drones, or examine the applicability of the theory 
in situations where crises have transitioned into armed conflict. Research in each of these areas 
will provide scholars and policymakers with a richer understanding of the effect of technology on 
conflict dynamics.  
The findings of the empirical analysis raise several additional questions that present 
pathways to expand the project into new research areas. For instance, future work might explore 
how allies and security partners conceive of drones during crises, helping to deepen scholarly and 
                                                        
63 Several historical agreements serve as precedents. For instance, the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (1972) 
offered guidelines on how to de-escalate confrontations between American and Soviet warships on the high seas.  
 294 
policy understanding of crisis bargaining and alliance reassurance.  For instance, do allies consider 
a patron state’s deployment of drones to be a credible signal of the patron’s commitment and 
reassurance? 
Additional work might explore the future of warfare by tackling questions surrounding the 
implications of increased drone proliferation and the burgeoning use of other remote warfighting 
technologies, like artificial intelligence (AI) enabled autonomous weapon systems. How does 
crisis escalation unfold in a world in which actors on all sides of a crisis have access to drones? 
What happens to escalation dynamics if and when remotely piloted drones are supplanted by 
autonomous systems with no operator in the loop? Could states use the lack of a human operator 
as a means of deescalating crises by arguing that actions – like an airstrike – were not intentional, 
but were instead the result of faulty or poorly trained AI? Further, how might states adapt their 
tactics if drones help to control crisis escalation? Will states eager to escalate simply eschew the 
substitutive use of these remote warfighting technologies? Such research might entail experimental 
studies that manipulate the balance of remote warfighting technologies across the sides of a crisis 
dyad or whether actors are using remotely operated or fully autonomous systems.64 
Future studies might examine the extent to which technology-enabled escalation control 
applies after crises escalate into large-scale, conventional military operations. Can the availability 
and use of remote warfighting technologies during conventional wars help prevent further 
escalation? Perhaps more importantly, can systems like drones help deescalate conflicts that are 
already underway? More specifically do the restrained retaliation and tempered targeting 
                                                        
64 Some research has already started to engage with these questions, Kenneth Anderson and Matthew C. Waxman, 
“Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology, ed. Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1097–1117; Michael C. Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International 
Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 3 (May 2018): 36–57; Paul Scharre, 
Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (W. W. Norton & Company, 2019). 
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mechanisms that operate during interstate crises also play out during periods of conflict? Future 
work might also assess whether and how targeting by drones affects escalation dynamics. For 
instance, does it matter whether airstrikes are carried out by a drone or manned asset? That is, do 
decisionmakers on the receiving end of these strikes respond differently depending on the type of 
asset involved. Do drone intelligence gather missions trigger concerns of expanding military 
actions that lead rivals to intensify their own military actions, escalating armed conflicts? 
Technology-enabled escalation control theory and the findings presented in this 
dissertation aim to offer a more complete explanation for technology’s effects on conflict dynamics 
and crisis escalation. Addressing the questions highlighted above will help test the limits of the 
theory across a range of technology types and operating contexts. The findings of this further 
research will expand our understanding of how technologies that remove friendly personnel from 
harm’s way affect the nature of conflict and escalation and provide policymakers with the data 
needed to inform their decisions. A deeper understanding of the relationship between remote 
warfighting technologies and conflict dynamics will not only provide us with a better 
understanding of the future of warfare, but also hopefully help policymakers and national security 
practitioners to control crises before they escalate into more intense or broader conflicts that 
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Wargame Prep Material: The Road to Crisis 
 
The Republic of Katunia 
 
The Republic of Katunia is located in Central Asia and is bordered by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and 
Dakastan. Katunia is a former Soviet Republic and has been led by President Kanat Burkhazov since December 
1991.  
 
Elections plagued by fraud are held every five years. Burkhazov has secured more than 96-percent of the vote 
in each election. He appoints all government ministers and governs the country in an autocratic style, with heavy 
executive controls over the media and judiciary. Burkhazov promotes a cult of personality and hopes to make 
Katunia a regional power.  
 
Katunia possesses substantial fossil fuel reserves and mineral deposits, and is a major exporter of copper and 
zinc. Katunia also has a sizeable agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. Over the last two decades, the 
Katunian government has attempted to diversify its economy and has developed robust pharmaceutical and 
petrochemical processing sectors. Katunia trades extensively with Kazakhstan and Russia, and its economy has 
fared reasonably well despite the decline of the Russian economy in the mid 2010s. 
 
The Katunian population has a near universal literacy rate (99.8%) and a relatively high life expectancy (78.8 
years). The government provides high quality public schooling and medical care to all Katunian citizens.  
  
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Katunia consist of the Army, Aerospace and Air Defense Force, and the 
Special Republican Guard. Income from oil and gas exports has enabled Katunia to modernize its military in 
recent years. The military imports aircraft and advanced weaponry from Russia, China, and France, but maintains 
no formal military alliances. Katunia’s most recent acquisitions are Sukhoi Su-30 fighters and Chinese-built 
Type 96 Main Battle Tanks.  
 
Katunia has maintained relatively peaceful relations with its neighbors since becoming an independent state in 
1991. Katunia had a minor border dispute with Dakastan in 1994, but this was settled peacefully through bilateral 





The Republic of Dakastan 
 
The Republic of Dakastan is located in Central Asia and is bordered by Kazakhstan, Katunia, Tajikistan, and 
Russia. Dakastan is a former Soviet Republic and Saken Tasmatov has served as President since 2014. Tasmatov 
maintains close ties with the United States and supports the presence of US air and special operations forces at 
Khanastov Air Base in southern Dakastan. 
 
Elections are held every six years. While election fraud and police crackdowns on opposition protests occurred 
during the most recent presidential election, several non-governmental organizations have assessed human rights 
conditions in Dakastan to be improving. President Tasmatov abolished capital punishment in 2016, the judicial 
system was revamped in 2012, and more than 40 independent newspapers and news outlets have been established 
since 2010.  
 
Dakastan has a near universal literacy rate (99.6%) and a high life expectancy (78.3 years), due in part to the 
state’s strong public school and health system. 
 
Like its neighbor Katunia, Dakastan also has significant fossil fuel reserves and mineral deposits. Dakastan has 
the fifth-largest gold deposits in the world and mines more than 73 tons of gold each year. The country also has 
large untapped reserves of natural gas. In recent years, a burgeoning tech sector has emerged, with Dakastan 
producing computer chips and other computer components. Most of these components are exported to Russia 
and the European Union.  
 
The Defense Forces of the Republic of Dakastan consist of the Ground Forces, Air Force, and Joint Special 
Operations Force. The defense force is well trained and equipped with an increasing amount of western 
equipment. Since 2002, the United States has maintained a significant presence at Khanastov Air Base in 
northern Dakastan. The base serves as a logistics hub for US Air Forces Central and hosts US Air Force mobility 
and reconnaissance aircraft. Bombers also routinely rotate through the base. Special Operations Command 
Central also maintains a presence at the base. As part of the US-Dakastan security partnership, the US provides 
air defense of the region surrounding Khanastov Air Base and conducts training with Dakastani forces. 
 
Recent Katunia-Dakastan Tensions 
 
Tensions between Katunia and Dakastan increased significantly following the discovery of oil reserves along 
the border in late 2013. Katunian President Burkhazov has repeatedly accused Dakastan’s government of using 
slant drilling to “illegally steal Katunia’s rightful property” and has ordered Dakastan to halt their oil extraction 
efforts.  International organizations have confirmed that Dakastan is not employing slant drilling and Dakastani 
President Saken Tasmatov has refused to halt oil exploration. Two or three times each year, Katunian Special 
Republican Guard units cross into Dakastan to harass oil field workers. In March 2017, a Dakastani oil pipeline 
was severely damaged in a bomb attack, halting oil flow for three months. A previously unknown group, “The 
Dakastan People’s Army”, claimed responsibility for the attack. Dakastani intelligence services believe the 
group is directed and funded by the Katunian government. Throughout summer and fall 2017, Katunian ground 
and air forces have exercised in the border region.  
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Vignette 1: Initiation (Presented to all Participants) 
 
Over the past two months, Katunia has increased the intensity of its military exercises near the contested oil 
reserves. In September, the Katunian Air Force conducted a week-long close air support exercise. In early 
October, the Katunian Army and Special Republican Guard participated in large-scale air assault exercises. 
Katunian President Burkhazov continues to demand that Dakastan halt oil extraction in the contested region. 
Burkhazov has also announced that any Dakastani or US military aircraft or personnel that approach the 
contested area are subject to “emergency defensive actions” by Katunian forces. In late October, Katunia 
deployed short-range air defense systems on the Katunian side of the border. As a result, the U.S. assesses a 
medium-level of risk to air operations in the Katunia-Dakastan border region.  
 
Dakastan has bolstered its military presence along the border, but has called for a peaceful resolution to the 
crisis.  
 
In early November, Dakastani and U.S. intelligence services received human intelligence reporting that the 
Katunian Special Republican Guard was training Katunian personnel to carry out terrorist attacks on Dakastani 
oil infrastructure and Khanastov Air Base under the banner of the Dakastan People’s Army. According to 
credible sources, training is being conducted at a camp in a mountainous region near the northern Katunia-





Task: You are members of a planning team at the 609th Combined Air Operations Center at Al-Udeid Air Base 
in Qatar, which is responsible for air operations in Central Asia. US Central Command has directed your team 
to develop a plan to assess whether terrorist training is occurring at the camp. Specifically, your team has been 
asked to select an aircraft to fly a reconnaissance mission along the border to collect imagery of the site.  
 
Because of resource constraints, you are limited to the two types of US Air Force reconnaissance aircraft based 
at Khanastov Air Base. You may select from an unarmed remotely piloted MQ-1 Predator Remotely Piloted 






Vignette 2: Amplified Aggression – Manned Aircraft Treatment 
 
Air surveillance radars at Khanastov Air Base detect a foreign aircraft on a direct course toward the base. The 
aircraft is approximately 100 miles west of the base and is traveling at approximately 250 knots (287mph).  The 
aircraft is not responding to radio calls. Air surveillance technicians have determined the aircraft is a Katunian 
Aerospace Force Su-25 ground attack aircraft that took off from Varyaz Air Base in Katunia.  The jet has already 
made several low altitude passes over Dakastani military outposts near the Katunia-Dakastan border.  
 
Dakastani Air Forces have sounded air raid sirens in the communities surrounding Khanastov Air Base and have 
asked the U.S. to carry out its obligations to provide integrated air defense of the Khanastov Air Base region.  
 
The bilateral Dakastani-U.S. rules of engagement provide the air defense commander with significant discretion 
in situations like this. The air and missile defense plan allows the air defense commander to employ U.S. Air 
Force F-16s, Dakastan Air Force MiG-21 fighters (Dakastan’s MiG-21s are on alert and can be scrambled in 10 
minutes), Patriot missile batteries deployed near Khanastov Air Base, and/or Dakastan Air Force Anti-Aircraft 
Artillery deployed near the air base. These assets can be used to intercept intruding aircraft, fire warning shots, 
or to destroy intruding aircraft.    
 
Task: You are members of the 609th Combined Air Operations Center integrated air and missile defense team 
who are forward deployed as liaisons at Khanastov Air Base. The 609th Air Operations Center at Al-Udeid Air 
Base in Qatar is responsible for air operations in Central Asia. Please identify the best course of action to respond 





Su-25 Frogfoot Attack Aircraft 
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Vignette 2: Amplified Aggression – Drone Treatment 
 
Air surveillance radars at Khanastov Air Base detect a foreign aircraft on a direct course toward the base. The 
aircraft is approximately 100 miles west of the base and is traveling at approximately 250 knots (287mph).  The 
aircraft is not responding to radio calls. Air surveillance technicians have determined the aircraft is a Katunian 
Aerospace Force CH-4 remotely piloted attack aircraft (RPA) that took off from Varyaz Air Base in Katunia.  
The RPA has already made several low altitude passes over Dakastani military outposts near the Katunia-
Dakastan border.  
 
Dakastani Air Forces have sounded air raid sirens in the communities surrounding Khanastov Air Base and have 
asked the U.S. to carry out its obligations to provide integrated air defense of the Khanastov Air Base region.  
 
The bilateral Dakastani-U.S. rules of engagement provide the air defense commander with significant discretion 
in situations like this. The air and missile defense plan allows the air defense commander to employ U.S. Air 
Force F-16s, Dakastan Air Force MiG-21 fighters (Dakastan’s MiG-21s are on alert and can be scrambled in 10 
minutes), Patriot missile batteries deployed near Khanastov Air Base, and/or Dakastan Air Force Anti-Aircraft 
Artillery deployed near the air base. These assets can be used to intercept intruding aircraft, fire warning shots, 
or to destroy intruding aircraft.    
 
Task: You are members of the 609th Combined Air Operations Center integrated air and missile defense team 
who are forward deployed as liaisons at Khanastov Air Base. The 609th Air Operations Center at Al-Udeid Air 
Base in Qatar is responsible for air operations in Central Asia.  Please identify the best course of action to respond 
to the intruding aircraft. 
 
 









Vignette 3: Restrained Retaliation – Manned Aircraft Treatment 
 
A U.S. Air Force MC-12 Liberty Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft is flying a mission 
to monitor the Katunian military buildup along the Katunia-Dakastan border. The MC-12 is operating in 
Dakastani airspace and is on a track (flight path) that runs parallel to the border. One hour into its mission, the 
Katunian Aerospace Force downs the MC-12 using a surface-to-air missile fired from an SA-8 SAM site. The 
four U.S. Air Force crewmembers are killed in the shootdown. Part of the MC-12 wreckage and the remains of 
the U.S. aircrew fall in Katunian territory. Images of the wreckage and crew’s remains are broadcast on Katunian 
state television. 
 
Shortly after the incident, Katunia’s Minister of Defense publicly announces that, “Katunian forces acted 
valiantly to eliminate a threat to Katunia’s national security and sovereignty.” 
 
Task: You are members of a planning team at the 609th Combined Air Operations Center. While she awaits 
political/strategic guidance from higher headquarters, the Commander of U.S. Air Forces Central directs your 
team to begin developing response options. These plans will enable her to provide feedback/inputs to higher 
headquarters. Specifically, she wants a recommendation for 1) how to handle the wreckage in Katunian territory 






Vignette 3: Restrained Retaliation – Drone Treatment 
 
A remotely piloted U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft 
is flying a mission to monitor the Katunian military buildup along the Katunia-Dakastan border. The MQ-1 is 
operating in Dakastani airspace and is on a track (flight path) that runs parallel to the border. One hour into its 
mission, the Katunian Aerospace Force downs the MQ-1 using a surface-to-air missile fired from an SA-8 SAM 
site. Part of the MQ-1 wreckage falls in Katunian territory. Images of the wreckage are broadcast on Katunian 
state television. 
 
Shortly after the incident, Katunia’s Minister of Defense publicly announces that, “Katunian forces acted 
valiantly to eliminate a threat to Katunia’s national security and sovereignty.” 
 
Task: You are members of a planning team at the 609th Combined Air Operations Center. While she awaits 
political/strategic guidance from higher headquarters, the Commander of U.S. Air Forces Central directs your 
team to begin developing response options. These plans will enable her to provide feedback/inputs to higher 
headquarters. Specifically, she wants a recommendation for 1) how to handle the wreckage in Katunian territory 








Wargame Participant Demographics and Treatment Schedule 
 
Rank  
Enlisted 50% (14) 
Junior Officer (O-1 to O-3) 28.6% (8) 
Field Grade Officer (O-4 to O-6) 21.4% (6) 
Service   
U.S. Army 46.4% (13) 
U.S. Navy 10.7% (3) 
U.S. Marine Corps 3.6% (1) 
U.S. Air Force 35.7% (10) 
Department of Defense 3.6% (1) 
Specialized Experience  
Remotely Piloted Aircraft 35.7% (10) 
Air Defense 39.3% (11) 
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Main Survey Instrument (Public Sample) 
 
 
Question 1: (Restrained Retaliation)  
Respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of the eight variants of Question 1. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Killed Variant, Weak Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security. The U-2 was on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at 
the time of the shoot down. The U-2 was destroyed and the American pilot was killed. The 
adversary is a militarily weak regional power. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Captured Variant, Weak Adversary]  
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security. The U-2 was on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at 
the time of the shoot down. The U-2 was destroyed and adversary forces are currently holding the 
American pilot as a prisoner. The adversary is a militarily weak regional power. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Rescued Variant, Weak Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security. The U-2 was on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at 
the time of the shoot down. The U-2 was destroyed and U.S. forces rescued the American pilot 
shortly after the shoot down. The adversary is a militarily weak regional power. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant, Weak Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a remotely piloted U.S. Air Force Global Hawk reconnaissance drone 
using a surface-to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the Global 
Hawk was a threat to their national security. The Global Hawk drone was on a routine mission and 
was operating in international airspace at the time of the shoot down. The Global Hawk drone was 
destroyed and there was no loss of U.S. life because no pilot is onboard the Global Hawk. The 
adversary is a militarily weak regional power. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Killed Variant, Strong Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security. The U-2 was on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at 
the time of the shoot down. The U-2 was destroyed and the American pilot was killed. The 





[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Captured Variant, Strong Adversary]  
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security. The U-2 was on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at 
the time of the shoot down. The U-2 was destroyed and adversary forces are currently holding the 
American pilot as a prisoner. The adversary is a militarily strong regional power. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Rescued Variant, Strong Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security. The U-2 was on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at 
the time of the shoot down. The U-2 was destroyed and U.S. forces rescued the American pilot 
shortly after the shoot down. The adversary is a militarily strong regional power. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant, Strong Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a remotely piloted U.S. Air Force Global Hawk reconnaissance drone 
using a surface-to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the Global 
Hawk drone was a threat to their national security. The Global Hawk drone was on a routine 
mission and was operating in international airspace at the time of the shoot down. The Global 
Hawk drone was destroyed and there was no loss of U.S. life because no pilot is onboard the Global 
Hawk. The adversary is a militarily strong regional power. 
 
Which of the following U.S. actions would you be most supportive of in response to the shoot 
down? 
a. No action 
b. Formal diplomatic protest  
c. Economic sanctions against the rival country 
d. Show of U.S. military force in vicinity of the rival country  
e. Limited airstrike against the missile site that downed the aircraft 
 
 
Question 2: (Restrained Retaliation: Microfoundations) 
 
Please write a sentence or two telling us why you chose this response. 
 
Question 3: (Treatment Check)  
 
What happened to the pilot in the scenario? 
 a. Pilot was killed 
 b. Pilot was captured 
 c. Pilot was rescued 
 d. There was no pilot onboard 
 
Question 4 (Initiation)  
Respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of the six variants of Question 4. 
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[Ground Force Variant, Low Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy ground forces to destroy the rival state’s chemical weapons 
production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. ground forces 
during the mission. There is a low likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant, Low Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy manned bomber aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical weapons 
production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. bomber aircraft 
during the mission. There is a low likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant, Low Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy remotely piloted drone aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical 
weapons production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. drones 
during the mission. There is a low likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Ground Force Variant, High Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy ground forces to destroy the rival state’s chemical weapons 
production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. ground forces 
during the mission. There is a high likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant, High Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy manned bomber aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical weapons 
production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. bomber aircraft 
during the mission. There is a high likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant, High Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy remotely piloted drone aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical 
weapons production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. drones 
during the mission. There is a high likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
What is your opinion of the government’s plan to handle the situation? 
a. Strongly Disapprove 
 b. Disapprove  
 c. Neither Disapprove nor Approve 
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 d. Approve 
 e. Strongly Approve 
 
Question 5: (Initiation: Microfoundations) 
 
Please write a sentence or two telling us why you disapproved or approved of the government’s 
plan to handle the situation.   
 
Question 6: (Treatment Check)  
 
What type of U.S forces will carry out the operation? 
 a. Ground Forces 
 b. Manned Bomber 
 c. Remotely Piloted Drone 
 
Question 7: (Deterrence Response) 
Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two variants of Question 7. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant] 
In response to a routine U.S. military patrol through a contested region, a rival state demands the 
immediate removal of U.S. forces. The rival also flies several threatening missions near the U.S. 
patrol using manned attack aircraft. The U.S. government is considering removing the patrol. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant] 
In response to a routine U.S. military patrol through a contested region, a rival state demands the 
immediate removal of U.S. forces. The rival also flies several threatening missions near the U.S. 
patrol using remotely piloted attack drone aircraft. The U.S. government is considering removing 
the patrol. 
 
How likely are you to support the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region? 
a. Strongly Disapprove 
 b. Disapprove  
 c. Neither Disapprove nor Approve 
 d. Approve 
 e. Strongly Approve 
 
Question 8: (Treatment Check)  
 
What type of forces carried out the operation? 
 a. Manned Attack Aircraft 







9. Please tell us how much you agree with this statement: 
 
“The United States should play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.”  
a. Strongly Disagree 
 b. Disagree  
 c. Neither Disagree nor Agree 
 d. Agree 
 e. Strongly Agree 
 
10. What is your gender? 
 a. Female 
 b. Male 
 
11. What is your age? 
 Free Response 
 
12. What is your race? (Select all that apply) 
 a. White 
 b. Black or African American 
 c. American Indian or Alaska Native 
 e. Hispanic  
 f. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 g. Asian 
 h. Mixed 
 i. Other (Fill In) 
 
13. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 a. Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling) 
 b. High school incomplete (Some high school, but no diploma) 
 c. High school graduate (or GED certificate) 
 d. Some college, no degree 
 e. Associate degree 
 f. Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB) 
 g. Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no postgraduate degree 
 h. Postgraduate or professional degree (e.g., MA, MS, JD, PhD, MD 
 
14. In general, would you describe your political views as: 
 a. Very liberal 
 b. Liberal 
 c. Moderate 
 d. Conservative 
 e. Very Conservative 
  
15. Are you currently serving, or have you ever served, in the United States military? 
 a. No 
 b. Yes 
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16. What is your annual household income? 
 a. Less than $10,000 
 b. $10,000-$24,999 
 c. $25,000-$49,999 
 d. $50,000-$74,999 




Follow Up Survey Instrument (Public Sample) 
 
Question 1 (Amplified Aggression)  
Respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of the two variants of Question 3. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant] 
Air surveillance radars have detected an adversary’s manned Su-25 attack aircraft approaching a 
coalition base in the Middle East. Over the past week, adversary aircraft have approached the base 
on five separate occasions. Today, the Su-25 has approached closer to the coalition base than 
previous flights. The aircraft has not responded to coalition radio calls.  
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant] 
Air surveillance radars have detected an adversary’s remotely piloted Shahed 129 attack aircraft 
(RPA) approaching a coalition base in the Middle East. Over the past week, adversary aircraft have 
approached the base on five separate occasions. Today, the Shahed 129 RPA has approached closer 
to the coalition base than previous flights. The aircraft has not responded to coalition radio calls.  
 
What do you believe is the highest level of U.S. response appropriate in this situation? 
a. No action 
b. Intercept with fighter jets 
c. Warning shots 
d. Down the aircraft (using fighter jets or surface-to-air missiles) 
e. Other (Please specify) 
 
Question 2 (Amplified Aggression: Microfoundations) 
 
Please write a sentence or two telling us why you chose this response. 
 
Question 3 (Amplified Aggression: Treatment Check)  
 
What type of military aircraft did the rival employ? 
a. Manned Attack Aircraft 
b. Remotely Piloted Attack Drone 
 
Question 4 (Deterrence Response) 
Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two variants of Question 6. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant] 
In response to a routine U.S. naval patrol through contested waters, a rival state demands the 
immediate removal of U.S. naval forces. The rival also flies several threatening missions near the 




[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant] 
In response to a routine U.S. naval patrol through contested waters, a rival state demands the 
immediate removal of U.S. naval forces. The rival also flies several threatening missions near the 
U.S. ships using remotely piloted attack aircraft (RPAs). The U.S. government is considering 
removing the ships. 
 
How likely are you to support the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region? 
a. Strongly Disapprove 
 b. Disapprove  
 c. Neither Disapprove nor Approve 
 d. Approve 
 e. Strongly Approve 
 
Question 5 (Deterrence Response: Treatment Check)  
 
What type of forces carried out the operation? 
 a. Manned Attack Aircraft 
 b. Remotely Piloted Attack Drone 
 
Question 6 (Initiation)  
Respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of the three variants of Question 11. 
 
[Ground Force Variant, Moderate Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy special operations forces to destroy the rival state’s chemical 
weapons production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. special 
operations forces during the mission. There is a moderate likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant, Moderate Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy manned bomber aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical weapons 
production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. bomber aircraft 
during the mission. There is a moderate likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant, Moderate Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy remotely piloted drone aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical 
weapons production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. drones 
during the mission. There is a moderate likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
Do you think the United States should launch this operation? 
a. Launch Operation 
 b. Do Not Launch Operation 
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Question 7 (Initiation: Microfoundations) 
 
Please write a sentence or two telling us why you disapproved or approved of the plan to handle 
the situation.  
 
8. Please tell us how much you agree with this statement: 
 
“The United States should play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.”  
a. Strongly Disagree 
 b. Disagree  
 c. Neither Disagree nor Agree 
 d. Agree 
 e. Strongly Agree 
 
9. What is your gender? 
 a. Female 
 b. Male 
 
10. What is your age? 
 Free Response 
 
11. What is your race? (Select all that apply) 
 a. White 
 b. Black or African American 
 c. American Indian or Alaska Native 
 e. Hispanic  
 f. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 g. Asian 
 h. Mixed 
 i. Other (Fill In) 
 
12. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 a. Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling) 
 b. High school incomplete (Some high school, but no diploma) 
 c. High school graduate (or GED certificate) 
 d. Some college, no degree 
 e. Associate degree 
 f. Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB) 
 g. Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no postgraduate degree 
 h. Postgraduate or professional degree (e.g., MA, MS, JD, PhD, MD 
 
13. In general, would you describe your political views as: 
 a. Very liberal 
 b. Liberal 
 c. Moderate 
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 d. Conservative 
 e. Very Conservative 
  
14. Are you currently serving, or have you ever served, in the United States military? 
 a. No 
 b. Yes 
 
15. What is your annual household income? 
 a. Less than $10,000 
 b. $10,000-$24,999 
 c. $25,000-$49,999 
 d. $50,000-$74,999 





Main Survey Instrument (Military Sample) 
 
Question 1 (Deterrence) 
 
In the year 2025 a rogue nation test fires its latest nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile. 
The test missile lands in the Indian Ocean approximately 300 miles off the coast of Mumbai. In 
response, the Pentagon orders a show of force mission through international airspace near the 
rogue nation to demonstrate U.S. resolve.  
 
What type of aircraft would you task for this mission? 
a. New remotely piloted bomber with capabilities similar to B-2 
b. Manned B-2 bomber  
 
Question 2 (Deterrence: Microfoundations) 
 
Please write a sentence or two telling us why you chose this aircraft. 
 
Question 3 (Amplified Aggression)  
Respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of the two variants of Question 3. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant] 
Air surveillance radars have detected an adversary’s manned Su-25 attack aircraft approaching a 
coalition base in the Middle East. Over the past week, adversary aircraft have approached the base 
on five separate occasions. Today, the Su-25 has approached closer to the coalition base than 
previous flights. The aircraft has not responded to coalition radio calls.  
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant] 
Air surveillance radars have detected an adversary’s remotely piloted Shahed 129 attack aircraft 
(RPA) approaching a coalition base in the Middle East. Over the past week, adversary aircraft have 
approached the base on five separate occasions. Today, the Shahed 129 RPA has approached closer 
to the coalition base than previous flights. The aircraft has not responded to coalition radio calls.  
 
What do you believe is the highest level of U.S. response appropriate in this situation? 
f. No action 
g. Intercept with fighter jets 
h. Warning shots 
i. Down the aircraft (using fighter jets or surface-to-air missiles) 
j. Other (Please specify) 
 
Question 4 (Amplified Aggression: Microfoundations) 
 




Question 5 (Amplified Aggression: Treatment Check)  
 
What type of military aircraft did the rival employ? 
c. Manned Attack Aircraft 
d. Remotely Piloted Attack UAV 
 
Question 6 (Deterrence Response) 
Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two variants of Question 6. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant] 
In response to a routine U.S. naval patrol through contested waters, a rival state demands the 
immediate removal of U.S. naval forces. The rival also flies several threatening missions near the 
U.S. ships using manned attack aircraft. The U.S. government is considering removing the ships. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant] 
In response to a routine U.S. naval patrol through contested waters, a rival state demands the 
immediate removal of U.S. naval forces. The rival also flies several threatening missions near the 
U.S. ships using remotely piloted attack aircraft (RPAs). The U.S. government is considering 
removing the ships. 
 
How likely are you to support the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region? 
a. Strongly Disapprove 
 b. Disapprove  
 c. Neither Disapprove nor Approve 
 d. Approve 
 e. Strongly Approve 
 
Question 7 (Deterrence Response: Treatment Check)  
 
What type of forces carried out the operation? 
 a. Manned Attack Aircraft 
 b. Remotely Piloted Attack Drone 
 
Question 8 (Restrained Retaliation)  
Respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of the four variants of Question 8. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Killed Variant, Strong Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security and that their air defense forces took appropriate defensive actions. The U-2 was 
on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at the time of the shoot down. The 
U-2 was destroyed and the American pilot was killed. The adversary is a militarily strong regional 
power. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Captured Variant, Strong Adversary]  
 338 
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security and that their air defense forces took appropriate defensive actions. The U-2 was 
on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at the time of the shoot down. The 
U-2 was destroyed and adversary forces are currently holding the American pilot as a prisoner. 
The adversary is a militarily strong regional power. 
 
[Manned Aircraft, Pilot Rescued Variant, Strong Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a manned U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft using a surface-
to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the U-2 was a threat to their 
national security and that their air defense forces took appropriate defensive actions. The U-2 was 
on a routine mission and was operating in international airspace at the time of the shoot down. The 
U-2 was destroyed and U.S. forces rescued the American pilot shortly after the shoot down. The 
adversary is a militarily strong regional power. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant, Strong Adversary] 
A rival country shot down a remotely piloted U.S. Air Force Global Hawk reconnaissance aircraft 
(RPA) using a surface-to-air missile. Leaders of the rival country have publicly claimed that the 
Global Hawk was a threat to their national security and that their air defense forces took 
appropriate defensive actions. The Global Hawk drone was on a routine mission and was operating 
in international airspace at the time of the shoot down. The Global Hawk was destroyed and there 
was no loss of U.S. life because no pilot is onboard the Global Hawk. The adversary is a militarily 
strong regional power. 
 
 
Which of the following U.S. actions would you be most supportive of in response to the shoot 
down? 
f. No action 
g. Formal diplomatic protest  
h. Economic sanctions against the rival country 
i. Show of U.S. military force in vicinity of the rival country  
j. Limited airstrike against the missile site that downed the aircraft 
 
 
Question 9 (Restrained Retaliation: Microfoundations) 
 
Please write a sentence or two telling us why you chose this response.  
 
Question 10 (Restrained Retaliation: Treatment Check)  
 
What happened to the pilot in the scenario? 
 a. Pilot was killed 
 b. Pilot was captured 
 c. Pilot was rescued 
 d. There was no pilot onboard 
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Question 11 (Initiation)  
Respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of the three variants of Question 11. 
 
[Ground Force Variant, Moderate Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy special operations forces to destroy the rival state’s chemical 
weapons production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. special 
operations forces during the mission. There is a moderate likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Manned Aircraft Variant, Moderate Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy manned bomber aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical weapons 
production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. bomber aircraft 
during the mission. There is a moderate likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
[Remotely Piloted Aircraft Variant, Moderate Likelihood of Success] 
Credible intelligence reports indicate that a rival state has started developing chemical weapons. 
The rival state has previously threatened to use chemical weapons against its neighbors. The 
United States plans to deploy remotely piloted drone aircraft to destroy the rival state’s chemical 
weapons production facility. There is a 50-percent chance the adversary will attack the U.S. drones 
during the mission. There is a moderate likelihood the mission will succeed. 
 
You are assigned as a planner in the operations division (J3) of this geographic combatant 
command. The J3 asks whether you would launch this operation.   
a. Launch Operation 
 b. Do Not Launch Operation 
 
Question 12 (Initiation: Microfoundations) 
 
Please write a sentence or two telling us why you disapproved or approved of the plan to handle 
the situation.  
 
Question 13 (Initiation: Treatment Check)  
 
What type of U.S forces will carry out the operation? 
 a. Ground Forces 
 b. Manned Bomber 
 c. Remotely Piloted Drone 
 
Question 14 (Service) 
 
What is your branch of service? 
a. US Army 
b. US Navy 
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c. US Marine Corps 
d. US Air Force 
e. US Coast Guard 
f. Other (free response) 
 
Question 15 (Rank) 
 







g. O-7 and above 
 
Question 16 (Gender) 
 




Question 17 (Aviator) 
 




Question 18 (RPA) 
 









Main Experiment, Public Sample (July 2017) 
 
 
1. Data from 2017 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates 
  Main Experiment Sample National Sample1 
Gender     
Male 45.6% 49.2% 
Female 54.4% 50.8% 
Race     
White alone 78.6% 73.0% 
Black alone 6.9% 12.6% 
American Indian or Alaska 
Native, alone 0.25% 0.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other 
Pacific Islander, alone 0.12% 0.2% 
Asian 6.9% 5.4% 
Hispanic 4.9% 17.6% 
Mixed/Other 2.3%  
Age     
Median Age (Years) 33 37.8 
Education     
High School or Higher 99.4% 87.3% 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher  57.0% 30.9% 
Annual Household Income     
Less than $10,000 5.8% 6.7% 
$10,000-24,999 15.2% 14.9% 
$25,000-49,999 30.3% 22.5% 
$50,000-74,999 23.4% 17.7% 
$75,000+ 25.2% 37.5% 
Military Veteran     
Yes 10.0% 7.7% 
No 90.0% 92.3% 
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Follow-up Experiment, Public Sample (January 2019) 
 
 









  Main Experiment Sample National Sample1 
Gender     
Male 54.45% 49.2% 
Female 45.54% 50.8% 
Race     
White alone 75.58% 73.0% 
Black alone 10.6% 12.6% 
American Indian or Alaska 
Native, alone 1.3% 0.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other 
Pacific Islander, alone 0.33% 0.2% 
Asian 5.28% 5.4% 
Hispanic 5.28% 17.6% 
Mixed/Other 1.65%  
Age     
Median Age (Years) 34 37.8 
Education     
High School or Higher 98.02% 87.3% 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher  54.12% 30.9% 
Annual Household Income     
Less than $10,000 3.96% 6.7% 
$10,000-24,999 14.52% 14.9% 
$25,000-49,999 29.37% 22.5% 
$50,000-74,999 27.06% 17.7% 
$75,000+ 25.08% 37.5% 
Military Veteran     
Yes 16.5% 7.7% 
No 83.5% 92.3% 
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  Experiment Sample 
Gender   
Male 80.5% 
Female 18.2% 
No Response 1.3% 
Service   
Army 2.6% 
Navy 1.3% 
Marine Corps 1.3% 
Air Force 92.2% 
Other 2.6% 
Rank   
Major/Lieutenant Commander 67.5% 
Lieutenant Colonel/Commander 19.5% 
Colonel/Captain 7.8% 
General/Flag Officer 1.3% 
Other (i.e. Civil Servants) 3.9% 
Air Defense Experience/ 
Aviator   
Yes 45.45% 
No 54.54% 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Experience   
Yes 37.66% 
No 62.34% 
Appendix H: Balance Tables and Regression Analysis




Service 3.949 (0.051) 4 (0.182)
Rank 4.359 (0.13) 4.763 (0.176)
Gender 1.846 (0.059) 1.974 (0.199)
Aviator or Air Defense Experience 1.462 (0.081) 1.658 (0.212)
RPA Experience 1.359 (0.078) 1.579 (0.213)
Randomization Check (Assignment to Treatment), Military Sample
Dependent variable:
















Residual Std. Error 0.507 (df = 71)
F Statistic 0.764 (df = 5; 71)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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RPA Intruder (Intercept) 3.205⇤⇤⇤ 4.032⇤⇤⇤
(0.150) (0.772)














Adjusted R2 0.170 0.160
Residual Std. Error 0.939 (df = 76) 0.948 (df = 70)
F Statistic 16.805⇤⇤⇤ (df = 1; 76) 3.406⇤⇤⇤ (df = 6; 70)




Interventionism 3.212 (0.093) 3.059 (0.092)
Gender 1.51 (0.041) 1.579 (0.04)
Age 36.887 (0.978) 36.796 (0.98)
Race 1.642 (0.123) 1.724 (0.127)
Education 5.464 (0.123) 5.368 (0.117)
Political Ideology 2.636 (0.085) 2.75 (0.085)
Veteran 1.126 (0.027) 1.204 (0.033)
Income 3.662 (0.094) 3.434 (0.089)
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Randomization Check (Assignment to Treatment), Civilian Sample
Dependent variable:






















Residual Std. Error 0.499 (df = 294)
F Statistic 1.275 (df = 8; 294)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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RPA Intruder (Intercept) 2.980⇤⇤⇤ 2.578⇤⇤⇤
(0.076) (0.405)




















Adjusted R2 0.055 0.075
Residual Std. Error 0.938 (df = 301) 0.928 (df = 293)
F Statistic 18.525⇤⇤⇤ (df = 1; 301) 3.710⇤⇤⇤ (df = 9; 293)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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2 Survey Experiment: Response to Shoot down (Restrained Retaliation)
2.1 Military Sample
Balance Table
Manned, Pilot Killed Manned, Pilot Captured Manned, Pilot Rescued RPA
Service 4.25 (0.244) 3.895 (0.105) 3.789 (0.164) 3.947 (0.195)
Rank 4.85 (0.319) 4.316 (0.134) 4.421 (0.159) 4.632 (0.205)
Gender 2.15 (0.363) 1.842 (0.086) 1.895 (0.072) 1.737 (0.104)
AviatiorAirDefense 1.85 (0.383) 1.579 (0.116) 1.368 (0.114) 1.421 (0.116)
RPAExpertise 1.75 (0.387) 1.263 (0.104) 1.421 (0.116) 1.421 (0.116)
Randomization Check (Assignment to Treatment), Military Sample
Dependent variable:
















Residual Std. Error 1.148 (df = 71)
F Statistic 0.555 (df = 5; 71)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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RPA (Intercept) 3.105⇤⇤⇤ 2.685⇤⇤⇤
(0.263) (0.980)
Manned, Pilot Killed 1.133⇤⇤⇤ 1.038⇤⇤⇤
(0.363) (0.376)
Manned, Pilot Captured 0.632⇤ 0.608
(0.372) (0.387)














Adjusted R2 0.081 0.064
Residual Std. Error 1.147 (df = 74) 1.156 (df = 68)
F Statistic 3.249⇤⇤ (df = 3; 74) 1.646 (df = 8; 68)




Pilot Killed, Weak Rival Pilot Killed, Strong Rival Pilot Captured, Weak Rival Pilot Captured, Strong Rival Pilot Rescued, Weak Rival Pilot Rescued, Strong Rival Drone, Weak Rival Drone, Strong Rival
Interventionism 3.13 (0.072) 3.158 (0.079) 3.099 (0.075) 3.16 (0.071) 3.114 (0.07) 3.059 (0.074) 2.97 (0.079) 3.039 (0.075)
Gender 1.53 (0.035) 1.546 (0.036) 1.547 (0.035) 1.56 (0.035) 1.517 (0.035) 1.626 (0.034) 1.522 (0.035) 1.502 (0.035)
Age 35.915 (0.772) 35.832 (0.85) 36.325 (0.788) 35.535 (0.746) 34.488 (0.786) 35.355 (0.84) 36.842 (0.86) 34.877 (0.772)
Race 1.795 (0.12) 1.821 (0.13) 1.724 (0.111) 1.635 (0.11) 1.637 (0.107) 1.788 (0.122) 1.67 (0.107) 1.645 (0.108)
Education 5.48 (0.106) 5.49 (0.105) 5.478 (0.101) 5.505 (0.104) 5.343 (0.11) 5.379 (0.104) 5.424 (0.104) 5.527 (0.106)
Political Ideology 2.54 (0.077) 2.699 (0.078) 2.601 (0.076) 2.715 (0.078) 2.657 (0.075) 2.749 (0.077) 2.685 (0.077) 2.67 (0.077)
Veteran 1.11 (0.022) 1.102 (0.022) 1.089 (0.02) 1.135 (0.024) 1.09 (0.02) 1.103 (0.021) 1.094 (0.02) 1.079 (0.019)
Income 3.42 (0.088) 3.383 (0.091) 3.517 (0.081) 3.5 (0.088) 3.438 (0.075) 3.502 (0.085) 3.502 (0.085) 3.488 (0.079)
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Residual Std. Error 2.291 (df = 1600)
F Statistic 1.050 (df = 8; 1600)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Drone, Strong Rival (Constant) 2.498⇤⇤⇤ 1.053⇤⇤⇤
(0.079) (0.203)
Drone, Weak Rival 0.138 0.145
(0.111) (0.108)
Pilot Killed, Weak Rival 1.002⇤⇤⇤ 1.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.112) (0.109)
Pilot Killed, Strong Rival 0.982⇤⇤⇤ 0.953⇤⇤⇤
(0.112) (0.109)
Pilot Captured, Weak Rival 1.020⇤⇤⇤ 1.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.111) (0.108)
Pilot Captured, Strong Rival 0.862⇤⇤⇤ 0.824⇤⇤⇤
(0.112) (0.109)
Pilot Rescued, Weak Rival 0.771⇤⇤⇤ 0.766⇤⇤⇤
(0.112) (0.109)














Adjusted R2 0.096 0.144
Residual Std. Error 1.123 (df = 1601) 1.092 (df = 1596)
F Statistic 25.375⇤⇤⇤ (df = 7; 1601) 23.597⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 1596)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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3 Survey Experiment: Initial Deployment (Increased Initiation)
3.1 Experiment 1: Military Sample
Balance Table
Ground forces Manned bomber RPA
Service 4.208 (0.204) 3.808 (0.136) 3.926 (0.14)
Rank 4.708 (0.267) 4.385 (0.137) 4.593 (0.162)
Gender 2.042 (0.309) 1.885 (0.064) 1.815 (0.076)
Aviator or Air Defense Experience 1.625 (0.327) 1.5 (0.1) 1.556 (0.097)
RPA Experience 1.583 (0.328) 1.462 (0.1) 1.37 (0.095)


















Residual Std. Error 0.829 (df = 71)
F Statistic 0.602 (df = 5; 71)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Support for Onset by Treatment (Onset Type), Military Sample
Dependent variable:
Onset Approval (Yes = 1, No = 2)
(1) (2)
Ground Forces (Intercept) 1.920⇤⇤⇤ 2.337⇤⇤⇤
(0.085) (0.371)
















Adjusted R2 0.205 0.211
Residual Std. Error 0.427 (df = 75) 0.427 (df = 69)
F Statistic 10.912⇤⇤⇤ (df = 2; 75) 3.906⇤⇤⇤ (df = 7; 69)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
3.2 Experiment 1: Civilian Sample
Balance Table
Ground forces Manned bomber RPA
Interventionism 3.373 (0.106) 3.125 (0.113) 2.914 (0.116)
Gender 1.559 (0.049) 1.594 (0.05) 1.486 (0.049)
Age 38.667 (1.334) 35.906 (1.056) 35.924 (1.16)
Race 1.667 (0.148) 1.719 (0.172) 1.667 (0.14)
Education 5.647 (0.149) 5.26 (0.138) 5.333 (0.15)
Political Ideology 2.667 (0.106) 2.792 (0.101) 2.629 (0.105)
Veteran 1.206 (0.04) 1.156 (0.037) 1.133 (0.033)
Income 3.618 (0.115) 3.573 (0.114) 3.457 (0.109)
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Residual Std. Error 0.818 (df = 294)
F Statistic 1.914⇤ (df = 8; 294)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Support for Onset by Treatment (Onset Type), Civilian Sample
Dependent variable:
Onset Approval (Yes = 1, No = 2)
(1) (2)
Ground Forces (Intercept) 1.392⇤⇤⇤ 1.868⇤⇤⇤
(0.049) (0.220)






















Adjusted R2 -0.002 0.071
Residual Std. Error 0.497 (df = 300) 0.478 (df = 292)
F Statistic 0.764 (df = 2; 300) 3.297⇤⇤⇤ (df = 10; 292)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Effect of Treatment (Onset Type) on Interventionist Attitude, Civilian Sample
Dependent variable:
Interventionism_Civ









Residual Std. Error 1.123 (df = 300)
F Statistic 4.311⇤⇤ (df = 2; 300)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
3.3 Experiment 2: Civilian Sample
Balance Check: Assignment to Onset Treatment Conditions (Experiment 2, Civilian Sample)
Dependent variable:
Ground_.LowLike Ground_HighLike Manned_LowLike Manned_HighLike RPA_LowLike RPA_HighLike
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.0005  0.0004  0.0004 0.001  0.0005 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender 0.026  0.014 0.007 0.003 0.010  0.032⇤
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Education  0.0002 0.001 0.006  0.016⇤⇤ 0.003 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income  0.006  0.013  0.007 0.005 0.019⇤⇤ 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Ideology  0.005  0.010 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Veteran 0.025  0.014 0.018  0.042 0.038  0.026
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Race  0.006 0.008  0.007 0.003 0.001 0.0003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.131⇤ 0.272⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤ 0.252⇤⇤⇤ 0.034 0.188⇤⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
Observations 1,609 1,609 1,609 1,609 1,609 1,609
R2 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.003
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001
Residual Std. Error (df = 1601) 0.376 0.373 0.369 0.371 0.373 0.375
F Statistic (df = 7; 1601) 0.705 1.185 0.645 1.207 1.293 0.764
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Initiation Models (OLS with Covariates and Select Interaction Effects, Experiment 2)
Dependent variable:
Approval_Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ground LowLike (Intercept) 2.241⇤⇤⇤ 0.838⇤⇤⇤ 1.959⇤⇤⇤ 1.704⇤⇤⇤
(0.066) (0.196) (0.171) (0.194)
Ground_HighLike 1.046⇤⇤⇤ 1.019⇤⇤⇤ 1.079⇤⇤⇤ 0.267
(0.094) (0.089) (0.241) (0.281)
Manned_LowLike 0.204⇤⇤ 0.170⇤  0.007  0.038
(0.095) (0.090) (0.249) (0.277)
Manned_HighLike 1.285⇤⇤⇤ 1.278⇤⇤⇤ 1.208⇤⇤⇤ 0.750⇤⇤⇤
(0.094) (0.089) (0.245) (0.269)
RPA_LowLike 0.633⇤⇤⇤ 0.622⇤⇤⇤ 0.438⇤ 0.242
(0.094) (0.089) (0.245) (0.274)
RPA_HighLike 1.671⇤⇤⇤ 1.643⇤⇤⇤ 1.648⇤⇤⇤ 0.894⇤⇤⇤



































Observations 1,609 1,609 1,609 1,609
R2 0.226 0.312 0.241 0.304
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.306 0.235 0.299
Residual Std. Error 1.095 (df = 1603) 1.035 (df = 1596) 1.086 (df = 1597) 1.040 (df = 1597)
F Statistic 93.444⇤⇤⇤ (df = 5; 1603) 60.183⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 1596) 45.975⇤⇤⇤ (df = 11; 1597) 63.428⇤⇤⇤ (df = 11; 1597)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Effect of Treatment on Interventionist Attitudes (Experiment 2)
Dependent variable:
Interventionist Attitude















Residual Std. Error 1.056 (df = 1603)
F Statistic 0.644 (df = 5; 1603)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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